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In the fundamental sense with which we are here concerned, re-
spect is defined as an interrelation among individual human beings
in which they reciprocally recognize and honor each others' freedom
of choice about participation in the value processes of the world
community or any of its component parts.' Respect includes not
only the perspectives or perceptions of worth by which the individ-
ual is characterized by himself and others, but also the translation
of these perspectives into the operative facts of social process.2 The
1. The concepts of freedom and coercion with which we work are: By freedom
we mean situations in which persons have many options, with high probabilities
of gain and low probabilities of loss. By coercion we mean situations in which
participants have few options, with low probabilities of gain and high probabilities
of loss. For comparable statements, see Deutsch, Strategies of Freedom: The Wid-
ening of Choices and the Change of Goals, in LIBERTY 301 (NOMOS IV, C. Friedrich
ed. 1962):
[W]e may then define freedom as the range of effective choices open to an
actor, such as an individual or a group of persons. The choices of action or
policy open to a group eventually can be translated by virtue of their conse-
quences into indirect choices for individuals.
Defined as the effective range of choices for an actor, freedom has at least
four major aspects or preconditions:
1. The absence of restraint, emphasized by such classical theorists as John
Locke and Adam Smith.
2. The presence of opportunity, stressed by more recent theorists of social
reform, such as T.H. Green, Karl Marx, George Bernard Shaw, and Sidney
Webb.
3. The capacity to act, stressed by Hegel and by more recent writers on
power such as Benito Mussolini.
4. The awareness of the reality without-including both unrestrainedness
and opportunity-and of the actor's own capacity. This awareness has been
stressed by Greek philosophers from Heraclitus to Socrates, and by modem
depth psychologists, such as the school of Sigmund Freud.
Id. at 301-02.
Oppenheim sums up freedom of choice in these words:
Whereas social freedom refers to two actors and their respective actions,
freedom of choice signifies a relationship between one actor and a series of
alternative potential actions.
Oppenheim, Freedom, 5 INT'L ENCYC. SocIAL Sci. 554, 556 (1968).
2. For specification of the detailed content of the values with which we work see
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relevant perspectives and operations extend to all the different val-
ues sought in social process and to the many distinctive institutional
facilitations and deprivations by which freedom of choice is af-
fected.
In more precise specification, respect may be said to entail four
particular outcomes:
1) a fundamental freedom of choice for all individuals regarding
participation in all value processes;
2) an equality of opportunity for all individuals to have experi-
ences that enable them to enjoy the widest range of effective choice
in their interactions with others and to participate in all value pro-
cesses in accordance with capability, that is, without discrimination
for reasons irrelevant to capability;
3) additional rewards in deference to individuals who make
preeminent contribution to common interests; and
4) an aggregate pattern of social interactions in which all indi-
viduals are protected in the utmost freedom of choice and subjected
to the least possible governmental and private coercion.
It requires no detailed documentation to show that the various
communities of mankind have seldom approximated, and often
have not even aspired to, the full achievement of respect in terms
of these four specified outcomes. Despite the increasing rhetorical
acceptance in modem times of human dignity as the overriding goal
for all communities, contemporary world social process continues
to exhibit immense disparities between aspiration and achievement
in relation to each outcome. The common assumption that slavery
is a thing-of the past is belied by the facts; slavery and slave-like
practices are still pervasive in some parts of the world.3 In other
communities caste systems persist (with remnants of "untouchabil-
ity" and rigidified discrimination); members of lower castes are
denied access to ordinary avenues of mobility and advancement.4
Apartheid, as imposed in South Africa and Namibia, has become a
new form of caste and segregation in which the position and free-
doms of individual human beings are stratified and frozen at birth
H. LASSWELL & A. KAPLAN, POWER AND SOCIETY (1950); Lasswell & Holmberg,
Toward a General Theory of Directed Value Accumulation and Institutional
Development, in COMPARATIVE THEORIES OF SOCIAL CHANGE 12 (H. Peter ed. 1966).
Cf. H. LASSWELL, POLITICS: WHO GETS WHAT, WHEN, How (1958); H. LASSWELL,
WORLD POLITICS AND PERSONAL INSECURITY (1965); POLITICS, PERSONALITY, AND SO-
CIAL SCIENCE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (A. Rogow ed. 1969).
3. See notes 124-30 & accompanying text infra.
4. See notes 371-74 & accompanying text infra.
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on the basis of race.5 Even where hardcore deprivations in the form
of slavery and caste have decreased or disappeared, there often per-
sists a steady denial of equality on various grounds such as race, sex,
religion, culture, political opinion, and alienage.6 The formal myth
of a community may emphasize equality, yet actual conditions of
deprivation and disparity may be such as to deny individuals effec-
tive choice and to render the aspiration toward equality a mockery.
Aside from the ongoing "class struggles" in all mankind's differing
communities, the tension generated and exacerbated by racial pre-
judice and discrimination, in its various manifestations, has tran-
scended national boundaries and become a matter of intense univer-
sal concern.7
Too often the deliberate bestowal of honor upon individuals is
abused and misused. Honor is frequently conferred upon individuals
on grounds having nothing to do with actual contribution to com-
mon interests. In some communities honor is still ascriptive ("he-
reditary"), and in others it has become simply an instrument ma-
nipulated arbitrarily by power elites for special interests.
The achievement of a comprehensive civic order, in which the
aggregate pattern of social interaction accords even a minimum
freedom of choice, is still far from reality. In an interdependent
world, where high expectations of violence prevail and a universaliz-
ing science and technology have enormous impact, both construc-
tive and destructive, the accelerating trend toward totalitarianism,
regimentation, governmentalization, centralization, and concentra-
tion' culminates in many places in patterns of social interaction in
which individuals are denied even a basic minimum of choice and
5. See notes 439-650 & accompanying text infra.
6. See notes 651-79 & accompanying text infra.
7. See notes 34-337 & accompanying text infra.
8. See generally H. LASSWELL, NATIONAL SECURITY AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM
(1950); Lasswell, The Garrison-State Hypothesis Today, in CHANGING PATTERNS OF
MILITARY POLITICS 51 (S. Huntington ed. 1962); Lasswell, The Major Trends in
World Politics, in THE ETHIc OF POWER: THE INTERPLAY OF RELIGION, PHILOSOPHY,
AND POLITIcs 343 (H. Lasswell & H. Cleveland eds. 1962); Lasswell, The World
Revolutionary Situation, in TOTALITARIANISM 360 (C. Friedrich ed. 1954); Lasswell,
The World Revolution of Our Time: A Framework for Basic Policy Research, in
WORLD REVOLUTIONARY ELITES 29 (H. Lasswell & D. Lerner eds. 1965); Lasswell,
Does the Garrison State Threaten Civil Rights?, 275 ANNALS 111 (1951); Lasswell,
The Garrison State, 46 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 455 (1941), reprinted in H. LASSWELL, THE
ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL BEHAVIOR 146 (1948); Lasswell, The Interrelations of World
Organization and Society, 55 YALE L.J. 889 (1946). Cf. Reisman, Private Armies
in a Global War System, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 252 (J.
Moore ed. 1974).
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governmental encroachment into private domains expands extrava-
gantly.
The protection of respect in any community, from the most inclu-
sive to the smallest, is of course a function of the production and
distribution of all other values. A value process of particular signifi-
cance for the protection of respect is, however, that of enlighten-
ment: many of the failures and difficulties in the protection and
fulfillment of respect are monuments to sheer intellectual failure.
These more particular failures include failure to identify and recog-
nize respect as a distinct value, and failure to clarify the basic
content ascribed to respect nd to specify the procedures by which
such content can be related to specific outcomes. Too often scholars
and statesmen indulge in derivational exercises rather than in for-
mulating procedures to facilitate empirical specification of decision
in specific instances Similarly, respect is frequently defined in a
negative sense only, with a focus upon the one particular outcome
of non-discrimination, rather than in a positive formulation which
might foster effective equality and a rich fulfillment of human
rights.'" Even non-discrimination is sometimes viewed so techni-
cally and narrowly, as in the European Convention on Human
Rights," that it relates only to preexisting legal rights with a trunca-
tion of freedoms regarding many values.'2
9. A recent example of high indulgence in derivational exercises, without care-
ful location in social process context, is J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JusTIcE (1971)
[hereinafter cited as J. RAWLS].
10. See, e.g., E. VIERDAG, THE CONCEPT OF DISCRIMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1973).
11. Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, adopted Nov. 4,
1950, 1950 Europ. T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter cited as European-
Convention].
12. Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides:
The enjoyment of rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall
be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, asso-
ciation with a national minority, property, birth or other status.
Id. art. 14, 213 U.N.T.S. at 232 (emphasis added).
As shown by the practice of the European Commission on Human Rights, this
provision is "auxiliary to" "the rights and freedoms set out" in the Convention,
and does not establish "a right to non-discrimination independent of them"; hence,
"there can be a breach of Article 14 only if there is a breach of such a provision of
the Convention, which is also discriminatory." J. FAwcErr, THE APPLICATION OF THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTs 233-34 (1969). In the same vein, Vallat
has observed:
There is a widespread tendency to regard the principle of non-discrimination
as elementary, basic, self-evident and universally binding, but a moment's
19751
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The most important failure, however, has been that of not recog-
nizing the fundamental importance of respect, when appraised
among all values in human motivation.13 Among the most profound
and intensely held demands of human beings in orienting them-
selves toward the world today is that for respect in the sense of the
four outcomes specified above. It is this insistence upon basic re-
spect that conditions people's identifications, demands, and expec-
tations in all other value processes. It is denial of respect which most
importantly conditions their willingness to engage in terror and viol-
ence to destroy established institutions and practices, and their
rejection of peaceful intercourse in the shaping and sharing of
wealth, power, and other values. When respect is not protected,
other values cannot be securely and abundantly shaped and shared
in society. 4
The most economic route of escape from these inherited intellec-
tual confusions is to be quite explicit, as we have sought to be above,
about what is meant by respect in terms of social process outcomes
and to relate these outcomes to other value processes in the larger
community context of which they are a part.'5 Any rational recom-
mendation of ways to reconstruct the process of authoritative deci-
sion the better to protect and foster respect must build upon a
careful specification of the different kinds of claims that individu-
als, in their multifarious capacities, make upon constitutive process
for the protection and fulfillment of respect."
reflection raises serious questions as to the legal nature of the principle or the
existence of a general right to be treated without discrimination.
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF Hur RIGHTS X (F. Vallat ed. 1972).
13. Cf. Shils, Reflections on Deference, in POLITICS, PERSONALITY, AND SOCIAL
SCIENCE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 297 (A. Rogow ed. 1969).
14. For the development of this theme see McDougal & Bebr, Human Rights in
the United Nations, 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 603 (1964); McDougal & Leighton, The
Rights of Man in the World Community: Constitutional Illusions Versus Rational
Action, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 490 (1949). See also R. SENNETT & J. COBB, THE
HIDDEN INJURIES OF CLASS (Vintage ed. 1973).
15. Recognition of the need for location in social process is long standing. In the
words of Harold Laski:
[The idea of liberty depends upon the results of the social process at any
given time; and it is against that background that its essential elements
require analysis.
Laski, Liberty, 9 ENCYC. SOCIAL SCI. 442, 444 (1933).
16. For the development of the concept of the world constitutive process of
authoritative decision see McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, The World Constitutive
Process of Authoritative Decision, 19 J. LEGAL ED. 253, 403 (1967). See also Lasswell
& McDougal, Trends in Theories About Law: Comprehensiveness in Conceptions
[Vol. 24:919
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The categorization of claims with which we propose to work is as
follows:
A. Claims relating to Outcomes
1. Claims for a basic degree of respect as individual human
beings
(a) Fundamental freedom of choice in value participation
(b) Elimination of slavery
(c) Elimination of caste
(d) Elimination of apartheid
2. Claims relating to a basic equality of opportunity in the
enjoyment of all values, that is, freedom from discrimination
for reasons irrelevant to capability, in terms of:
(a) Race (color; national, ethnic or social origin; birth,
descent or other status)
(b) Sex
(c) Religion
(d) Political or other opinion
(e) Language
(f) Alienage
(g) Age
(h) Other factors
3. Claims for further rewards in respect for meritorious contri-
bution
(a) Recognition
(b) Honor
(c) Reputation
4. Claims relating to the aggregate interest in respect
(a) Comprehensive public order
(b) Civic order (including privacy)
B. Claims relating to Participation
1. Claims in relation to participation in the shaping of respect
(a) Governmental deprivations
(i) in conformity with law
(ii) not in conformity with law
(b) Non-governmental deprivations
2. Claims in relation to participation in the sharing of respect
(a) Individuals
(b) Groups (minority protection)
1975]
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C. Claims relating to Perspectives
1. Claims relating to permissibility or impermissibility of pur-
poses
(a) Range of values included within impermissible pur-
poses
(b) Relevance of grounds alleged for deprivations to com-
mon interests
(c) Discriminatory purpose per se constituting deprivation
2. Claims to be free to acquire a demand for respect-the op-
portunity to have experiences that will facilitate capabilities
(claims to freedom from indoctrination)
(a) Opportunity to discover latent capabilities for partici-
pation
(b) Opportunity to acquire capabilities
(c) Opportunity to exercise capabilities
3. Claims for freedom to establish and change identification
4. Claims for opportunity to achieve realism in expectations
D. Claims relating to Situations-freedom of access to all social
interactions in which respect is shaped and shared
1. Claims relating to institutions specialized to respect
(a) Freedom to initiate and constitute institutions special-
ized to respect
(b) Freedom of access to institutions specialized to respect
(c) Prohibition of organizations or institutions inimical to
respect (e.g., racist organizations)
2. Claims relating to institutions not specialized to respect
(equality in association)-freedom of access to institutions
not specialized to respect (access to public accommoda-
tions, etc.)
3. Claims relating to geographic separation
4. Claims relating to crisis
(a) Impact of crises upon differentiation
(b) According respect proportionately despite crises
E. Claims relating to Base Values
1. Claims relating to authority-that the process of authorita-
[Vol. 24:919
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tive decision is available to defend and fulfill respect
(ay Equality of access to authority (invocation)
(b) Impartiality in the application of law (application)
(c) Equality in law or legal interests (prescription)
2. Claims relating to control
(a) Availability of participation in each of the other value
processes to defend and fulfill respect
(b) Impartial allocation of participation in value processes1 7
3. Claims for special assistance to overcome handicaps not at-
tributable to merit ("compensatory differentiation")
F. Claims relating to Strategies
1. -Employment of the diplomatic instrument for affecting re-
spect: enforcing agreements, prohibiting discriminatory
agreements, minimizing deprivations, protecting reputation,
etc.
2. Claims relating to the use of the ideological instrument for
affecting respect
(a) Prohibition of race-mongering
(b) Education for the enjoyment of equality
3. Claims relating to the management of goods and services for
affecting respect
(a) Prohibition of slavery, forced labor, imprisonment for
debt, etc.
(b) Employment of monetary rewards
4. Claims relating to the use of the military instrument for
affecting respect
(a) Terrorist activities
(b) Use of the military instrument for the protection of
groups (martial law, etc.)
II. THE CLARIFICATION OF GENERAL COMMUNITY POLICIES
The commitment we make, and recommend to others, to the
particular interactions we have described as respect outcomes is not
dependent upon any particular mode of logical or philosophical de-
rivation. For many centuries scholars have debated about the ap-
propriate high level principles and sources of authority from which
1975]
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outcomes comparable to those we have specified may be derived.' 8
From our perspectives the method, style, and purport of deriva-
tional exercises are matters of personal choice. The more urgent
questions relate to the more detailed specification of preferred out-
comes in terms of empirical relations between human beings, and
to how people with different modalities of derivation may cooperate
in the achievement of postulated outcomes.
It may be emphasized that the most general commitment we
recommend in pursuit of shared respect is broader than one of mere
non-discrimination. The core reference we make is to freedom of
choice, the same core reference that has characterized most histori-
cal concepts of human dignity." Even non-discrimination we seek
to define in positive terms as opportunities to discover, develop, and
exercise full capabilities for constructive participation in all value
processes. The rewards in honor of actual contributions to aggregate
common interests that we recommend are designed to be integra-
tive, and not incompatible, in the sense that they need not result
in reducing access to values by other community members. The
aggregate patterns of interaction that we specify as civic order are,
further, designed to include not merely the maximum fundamental
of Constitutive Process, 41 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1972) ; McDougal, Lasswell &
Reisman, Theories About International Law: Prologue to a Configurative
Jurisprudence, 8 VA. J. INT'L L. 188 (1968).
17. In this article we deal only with problems through this particular Claim. For
continuing discussion of the general norm of non-discrimination, see McDougal,
Lasswell, & Chen, Human Rights for Women and World Public Order: The Out-
lawing of Sex-Based Discrimination, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 497 (1975). The remaining
claims about the respect process will be discussed in other fora.
18. J. RAWLS, note 9 supra, offers some history of this debate. For a summary of
Rawls' theories and an indication of the difficulties of applying these theories in
specific instances see Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One
View of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 962 (1973). For further exposi-
tion see R. NozICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 183-231, 344-48 (1974); Hamp-
shire, A New Philosophy for the Just Society, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 24, 1972, at
34; Nagel, Rawls on Justice, 82 PHILOSOPHICAL REv. 220 (1973).
For other surveys see 1 & 2 M. ADLER, THE IDEA OF FREEDOM (1958-61); ASPECTS
OF LIBERTY (M. Konvitz & C. Rossiter eds. 1958); C. BAY, THE STRUCTURE OF
FREEDOM (1958); I. BERLIN, FouR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY (1969); M. CRANSTON,
FREEDOM: A NEW ANALYSIS (2d ed. 1954); FREEDOM: ITS MEANING (R. Anshen ed.
1940); F. HAYEK, THE CONsTrrrUTON OF LIBERTY (1960); LIBERTY (NOMOS IV, C.
Friedrich ed. 1962); H. MULLER, FREEDOM IN THE MODERN WORLD (1966); R. NE-
VILLE, THE COSMOLOGY OF FREEDOM (1974); F. OPPENHEIM, DIMENSIONS OF FREEDOM
(1961); P. WEIS, MAN'S FREEDOM (1950).
19. For an excellent brief statement on freedom of choice see C. MERRIAM, SYS-
TEMATC PoLmcs 54-64 (1945) . See also the citations in note 18 supra.
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freedom and the largest effective opportunity for the maturing of
individual capability along with rational distribution of rewards for
unique contributions, but also a reserved domain in which all indi-
viduals are protected in the utmost private autonomy in uncoerced
choices about the value processes in which they participate and the
modalities by which they participate.
Our concern extends, as noted, beyond how respect is shared to
how it is shaped in the aggregate. What is known as "distributive
justice," or sharing, is of course important .2 No less important,
however, is a coordinate policy of fostering a continuing develop-
ment toward shaping the most ample aggregate outcomes of respect,
as of other values, so that what is ultimately available to individuals
is optimized.
It is, we assume, inescapable that in relation to respect, as to
other values, community policies are projected and clarified in sets
of complementary policies. 2' Most inherited prescriptions explicitly
recognize the continuing necessity for the accommodation in partic-
ular instances of any one person's freedoms with the comparable
freedoms of others and with aggregate common interests. 22 An effec-
tive method for seeking such accommodation, as has been elabo-
rated and applied elsewhere, is a contextual method that employs
adequate principles of content and procedure. 23 The proper employ-
20. The principal concern of J. RAWLS, note 9 supra, is for "distributive justice."
The values available for distribution to community members, including "the least
advantaged," are of course dependent upon total production.
For varying views see E. CAHN, THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE (1964 ed.); JUSTICE
(NOMOS VI, C. Friedrich & J. Chapman eds. 1963); C. MERRIAM , SYSTEMATIC
POLITICS 45-54 (1945); R. POUND, JUSTICE ACCORDING TO LAW (1951); R. STAMMLER,
THE THEORY OF JUSTICE (1925); G. DEL VECCHIO, JUSTICE: AN HISTORICAL AND PHILO-
SOPHICAL ESSAY (A. Campbell ed. 1952).
21. See McDougal, The Ethics of Applying Systems of Authority: The Balanced
Opposites of a Legal System, in THE ETHIC OF POWER: THE INTERPLAY OF RELIGION,
PHILOSOPHY, AND POLITICS 221 (H. Lasswell & H. Cleveland eds. 1962).
22. See McDougal, Human Rights and World Public Order: Principles of Con-
tent and Procedure for Clarifying General Community Policies, 14 VA. J. INT'L L.
387 (1974); McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, Human Rights and World Public Order:
A Framework for Policy-Oriented Inquiry, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 237, 264-69 (1969).
The necessity for accommodation was underscored by Laski in these words:
So long as it was conceived as a body of absolute rights inherent in the
individual and entitled to be exerted without regard to their social conse-
quences, liberty was divorced from the ideas of both equality and justice. The
individual became the antithesis of the state; and liberty itself became, as
with Herbert Spencer, a principle of anarchy rather than a body of claims to
be read in the context of the social process.
Laski, Liberty, 9 ENCYC. SocIAL SCI. 442, 443 (1933).
23. J. RAWLS, note 9 supra, appears to reject the notion of a comprehensive
19751
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ment of this method will, it is predicted, reveal that respect out-
comes are often not competitive, and can be attained in many situa-
tions by genuinely integrating the interests of all.
The commitment we recommend in relation to fundamental free-
dom is that of community aspiration toward the widest possible
range of choice for all individuals in regard to all value processes.'4
This aspiration is sometimes specified in terms of a basic minimum
of freedom or liberty,2H but the word "minimum" has unfortunate
connotations: what we recommend is concern for continuing devel-
opment toward an optimum shaping and sharing of values in which
the participation of each individual will be as ample as possible. We
recognize of course, among the necessary constraints upon this aspi-
ration, that the fundamental freedoms protected for any particular
individual in any particular instance must perforce be measured
against the comparable freedoms of others and the aggregate com-
mon interest.
The means by which the measure of this fundamental freedom,
or of a basic minimum, can be established, is sometimes debated.2 1
This would appear, if what is sought is further high-level abstract
content statements, a relatively futile quest.Y What is needed is the
specification of procedures for relating the already abundant high-
accommodation of values, or integration of interests, in context and to search
instead for transcendant principles of justice. He does not, however, make clear by
what criteria and procedures he would in particular instances calculate costs and
benefits in determining "equality" among community members or in relating "the
least advantaged" to other community members. Lasswell, The Public Interest:
Proposing Principles of Content and Procedure, in THE PUBLIC INTEREST 54
(NOMOS V, C. Friedrich ed. 1962); Lasswell, Clarifying Value Judgment: Princi-
ples of Content and Procedure, 1 INQumY 87 (1958); McDouAL, Human Rights and
World Public Order: Principles of Content and Procedure for Clarifying General
Community Policies, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 387, 402-06 (1974).
24. See H. LASSWELL & A. KAPLAN, Power and Society (1950); Lasswell & Holm-
berg, Toward a General Theory of Directed Value Accumulation and Institutional
Development, in COMPARATIVE THEORIES OF SOCIAL CHANGE 12 (H. Peter. ed. 1966);
McDougal, Perspectives for an International Law of Human Dignity, 1959
PROCEEDINGS, AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 107; McDougal & Lasswell, The Identification and
Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1959). For a
comparable emphasis see Brewster, So the Poor Little Lambs Won't Lose Their
Way, N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1974, at 45, col. 1.
25. See, e.g., J. RAwLS, supra note 9, at 265, 274-87.
26. See J. RAWLS, supra note 9, at 258-332.
27. The "original position" postulated by J. RAwLS, note 9 supra, as a basis for
his derivations would appear merely an intellectual device designed to minimize
the biases and interests of an observer. It may aid objectivity, but it scarcely affords
access to transcendant truth.
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level statements to the options open in any particular instance of
decision. The freedoms that can be secured for any particular indi-
vidual in any specific instance are a function of the values at stake
and of many concomitant variables in an ongoing community pro-
cess. What can be protected will vary from value to value, from
problem to problem even in the same value process, and from con-
text to context. The relevant intellectual quest is for principles of
procedure that will facilitate review and assessment of all the perti-
nent variables.2
The traditional philosophical justification for protecting funda-
mental freedom of choice has been in terms of common humanity,
of protecting man as man.29 The basic thrust of the position is that
every individual should be treated as an end in himself, not as an
instrument for others.3" It may be conceded that the image that man
has developed of himself as being different from animals and other
forms of life has had important and beneficent historical impacts
upon the acceptance and cultivation of all the values we cherish as
those of human dignity.3 More contemporary justifications toward
the same ends may, however, be grounded in the findings of modem
psychology which stress the overriding importance to the individual,
and to community process, of affording to every individual oppor-
tunities for the participations necessary to the development of a
constructive "self," capable of respecting the self and others and
therefore of sharing freedom in choice.2
It is apparent that all the comprehensive and systematic depriva-
28. See notes 22-23 supra.
29. As Bernard Williams puts it:
The factual statement of men's equality was seen, when pressed, to retreat
in the direction of merely asserting the .equality of men as men; and this was
thought to be trivial. It is certainly insufficient, but not, after all, trivial.
That all men are human is, if a tautology, a useful one, serving as a reminder
that those who belong anatomically to the species homo sapiens, and can
speak a language, use tools, live in societies, can interbreed despite racial
differences, etc., are also alike in certain other respects more likely to be
forgotten.
Williams, The Idea of Equality, in PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND SOcmTY 110, 112 (P.
Laslett & W. Runciman eds. 1962).
30. For an excellent testimony to this cosmopolitan perspective, as recorded in
various cultures of human history, see UNESCO, BmITHRGr OF MAN (1969).
31. See id.
32. See THE SELF IN SOCIAL INTERACTION (C. Gordon & K. Gergen eds. 1968); H.
SULLIVAN, CONCEPTIONS OF MODERN PSYCHIATRY (2d ed. 1953); Lasswell, Person,
Personality, Group, Culture, 2 PSYCHIATRY 5 (1939), reprinted in H. LASSWELL, THE
ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL BEHAVIOR 195 (1948).
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tions of freedom-slavery, caste, and apartheid-are by definition
contrary to our postulated goals of human dignity. Fortunately, the
rejection of all these practices, once described, can be made syntact-
ically, as the antitheses of our basic recommendations. Thus slav-
ery, with its complete subjection of the victim to the will of the
master, would appear to represent the severest, and most intolera-
ble, restriction of freedom of choice known to contemporary cul-
ture.3 Similarly, caste, with its insistence upon permanent distinc-
tions based upon the accidents of birth, would appear wholly incom-
patible with demands that individuals be accorded fullest oppor-
tunity to discover, mature, and exercise their latent capabilities to
the highest levels of excellence for participation in social process.'4
Finally, apartheid, with its grouping and segregation of populations
on the basis of race and birth and its rigid prescriptions of differen-
tial access to values, would appear to crystallize and institutionalize
a system fully comparable to, and equally unacceptable as, that of
a caste society. 5
The members of a community are of course, even in the absence
of legally prescribed stratifications, always classifying and reclassi-
fying themselves in relation to one another according to their value
positions, potentials, and expectancies, including a system of re-
spect grades." It is when the class system in a society is formalized
as a rigidified hierarchy in which the individual is not allowed to
alter the status ascribed to him at birth, that it becomes a caste
society.37 In a less rigidified society comprised of different classes in
terms of relative positions in relation to different values, though it
is obviously more difficult for members of lower classes to move
upward, the mobility of people is not predetermined by status at
birth, but may depend upon the capability and achievement of
individual persons. 8 It is the equality of opportunity for the devel-
opment of capability and for achievement that is critical.
The equality of opportunity that we specify as the second impor-
tant outcome in the respect process is to be understood both posi-
tively and negatively: positively in terms of opportunities for indi-
33. See notes 79-354 & accompanying text infra.
34. See notes 355-438 & accompanying text infra.
35. See notes 439-91 & accompanying text infra.
36. See note 357 infra.
37. See notes 355-74 & accompanying text infra.
38. See note 36 supra. See generally THE AMERICAN OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTURE (P.
Blau & 0. Duncan eds. 1967); S. LiPsET & R. BENDIX, SOCIAL MOBILITY IN INDUSTRIAL
SocIETy (1959); P. SOROKIN, SOCIAL MOBILITY (1927).
[Vol. 24:919
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
viduals to enjoy the widest range of effective choice in their interac-
tions with others, and negatively in terms of access to participation
in all value processes without discrimination for reasons irrelevant
to capability. The critical importance of a positive formulation was
eloquently articulated by R. H. Tawney in his classic study,
Equality, where he insists that a genuine equality depends
not merely in the absence of disabilities, but on the presence of abili-
ties. It obtains in so far, and only in so far as, each member of a
community, whatever his birth, or occupation, or social position, pos-
sesses in fact, and not merely in form, equal chances of using to the
full his natural endowments of physique, of character, and of intellig-
ence. 9
It should be noted that the equality we recommend, whether the
formulation be positive or negative, is an equality, not of capabili-
ties and characteristics, but of treatment." It is a commonplace that
human beings differ greatly in capabilities and characteristics and
in exposure to past experiences and that many such differences are
indispensable to an appropriate diversity and pluralism in social
process. What cannot be conceded is that some human beings
should, alleged on grounds of group differences in capabilities, char-
acteristics, and past experience, be arbitrarily treated differently
from others in terms of access to social process for maturing latent
talent and contributing to aggregate common interest.
Our complex modem society, with its multiple intersecting and
interacting value processes, requires many different roles and per-
formances from individual community members. It is not to be
asserted that all individuals have even comparable capabilities for
all these different roles and performances. A rational community
policy must honor an appropriate differentiation in opportunity,
training, and recruitment. A rational policy need not, however,
39. R. TAWNEY, EQUALITY 103-04 (1964).
40. Dobzhansky has eloquently put it this way:
Equality of opportunity neither presupposes nor promotes equality of abil-
ity. It only means that every person may, without favor or hindrance, develop
whatever socially useful gifts or aptitudes he has and chooses to develop.
Civilization fosters a multitude of employments and functions to be filled
and served-statesmen and butchers, engineers and policemen, scientists
and refuse collectors, musicians and sales clerks. Equality of opportunity
stimulates the division of labor rather than sets it aside; it enables, however,
a person to choose any occupation for which he is qualified by his abilities
and his willingness to strive.
T. DOBZHANSKY, MANKIND EVOLVING: THE EVOLUTION OF THE HUMAN SPECms 243
(1962) [hereinafter cited as T. DOBZHANSKY].
19751
934 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
honor differentiations which have no basis in individual capabilities
and, hence, become arbitrary discriminations.
The principal thrust of the policy we recommend is, therefore,
that individuals should be accorded or denied opportunities for free-
dom of choice in regard to any value process only upon the basis of
individual capabilities and characteristics, and not according to an
alleged group capability and characteristic.4' Permissible differen-
tiations may be made between individuals in terms of the particular
capabilities and characteristics appropriate for particular roles, but
discrimination grounded upon alleged group characteristics is an
abomination only less rigid and irrational than that of caste. All
blanket assignments of individuals to allegedly different groupings
with different capabilities must be condemned by a legal system
whose prescriptions are compatible with human dignity. None of
the historical groupings, such as race, color, sex, religion, opinion,
and culture, has any invariable and uniform relevance to capability
for performing roles in modem society.2 It is not merely because
many alleged group characteristics are beyond the effective control
of the individual that we condemn such groupings as bases for per-
missible differentiation, but because they impose wholly unneces-
sary deprivations upon both individual development and fulfillment
and the creation of community values. The tradition upon which we
build has been well summarized by Bell:
The principle of equality of opportunity derives from a fundamental
tenet of classic liberalism: That the individual-and not the family,
the community, or the state-is the basic unit of society, and that
the purpose of societal arrangements is to allow the individual the
freedom to fulfill his own purposes-by his labor to gain property, by
exchange to satisfy his wants, by upward mobility to achieve a place
commensurate with his talents. It was assumed that individuals will
differ-in their natural endowments, in their energy, drive, and moti-
vation, in their conception of what is desirable-and that the institu-
tions of society should establish procedures for regulating fairly the
competition and exchanges necessary to fulfill these diverse desires
and competences. 3
Our recommendation in reference to honor is that it be employed,
not as the heritage of a class or an appendage of effective power, but
in deliberate bestowal in recognition for important community
41. See notes 651-963 & accompanying text infra.
42. See id.
43. Bell, On Meritocracy and Equality, 29 THE PUBLIC INTEREST 29, 40 (1972).
See also D. BELL, THE COMING OF POST-INDUSTRIAL SocIETY 425 (1973).
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achievement. We recommend that individuals who contribute con-
spicuously to the common interest receive honor in comparable de-
gree. Though equality of opportunity is indispensable to the nurtur-
ing of capability, honor is properly conferred, not upon the basis of
capability or potential, but in acknowledgement of actual contribu-
tion. A contribution to the common interest is a contribution to
social processes where people enjoy, besides fundamental freedom,
opportunities to mature their latent capabilities for participation in
the shaping and sharing of values. When so conferred, honor can be
integrative, not destructive; taking away from none, it may enhance
the freedom of all. An incisive summary is offered by Tawney:
[N]o one thinks it inequitable that, when a reasonable provision has
been made for all, exceptional responsibilities should be compensated
by exceptional rewards, as a recognition of the service performed and
an inducement to perform it."
The realization of appropriate respect relationships in any part of
the world community depends upon achieving a vigorous civic order
to interact with a public order that performs its essential tasks. The
civic order we recommend is composed of aggregate patterns in a
community process where coercion from any source, governmental
or other, is held to a minimum. A civic order of this kind can only
be the product of an effectively functioning constitutive process
which both reflects human dignity values in its own features and
expresses such values in the public order decisions which emanate
from it."
The term "civic order" is used for explicit distinction from "pub-
lic order." By public order we refer to features of the social (value-
institution) process which are established and maintained by effec-
tive power, authoritative or other, through the imposition of severe
sanctions against challengers.46 By civic order is meant the features
of social process that are established and maintained by resorting
to relatively mild sanctions, and which afford a maximum of auton-
omy, creativity, and diversity to the private choice of individuals.
Our postulated, overriding goal of human dignity favors the wid-
est possible freedom of choice and, hence, the fewest possible
44. R. TAWNEY, EQuALITY 113 (1964).
45. See H. LASSWELL, THE FUTURE OF PoLrIcAL Sci_ CE (1962); H. LASSWELL, A
PRE-VIEW OF POLICY SCIENCES 1-2, 27-28 (1971).
46. See McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, The World Constitutive Process of
Authoritative Decision, in 1 THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 73, 100
n.63 (R. Falk & C. Black eds. 1969); McDougal, Jurisprudence for a Free Society,
1 GA. L. REV. 1, 1-7 (1966); McDougal & Lasswell, The Identification and Ap-
praisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order, 53 Am. J. INT'L L. 1, 6-11 (1959).
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coerced choices for individuals. This is part of the great liberal
tradition which champions the least possible degree of politicization
or governmentalization of social interactions compatible with the
achievement of other goals." In a totalitarian polity every sector of
society is highly politicized and government swallows up society:
government is society and society is government, with correlative
attenuation of all zones of individual autonomy. When all the inter-
actions occurring in a social process are encompassed by the power
process, an entire society is politicized." The contrasting anarchistic
vision of a commonwealth of free people, in which power decisions
have become unnecessary, is obviously a will-of-the-wisp in the
contemporary world. It does nevertheless offer an appropriate re-
minder and caution to the leaders and led of our historic period."
The term "privacy" is sometimes employed, as when made equiv-
alent to "a right to be let alone,"5 with much the same comprehen-
sive reference that we impute to civic order. It would appear prefera-
ble, however, to limit the reference of "privacy" to freedom of indi-
vidual choice about what is to be communicated to others about
oneself, and to perceive this freedom as a single example of the more
comprehensive freedoms embraced within a properly functioning
civic order.-' Such a restriction on the term privacy could make
easier and render more precise the contextual analysis that must be
executed when a decision has to be made whether to limit the pre-
sumption in favor of privacy on behalf of the equal rights of others
or of the aggregate common interest. Proper procedures relate differ-
ent freedoms to divergent features of interaction and context.
The degree to which the four outcomes that we have specified as
basic realizations of the "respect" value can be achieved in any
particular social context must of course depend both upon the char-
acteristics of the respect process and upon the management of for-
mal authority and effective control. It is important to bear in mind
the coordination of perspectives and operational behaviors that
must be achieved and subsequently sustained if the requirements
for shaping and sharing of respect are to be fully realized. There
47. See, e.g., F. WATKINS, THE AGE OF IDEOLOGY-POLITICAL THOUGHT, 1750 TO
THE PRESENT (1964); F. WATKINS, THE POLITICAL TRADITION OF THE VEST (1948).
48. See H. LASSWELL, A PRE-VIEW OF POLICY SCIENCES 28 (1971).
49. Cf. C. JACKER, THE BLACK FLAG OF ANARCHY (1968); G. RuNKLE, ANARCHISM:
OLD AND NEW (1972).
50. See, e.g., Miller, Privacy in the Corporate State: A Constitutional Value of
Dwindling Significance, 22 J. PuB. L. 3 (1973).
51. See Lasswell, The Threat to Privacy, in CONFLICT OF LOYALTIES 121 (R.
Maclver ed. 1952).
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must be an effective process of political socialization (education)
that mobilizes and particularizes the objectives and strategies in-
cluded within the demand for basic human respect. Perspectives
must also sustain the policies that keep the doors of opportunity
open for the cultivation of individual capacities and confer distinc-
tion upon those who make exceptional contributions to common
values. Crucial to the functioning of such a society is the successful
transmission of demands upon the self and others to receive rewards
in a form that protects the integrity of the institutions compatible
with respect. For example, it would be generally understood that
substantial differences in protected claims to material resources
have undermined the vitality of communities whose structure at one
time exhibited a high degree of equality in the control of such re-
sources. An effective social order will remain alert to changes in
resource control and will sustain effective demands to formulate
prescriptions and apply procedures that reward exceptional contri-
butions without endangering genuine access to opportunity. It is
probable that forms of reward other than wealth will be emphasized
and accepted by the members of a social system that is truly com-
mitted to a commonwealth of respect. Historically, it has proved
dangerous to devolve titles or ranks from one person to another,
especially from parent to child.
A successful program of political socialization will highlight these
common problems and mobilize codes of rectitude that give support
to those who refrain from attempting to institutionalize what
amounts to a group-based claim to unjust enrichment in terms of
social status. No specific "once and for all" set of norms can be
usefully projected for these, any more than for other, dynamic
human relationships. The essential challenge is to sustain a process,
and especially a set of context-examining procedures, that confront
long range goals with historic, contemporary, and prospective reali-
ties. In the pages that immediately follow we propose to consider the
strategies available for improving the institutions of the respect
process in the world community. Elsewhere we focus on rearrange-
ment of the more comprehensive features of formal and effective
power that are especially relevant to the protection of respect and
other human rights.2
III. TRENDS IN DECISION AND CONDITIONING FACTORS
A. Claims Relating to Outcomes
1. Claims for a Basic Degree of Respect as a Human Being
52. See note 16 supra.
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a. Claims for a Fundamental Freedom of Choice in Value
Participation
The overriding importance of freedom of choice in the shaping
and sharing of all values is beginning to be articulated and estab-
lished as authoritative general community expectation in a wide
range of formal expressions at both the transnational and national
levels. Thus, most importantly, the Charter of the United Nations
reaffirms "faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and
worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women,"
and pledges to "promote social progress and better standards of life
in larger freedom" and to "employ international machinery for the
promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples." 3
In particular, Article 55 of the Charter specifies:
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being
which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations
based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote:
a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of
economic and social progress and development;
b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and related
problems; and international cultural and educational cooperation;
and
c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fun-
damental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, lan-
guage or religion. 4
In similar tenor, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights" in
its preamble recognizes "the inherent dignity" and "the equal and
inalienable rights of all members of the human family" as "the
foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world," and pro-
claims "the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy
freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want" as
"the highest aspiration of the common people" and reiterates man-
53. U.N. CHARTER, preamble.
54. Id. art. 55.
55. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted Dec. 10, 1948, G.A.
Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948) [hereinafter cited as Universal Declara-
tion]. A collection of the more important global human rights prescriptions is
conveniently offered in UNITED NATIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMPILATION OF INTERNA-
TIONAL INSTRUMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS, U.N. Doc. ST/HR/I (1973). Other
useful collections include: BASIC DOCUMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS (I. Brownlie ed.
1971); BASIC DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (L. Sohn
& T. Buergenthal eds. 1973).
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kind's determination "to promote social progress and better stan-
dards of life in larger freedom" and "to secure universal and
effective recognitions and observance" of fundamental freedoms
and rights. 6 The International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, in its preamble, confirms that
the ideal of free human beings enjoying civil and political freedom
and freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if conditions
are created whereby everyone may enjoy his civil and political rights,
as well as his economic, social and cultural rights.57
The same emphasis, with practically identical formulation, is evi-
dent throughout the International Covenant on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights.58
Comparable regional expression is found in the preamble of the
American Convention on Human Rights which, after stating that
"the essential rights of man are not derived from one's being a
national of a certain State, but are based upon attributes of the
human personality," also stresses the centrality of freedom of
choice.59 The European Convention on Human Rights expresses the
profound belief in those Fundamental Freedoms which are the foun-
dation of justice and peace in the world and are best maintained on
the one hand by an effective political democracy and on the other by
a common understanding and observance of the Human Rights upon
which they depend .... 10
In a more recent summation, the Proclamation of Teheran,6'
adopted at the International Conference on Human Rights in 1968,
solemnly reaffirmed that
The primary aim of the United Nations in the sphere of human
rights is the achievement by each individual of the maximum free-
56. Id. preamble, U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71-72.
57. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966,
preamble, G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 52-53, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966) [hereinafter cited as Covenant on Civil and Political Rights].
58. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted
Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966) [hereinafter cited as Covenant on Economic Rights].
59. American Convention on Human Rights, signed Nov. 22, 1969, preamble,
O.A.S. Official Records OEA/Ser.K/XVI/1.1, Doc. 65, Rev. 1, Corr. 1 (Jan. 7, 1970),
reprinted in 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 99, 101 (1970) [hereinafter cited as American
Convention].
60. European Convention, supra note 11, preamble, 213 U.N.T.S. at 222-24.
61. Proclamation of Teheran, Final Act of the International Conference on
Human Rights, Teheran, 22 April to 13 May 1968, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.32/41 (1968).
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dom and dignity. For the realization of this objective, the laws of
every country should grant each individual, irrespective of race, lan-
guage, religion or political belief, freedom of expression, of informa-
tion, of conscience and of religion, as well as the right to participate
in the political, economic, cultural and social life of his country."
It concluded by urging
all peoples and governments to dedicate themselves to the principles
enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to re-
double their efforts to provide for all human beings a life consonant
with freedom and dignity and conducive to physical, mental, social
and spiritual welfare. 3
It may be recalled, in a more comprehensive search for relevant
prescription and application, that the fundamental freedom of
choice with which we are here concerned is the central concept of
human dignity and forms the core reference of human rights in
relation to all values. 4 Thus, in relation to power, its reference is to
participate fully as a person in the process both of effective power
and of authoritative decision; in relation to enlightenment, the free-
dom to acquire, use, and communicate knowledge; in relation to
well being, the freedom to develop and maintain psychosomatic
integrity and a healthy personality; in relation to wealth, freedom
of contract and of access to goods and services; in relation to skill,
the freedom to discover, mature, and exercise latent talents; in rela-
tion to affection, the freedom to establish and enjoy congenial per-
sonal relationships; and in relation to rectitude, freedom to form,
maintain, and express norms of responsible conduct. This perva-
siveness in reference to the central concept of freedom of choice
makes relevant to its prescription and application all the more de-
tailed prescriptions and applications about the various specific
human rights relating to each of the different value processes. 5 In
other words, the degree to which the claim for fundamental freedom
of choice, as a generic aspiration, is protected must be confirmed by
reference to the whole flow of decisions, prescriptive and other,
about human rights.
62. Id. at 4.
63. Id. at 6.
64. See notes 1-52 & accompanying text supra.
65. This point has been documented by a series of U.N. studies on non-
discrimination. See, e.g., J. INGLES, STUDY OF DISCRIMINATION IN RESPECT OF THE
RIGHT OF EVERYONE TO LEAVE ANY COUNTRY, INCLUDING His OWN 9-12, U.N. Doe.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/220/Rev.1 (1963); H. SANTA CRUZ, STUDY OF DISCRIMINATION IN THE
MATTER OF POLITICAL RIGHTS 15-25, U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/Sub.2/213/Rev.1 (1962).
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The basic thrust in global community expectations toward pro-
tecting individual freedom of choice in all value processes is greatly
fortified by the long history of developments within the constitutive
processes of the different national communities. The continued in-
sistence by so many peoples in different communities and cultures
that authority can rightfully come only from the people is a direct
expression of demand for freedom of choice in the power processes
that affect all other processes. 6 It is this demand for freedom of
choice, secure from arbitrary coercion, which underlies the whole
historic panorama of constitutional reforms beginning with Greek
and Roman liberalism and extending through the English, Ameri-
can, French, and Russian revolutions to the present era of the eman-
cipation of former colonial peoples. 7 The significance of the incorpo-
ration, especially after the eighteenth century, of the long cherished
doctrines of the basic human rights in formal constitutive charters
has been well noted by Lauterpacht:
The notion of human nature as a source and standard of political
rights is older than the end of the eighteenth century. What was new
was the formal incorporation of these rights as part of the constitu-
tional law of States and the possibility of their consequent protection
not only against the tyranny of kings but also against the intolerance
of democratic majorities.68
The demand to clarify and enhance the protection of the funda-
mental freedom of the individual in the broad sense we have speci-
fied, however much aspiration may sometimes beg achievement,
may be observed in every feature of contemporary national constitu-
tive processes. For brief, synoptic illustration, reference may be
made: to provision for individual as distinguished from group par-
ticipation; to specification that decisions be taken by criteria of
common interest, with some prescriptions-such as a "bill of
rights"-being accorded priority over other prescriptions; 9 to the
66. Article 21(3) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights expresses this
crystallized expectation: "The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority
of government ... ." Universal Declaration, supra note 55, art. 21(3), U.N. Doc.
A/810 at 75.
67. For an excellent summary see Friedrich, Constitutions and Constitution-
alism, 3 INT'L ENCYC. SOCIAL Sci. 318 (1968). See also K. LOEWENSTEIfi, POLITICAL
POWER AND THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS (1957), Hamilton, Constitutionalism, 4
ENcYc. SOCIAL Sci. 255 (1931).
68. H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HuMAN RIGHTS 88-89 (1950)
[hereinafter cited as H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW].
69. See C. MCILwAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, ANCIENT AND MODERN 14, 87 (rev. ed.
1947); G. SABINE, A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THEORY 451-54 (3d ed. 1961).
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balancing of power, in a differentiation of competence for decision,
between different branches of the government and different geo-
graphic regions;70 to the subjection of all individuals, including offi-
cials, to authoritative decision and the pluralistic distribution of
both authority and control; and to the requirement of authorized,
uniform procedures in all types of decision with opportunity to chal-
lenge decisions allegedly incompatible with authority.7' This broad
sweep of contemporary demand upon constitutive processes has
been well summarized by Friedrich, who finds that "the political
function of a constitution," "the core objective," is "that of safe-
guarding each member of the political community" as "a person":
Each man is supposed to possess a sphere of genuine autonomy. The
constitution is meant to protect the self; for the self is believed to be
the (primary and ultimate) value . . . .Hence the function of a
constitution may also be said to be the defining and maintaining of
human rights. The constitution is to protect the individual member
of the political community against interference in his personal
sphere.13
The pervasive contemporary emphasis upon "constitutionalism" as
a set of preferred prescriptions, though quite inadequate as descrip-
tion of the whole of constitutive process,74 is nonetheless an eloquent
and rational affirmation of the more fundamental policies which
have historically underlain such process.
The special importance, in establishing transnational prescrip-
tion for the protection of fundamental freedom, of the developments
in national constitutive processes derives from the fact that "general
principles of law" are a recognized authoritative source of interna-
tional law. It is provided in a well-worn article of its statute that the
International Court of Justice shall apply "the general principles of
law, recognized by civilized nations,"75 and, despite the provincial-
ism of the wording,78 those who apply international law habitually
70. See G. SABINE, A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THEORY 551-60 (3d ed. 1961); M.
VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS (1967).
71. See K. LOEWENSTEIN, POLITICAL POWER AND THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS
123-63, 315-43 (1957); Lasswell & McDougal, Trends in Theories About Law:
Comprehensiveness in Conceptions of Constitutive Process, 41 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1 (1972).
72. C. FRIEDRICH, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRACY 8 (4th ed. 1968).
73. Id.
74. See Lasswell & McDougal, Trends in Theories About Law: Comprehensi-
veness in Conceptions of Constitutive Process, 41 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1972).
75. I.C.J. STAT. art. 38(1)(c).
76. The reference of "civilized" nations in the ICJ Statute, resented as it is by
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seek guidance for determining transnational perspectives from uni-
formities in national prescriptions and applications. The cumula-
tive massing of prescriptions designed to protect the fundamental
freedom of the individual in national constitutive processes must
contribute significantly to the continued crystallization of global
expectations that such freedom is to be protected.7 Conversely, it
may be noted that, in interaction as beneficent as cumulative, the
shaping of global expectations in turn will have an important effect
on the shaping of national expectations. This is most vividly illus-
trated in the widespread incorporation of provisions from the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights in the constitutive charters of
many newly independent states.78
b. Claims for Elimination of Slavery
i. Factual background
Slavery, in all its many manifestations, and equivalences, repre-
sents the most extreme deprivations of freedom of choice about
participation in value processes. Though a slave may physically
participate in the shaping and sharing of values, the modality of
participation is completely dictated by others. For access to and
enjoyment of value processes, the slave may be in total and continu-
ous servitude to the will of a master. His participation in com-
munity power processes will, of course, be minimal. Biologically the
slave is a human being, but legally he may not be recognized as a
person, and may be denied any access to processes of authoritative
decision. 79 He may be totally without rights or powers, or accorded
participation and protection only in minor degree.
members of the African-Asian community, is a reminder that early international
law was shaped largely by the European Powers.
77. See H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 68, at 73-93.
78. See UNITED NATIONS, THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 13-15 (1973);
Measures Taken Within the United Nations in the Field of Human Rights 28-30,
U.N. Doc. A/Conf.32/5 (1967) (study prepared by the Secretary-General).
The modalities and importance of prescription in global constitutive process are
indicated in McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, The World Constitutive Process of
Authoritative Decision, in 1 THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER
139-42 (R. Falk & E. Black eds. 1969). The crystallization of community expecta-
tion into authoritative policy is indispensable to the effective performance of other
decision functions.
It is sometimes tragic that lawyers engaged in litigation within national constitu-
tive processes overlook the applicability of transnational prescriptions which could
be presented as the internal law of the land.
79. See, e.g., 1 & 2 J. HURD, THE LAW OF FREEDOM AND BONDAGE IN THE UNITED
STATES (1968 ed.).
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Himself an object of ownership and trade, a thing rather than a
person,8 the slave's principal participation in wealth processes is in
the coerced contribution of labor and services to others. He may be
sold or otherwise disposed of, either separately as a chattel (chattel
slavery)," or together with a piece of land under an exploitative
system of land tenure (serfdom, peonage).,2 He may be traded lo-
cally or transnationally.8 3 He may be compelled to work for creditors
practically for life because of indebtedness (debt bondage).84 When
he dies, the debt and bondage may even pass on to his heirs. 5
Members of his kin group may sometimes be taken as security for
debt. He may be condemned to forced labor for the payment of debt
or other reason. He may be denied the right to own property and he
may have no competence to enter into any contract, for "neither his
80. See, e.g., W. BUCKLAND, The Slave as Res, in THE ROMAN LAW OF SLAVERY 10
(1908) [hereinafter cited as W. BUCKLAND, ROMAN LAW]. In the words of Chief
Justice Taney in the Dred Scott decision:
[The slave] was bought and sold, and treated as an ordinary article of
merchandise and traffic, whenever a profit could be made by it.
Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857).
Similarly, Davis has written:
As laws governing chattle property evolved from the earliest civilizations, it
was almost universally agreed that a slave could be bought, sold, traded,
leased, mortgaged, bequested, presented as a gift, pledged for a debt, in-
cluded in a dowry, or seized in a bankruptcy.
D. DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN WESTERN CULTURE 32 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as D. DAVIS, WESTERN CULTURE].
81. See C. GREENIDGE, SLAVERY 36-48 (1958) [hereinafter cited as C.
GREENIDGE].
82. See id. at 74-93; McBride, Peonage, 12 ENCYC. SOCIAL ScI. 69 (1934). See
generally J. BLUM, LORD AND PEASANT IN RusSIA (1961).
83. On the history of the slave trade see E. ALPERS, THE EAsr AFRICAN SLAVE
TRADE (1967); L. BETHELL, THE ABOLITION OF THE BRAZILIAN SLAVE 'TRADE (1970); B.
DAVIDSON, BLACK MOTHER: THE YEARS OF THE AFRICAN SLAVE TRADE (1961); C.
GREENIDGE, supra note 81, at 49-57; S. O'CALLAGHAN, THE SLAVE TRADE TODAY
(1961); Schakleton, The Slave Trade Today, in SLAVERY: A COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE 188 (R. Winks ed. 1972); Umdzurike, The African Slave Trade and
the Attitudes of International Law Towards It, 16 How. L.J. 334 (1971). For a
powerful description of the profound trauma visited upon victims of the slave trade
see P. Murray, Roots of the Racial Crisis: Prologue to Policy 227-43 (June, 1965)
(unpublished J.S.D. dissertation in Yale Law School Library) [hereinafter cited
as P. Murray].
84. See C. GREENIDGE, supra note 81, at 66-73; Forms of Involuntary Servitude
in Asia, Oceania and Australia, U.N. Doc. E/AC.33fR.11 (1951); Gullick, Debt-
Bondage in Malaya, in SLAVERY: A COMPARATIVE PERSPEcTIVE 51-57 (R. Winks ed.
1972).
85. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1973, at 10, col. 1; id., Dec. 8, 1968, at 7, col.
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word nor his bond has any standing in law." 8
Although their minimum health needs may be served for the secu-
rity of investment, slaves may have few or no rights to well-being
and personal security." He may be subjected to all kinds of physical
abuse and torture, including castration," female circumcision,
branding with identification marks,89 other types of mutilation, and
sexual molestation. The effects of enslavement have been appropri-
ately likened to those of death.'"
The victims of servitude are commonly denied opportunity to
discover, develop, and exercise their latent skills for social expres-
sion; they may be kept in a state of relative ignorance. They are
often conditioned to be content with their plight-to "love their
chains"-not to demand freedom to participate equally and fully in
the shaping and sharing of values.' Denied opportunities to acquire
and exercise a range of socially useful skills, they are thus con-
demned to manual labor.
Slaves may be denied access to the affection value and be given
little opportunity to develop congenial personal relationships. They
may not be permitted to mate according to their choice; although
informal relationships may be tolerated, these may not be protected
by the laws of marriage, parentage, and kinship. 2 Their family life,
if any, is often broken and completely at the mercy of their masters
who can arbitrarily separate husband from wife, children from par-
86. C. SILBERMAN, CRISIS IN BLACK AND WHITE 89 (1964) [hereinafter cited as C.
SILBERMAN].
87. In the words of Kardiner and Ovesey:
The relation of a man to a slave is quite the same as to a horse, and yet there
are important differences. It is the same, insofar as the prime objective is to
exploit the utility value of the slave, and to perpetuate the conditions which
favor his maximum utility.
A. KARDINER & L. OVEsEY, THE MARK OF OPPRESSION 42 (1951).
88. See C. GREENIDGE, supra note 81, at 27.
89. Slave branding provided a mark of identification, facilitated the recovery
of fugitives, and satisfied the satanic claim that Negroes were less than
human.
D. DUMOND, ANTISLAVERY 10 (1961).
90. W. BUCKLAND, A TEXT-BOOK OF RoIu' LAW 72 (1964 ed.).
91. As Degler has put it:
In the minds of many modem Americans, the Negro is pictured as a man who
was once a slave and one, moreover, who was essentially content in that
status.
C. DEGLER, OUT OF OuR PAST 168 (1959). This portrayal is, of course, but another
aspect of denial of freedom to participate equally and fully in the shaping and
sharing of values.
92. C. SILBERMAN, supra note 86, at 89.
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ents.'3 Lonely and friendless, slaves may even be forced to breed like
cattle in order to supply more slave labor. Children may find them-
selves slaves because of their parentage. They may be sold during
childhood in the guise of adoption." They may become subject to
"child marriage" under arrangements such as Mu-tsai. They may
be sold in the guise of marriage as concubines, or in exchange for a
"bride price" (dowry, lobolo, or boxadi)."1 Abuses of the bride-price
system lead to "prostitution, sterility and depopulation."97
The slave, "humbled to the condition of brutes,"98 is deprived
even of his sense of right. He is denied opportunity to develop appro-
priate norms of responsible conduct. In the words of Malinowski,
"even his [the slave's] conscience is not his own."99 Gustavus
Vassa, an eighteenth century slave, summed up his enslaved experi-
ences this way:
When you make men slaves you deprive them of half their virtue, you
set them in your own conduct, an example of fraud, rapine, and
cruelty, and compel them to live with you in a state of war.'0'
The cumulative impact of enslavement is to deprive its victims
of their fundamental respect for themselves as human beings. Elk-
ins, employing insights into the behavioral patterns of prisoners in
the concentration camps, suggests a comparable disintegration of
adult personality in slaves.' 1 Thus, he says that the slave's "rela-
tionship with his master was one of utter dependence and childlike
attachment: it was indeed this childlike quality that was the very
key to his being.' ' 02 Under such conditions of infantile dependency,
93. This is a consequence of paramount importance of "utility" attached to the
slave.
Neither paternity nor permanent marriage could be recognized, for this
would interfere with the free mobility of the slave for sale purposes.
A. KARDINER & L. OVESEY, THE MARK OF OPPRESSION 43 (1951).
94. See C. GREENIDGE, supra note 81, at 105-06.
95. Mu-tsai, meaning "little sister," has become a popular usage among Europe-
ans, especially in the British colony of Hong Kong, though it has been known in
China in various other names such as "ya-tow." It was particularly prevalent in
East and Southeast Asia. See C. GREENIDGE, supra note 81, at 105-16; J. GULLICK,
DEBT BONDAGE IN MALAYA (1958). In Taiwan, it is called sim-pua, "little daughter-
in-law." Cf. M. WOLF, WOMEN AND THE FAMILY IN RURAL TAIWAN (1972).
96. See C. GREENIDGE, supra note 81, at 94-104.
97. Id. at 100.
98. P. Murray, supra note 83, at 131 (quoting Gustavus Vassa).
99. C. GREENIDGE, supra note 81, at 21.
100. P. Murray, supra note 83, at 131.
101. See S. ELKINS, SLAVERY 81-139 (2d ed. 1968).
102. Id. at 82.
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respect in the sense we have specified (self-esteem and deferential
characterization by others) is not possible. As Kardiner and Ovesey
have aptly put it, the individual's "self-esteem suffers because he
is constantly receiving an unpleasant image of himself from the
behavior of others to him.' '0 3 His own sense of worth is utterly
destroyed.104
Historically, slavery in the sense outlined above extends back to
very ancient times and has existed in many cultures and many
countries, with many variations in institutional manifestations and
varying degrees of approximation to our description. 0' The slowness
of mankind's movement toward fundamental freedom is but a mir-
ror reflection of the prevalence of slavery in its various forms. Al-
though its origins are still controverted, it appears that slavery first
emerged when tribes moved from the hunting to the pastoral
stage."' Slavery was early associated with warfare. In the ancient
Near East, captives were first killed but later spared to serve their
captors. Slavery, it is said, became established in the Sumerian
culture of the Babylonian area in the fourth millennium B.C.' 7 In
103. C. SILBERMAN, supra note 86, at 109 (quoting A. Kardiner).
104. Id. at 115.
105. The literature on slavery is vast. It has expanded significantly in recent
years because of the contemporary interest, scholarly and other, in this subject. We
are indebted to our colleague, Robert M. Cover, for assistance in guiding us through
this literature. C. GREENIDGE, note 81 supra, is particularly useful for our present
purposes. For recent outstanding historical studies on slavery see R. COVER, JUSTICE
ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975); D. DAVIS, THEPROBLEM OF
SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION 1770-1823 (1975); D. DAVIS, WESTERN CULTURE,
note 80 supra; R. FOGEL & S. ENGERMAN, TIME ON THE CROSS (1974); E. GENOVESE,
ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVES MADE (1974).
Of a growing list of anthologies, SLAVERY: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (R. Winks
ed. 1972) is especially recommended. Two concise accounts appear in: Finley,
Slavery, 14 INT'L ENCYC. SOCIAL Sci. 307 (1968); Slavery, 20 ENcYC. BRITANNICA 628
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Slavery]. Other useful background readings include:
E. COPLEY, A HISTORY OF SLAVERY AND ITS ABOLITION (1969); SLAVERY IN THE NEW
WORLD (L. Foner & E. Genovese eds. 1969); J. FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM
(2d ed. 1956); E. GENOVESE, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SLAVERY (1965); J. HARRIS,
SLAVERY OR "SACRED TRUST"? (1926); W. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK (1968); H.
KLEIN, SLAVERY IN THE AMERICAS (1967); L. LITWACK, NORTH OF SLAVERY (1961); E.
MCMANUS, BLACK BONDAGE IN THE NORTH (1973); H. NIEBOR, SLAVERY AS AN IN-
DUSTRIAL SYSTEM (2d ed. 1910); AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVERY: A MODERN READER (A.
Weinstein & F. Gatell eds. 1973); E. WILLIAMS, CAPITALISM & SLAVERY (1966);
Slavery, Colonialism, and Racism, DAEDALUS (Spring 1974); Woodward, The Jolly
Institution, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, May 2, 1974, at 3-6.
106. See Slavery, supra note 105, at 629.
107. Westermann, Slavery: Ancient, 14 ENCYC. SOCIAL Sci. 74 (1934).
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addition to capture in war, slave sale and purchase gradually be-
came a source of supply, with victims extending to include even
non-foreigners. In Egypt slavery existed from the earliest dynastic
period under the pharaohs."'8
In ancient Greece slave ownership was recognized at the time of
Homer."0 9 Subsequently, Aristotle, defining a slave as "a living pos-
session," considered slavery a natural component of society in which
the domination-submission relationship persists."0 As wars were fre-
quent and piracy was rife during the Hellenistic period (323-30
B.C.), increasing numbers of captives in war fell victims of slavery.
The close connection between slavery and warfare became more
pronounced with the rise of the Roman Empire. As Rome's wars of
conquest unfolded, large numbers of "barbarian" captives from Af-
rica, Spain, Gaul, Greece, and Asia Minor were put upon the mar-
ket.111 The slave population of Rome increased so rapidly that by the
middle of the first century it practically equalled the free popula-
tion,' with the potential threat of insurrection. Hence, the Romans
made a fine art of slavery with most elaborate and detailed legal
regulation.' The institution of slavery became an integral part of
the social structure of the Roman Empire.' Meanwhile, in China,
India, and other parts of the East, various forms of human servitude
were also widely prevalent. u5
With the fall of the Roman Empire, slavery declined sharply but
did not disappear. Throughout the Middle Ages, slavery existed in
many parts of Europe, although the conditions of slavery were amel-
iorated by the same Christian influence. Chattel slavery seems to
108. See A. BAKIR, SLAVERY IN PHARANOIc EGYPT (1952); I. MENDELSOHN, SLAVERY
IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST (1949).
109. Westermann, Slavery: Ancient, 14 ENCYC. SOCIAL Sci. 74, 75 (1934).
110. See THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE 8-18 (E. Barker ed. & transl. 1958). Cf. G.
MORROW, PLATO'S LAW OF SLAVERY IN ITS RELATIONS TO GREEK LAW (1939).
111. See Slavery, supra note 105, at 632.
112. See C. GREENIDGE, supra note 81, at 16. For a discussion of the sources and
numbers of slaves in Rome see W. WESTERMANN, THE SLAVE SYSTEMS OF GREEK AND
ROMAN ANTIQUITY 84-90 (1955) [hereinafter cited as W. WESTERMANN, SLAVE
SYSTEMS]. See also R. BARROW, SLAVERY IN THE ROMAN EMPIRE 20-21 (1968 ed.) .
113. See W. BUCKLAND, ROMAN LAW, note 80 supra.
114. See R. BARROW, SLAVERY IN THE ROMAN EMPIRE (1968 ed.); W. BUCKLAND,
ROMAN LAW, note 80 supra; W. WESTERMANN, SLAVE SYSTEMS, note 112 supra.
115. See D. CHANANA, SLAVERY IN ANCIENT INDIA (1960); L. HOBHOUSE, MORALS
IN EVOLUTION 289-95 (1915); E. SCHAFER, THE GOLDEN PEACHES OF SAMARKAND: A
STUDY OF T'ANG EXoTICS 43-47 (1963); C. WILBUR, SLAVERY IN CHINA DURING THE
FORMER HAN DYNASTY (1967); Pulleyblank, The Origins and Nature of Chattel
Slavery in China, 1 J. ECON. & SOCIAL HIST. OF THE ORIENT 201 (1958).
[Vol. 24:919
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
have disappeared in Western and Central Europe in the late 13th
century, only to be replaced by serfdom under the feudal system."'
In Southern Europe and the Middle East, slavery continued under
the Byzantine Empire and flourished with the rise of Islam. 17 The
Crusades resulted in a substantial increase in the slave trade, both
in Muslim lands and in Christian Europe. In the Iberian peninsula,
slavery survived not only the Arabic or Moorish domination, but
also the Christian reconquest of the peninsula in the fifteenth cen-
tury. Having reduced the defeated Muslims to slavery, the Portu-
guese proceeded to import slaves from Africa beginning in 1444, and
to set up slave trading posts on the coast of Guinea.' The Spaniards
soon followed suit. As the Portuguese dominions extended to the
East Indies and other areas, many of the natives of these regions
became new victims of slavery." 9
The discovery of the New World ushered in a further epoch into
the history of slavery. In the Hispanic colonies of the New World,
slavery was initially confined to the aborigines (Indians). Later,
Indian slaves became less significant when Negro slaves from Africa
were imported on a large scale to meet the labor need of the growing
plantation economy.'2 Following the Portuguese and Spaniards, the
Dutch, French, and British also undertook to engage in the slave
trade; all these groups scrambled for spheres of influence on the
African coast, with the British playing the dominant role.,' Of the
116. See W. BROWNLOW, SLAVERY AND SERFDOM IN EUROPE 42-86 (1969). In the
words of Davis:
If the French serf was protected by local custom and if there was little incen-
tive to exploit his labor for commercial or industrial profit, he enjoyed few
legal rights not possessed by Roman slaves of the late Empire.
D. DAVIS, WESTERN CULTURE, supra note 80, at 38.
117. For the perspective of Islam toward slavery see C. GREENIDGE, supra note
81, at 58-65.
118. See Slavery, supra note 105, at 634. See also D. DAVIS, WESTERN CULTURE,
supra note 80, at 41-46.
119. See G. MACMUNN, SLAVERY THROUGH THE AGES 83-178 (1938).
120. See E. WILLIAMS, CAPITALISM & SLAVERY (1966). A significant interpretation
is offered in E. GENOVESE, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SLAVERY (1965). Contra, J.
GRATUS, THE GREAT WHITE LIE (1973); U. PHILLIPS, AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVERY
(1918). On the controversial issue of the profitability of slavery see DID SLAVERY
PAY?: READINGS IN THE ECONOMICS OF BLACK SLAVERY IN THE UNITED STATES (H.
Aitken ed. 1971); K. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION 383-418 (1956); Conrad
& Meyer, The Economics of Slavery in the Ante Bellum South, 66 J. POL. ECON.
95 (1958); Genovese, The Slave South: An Interpretation, 25 ScI. & Soc'Y 320
(1961); Woodman, The Profitability of Slavery: A Historical Perspective, 29 J.
SOUTHERN HIST. 303 (1963).
121. See G. MACMUNN, SLAVERY THROUGH THE AGES 83-178 (1938).
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millions of African slaves transported to America, a large number
were sold in Brazil, the West Indies, and the United States.'2 The
traumatic impacts of this wholesale enslavement of peoples are still
being felt both within the United States and other bodies politic., 3
It is not, unhappily, to be assumed that slavery, in all its manifes-
tations, is a mere relic of the past. In relatively recent times most
states have, through their national laws, as will be described
below,'2 4 succeeded in formally proscribing at least technical or
"chattel" slavery. Yet even this most onerous form of servitude and
many of its approximations-such as peonage, debt bondage, bride
price, sham adoptions, and forced labor-continue to persist in
many parts of the world. Thus, Cassin has recently observed:
Even now, after nearly two centuries of international agreements and
even civil wars, the scourge of slavery has not yet been completely
eradicated, and, unfortunately, millions of human beings-men,
women and children-are literally still slaves, reduced to the condi-
tion of objects, or merchandise, or subjected to a regime very much
like slavery."'
The report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Slavery in
1970, drawing upon a non-governmental source, adds detail:
• chattel slavery, serfdom, debt bondage, the sale of children and
122. See generally P. CURTIN, THE ATLANTIC SLAVE TRADE: A CENSUS (1969);
DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE HISTORY OF THE SLAVE TRADE TO AMERICA (E. Don-
nan ed. 1930-35) (4 vols.); W. DuBois, THE SUPPRESSION OF THE AFRICAN SLAVE-
TRADE TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1638-1870 (1896); D. MANNIX & M.
COWLEY, BLACK CARGOES: A HISTORY OF THE ATLANTIC SLAVE TRADE, 1518-1865
(1962); 0. RANSFORD, THE SLAVE TRADE (1971).
123. Originally the fate of slavery was not confined to any particular race or
ethnic group, but during the era of the European colonial expansion, the fact of
the slave trade and the servile exploitation of "fellow men" from Africa appeared
difficult to reconcile with the professed Christian ideal that all men are born equal
before God. Hence, racism asserted itself as a new justification: the black people
were condemned to slavery because of their inherent inferiority. The age-worn
elitist doctrine was thus wedded to the concept of "race," the damaging impacts
of which are still being felt today. This point has been repeatedly emphasized in
the recent works in the field of black studies. For profound and detailed analyses
see S. ELKINS, SLAVERY (2d ed. 1968); W. JORDAN, THE WHITE MAN'S BURDEN:
HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF RACISM IN THE UNITED STATES (1974); G. MYRDAL, AN AMERI-
CAN DILEMMA (1944); P. Murray, note 83 supra. See also M. BANTON, RACE
RELATIONS (1967); Pollak, Law and Liberty: The American Constitution and the
Doctrine that All Men Are Created Equal, 2 HUMAN RIGHrs 1 (1972).
124. See notes 206-30 & accompanying text infra.
125. Cassin, From the Ten Commandments to the Rights of Man, in OF LAW AND
MAN 13, 19 (S. Shoham ed. 1971).
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servile forms of marriage survive today to the extent that they consti-
tute a recognizable element in the pattern of society in seventeen
African countries, fifteen Asian countries and six Latin American
countries.'2
The same report elsewhere summarizes:
A recent ILO report indicated that thousands of farm workers still
live under systems of tenure entailing conditions akin to serfdom,
especially in Latin America but also in other parts of the world.'2 7
The Rapporteur's more elaborate Report on Slavery of 196628 offers
country-by-country documentation. Greenidge provides a pertinent
summary of the contemporary problem:
The slavery that arose from war, and subsequently from raiding,
trading and dealing, and from birth, was what is known as 'classic'
or chattel slavery, in which the slave was a piece of property. While
this form still survives in Arabia, elsewhere slavery exists, as an ex-
ploitation of the weaker members of society by the stronger, and
frequently maintained by social sanction, in less straightforward
guises. Debt-bondage, by which a debtor may enslave himself volun-
tarily, or someone under his control, as security for a debt is a major
cause of practical enslavement; while the system of land tenure in
several parts of the world keeps millions of people in a state of near
slavery under such euphemistic terms as peonage. Finally, under the
pressure of economic conditions there have developed such practices
as the sale of daughters into marriage without their consent, an exam-
ple of which is the vexed question of the African 'bride price', and the
selling or giving of children to others who desire to exploit their labour
under the guise of adoption, a practice particularly prevalent in the
Far East.' 9
126. Question of Slavery and the Slave Trade in All Their Practices and Mani-
festations, Including the Slavery-like Practices of Apartheid and Colonialism, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/312, at 43 (1970) (Progress report submitted by the Special
Rapporteur, Mr. Mohamed Awad) [hereinafter cited as Awad's 1970 Progress
Report].
127. Id. at 17.
128. M. AWAD, REPORT ON SLAVERY, U.N. Doc. E/4168/Rev. 1 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as AWAD'S REPORT ON SLAVERY].
129. C. GREENIDGE, supra note 81, at 20. Other documentations of the continued
existence of slavery include: Montgomery, Slavery, in HUMAN RiGHTs 59-67
(U.K. Comm. for Human Rights Year ed. 1967); The Changing Face of Slavery,
1973 INT'L AssOCIATIONs 550; Slavery Still Plagues the Earth, SATURDAY REVIEW,
May 6, 1967, at 24; WORLD, Dec. 19, 1972, at 4; N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1974, at 1,
col. 7 (Paraguay); id., Oct. 26, 1973, at 3, col. 1 (India); id., Oct. 5, 1973, at 10,
col. 1 (India); id., Dec. 8, 1968, at 7, col. 1 (India); id., Mar. 28, 1967, at 16, col. 3
(Saudi Arabia); id., Mar. 22, 1967, at 6, col. 4 (Human Rights Comm'n).
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Hence, it can be no cause of surprise that the larger community of
mankind continues to exhibit concern for the complete eradication
both of chattel slavery and of all its approximations.'30
ii. Basic community policies
It has already been observed that slavery in all its manifestations
and approximations is the antithesis of the freedom of choice essen-
tial to human dignity.13' "The inherent contradictions of slavery,"
as the historian David Brion Davis has put it, resides "not in its
cruelty or economic exploitation, but in the underlying conception
of man as a conveyable possession with no more autonomy of will
and consciousness than a domestic animal.' 32 Fortunately, most of
the world's great religions and secular moralities have, despite occa-
sional tergiversations toward elitism in theory and recommenda-
tion, come to this same conclusion.'13
The ill consequences of slavery, ramifying out from its individual
victims through all the communities in which they interact with
others, have long been recognized as transnational in reach. Lin-
coln's dictum that a society cannot endure half slave and half free
is widely, and rationally, regarded as applying equally to world
society. Quoting Camus' comment, "we are all condemned to live
together," Silberman observes that "man cannot deny the human-
ity of his fellow man without ultimately destroying his own."' 34 It is
not the mere amelioration of the conditions of slaveiy, but rather
its total abolition, which is the overriding objective of general com-
munity policy today.' 35
130. For contemporary efforts toward the elimination of slavery in all its forms
see notes 184-334 & accompanying text infra.
131. See text accompanying note 33 supra.
132. D. DAvis, WESTERN CULTURE, supra note 80, at 62.
133. For a collection of antislavery arguments see THE ANTISLNVERY ARGUMENT
(W. Pease & J. Pease eds. 1965).
134. C. SILBERMAN, supra note 86, at 16. Slavery is, as Greenidge has put it,
bad for the slave because it tends to make him harsh, sensual and cruel, and
to grow to despise the work in which he is engaged, and to shirk it. It is bad
for the master because the habit of absolute rule is corrupting. It offers
constant facilities for libertinism, and the morality of the slave-owner and
his sons is undermined by intimate contact with a despised and degraded
class. Cruelty and lust have been its shadows wherever it has existed.
C. GREENIDGE, supra note 81, at 35.
135. The words contained in the 1848 Abolition Decree of France are worth
quoting:
Whereas slavery is an affront to human dignity, inasmuch as in destroying
the free will of man it destroys the natural principles of right and duty;
[Vol. 24:919
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
iii. Trends in decision
In the ancient world, slavery was not generally regarded as unlaw-
ful under either community or trans-community perspectives of
authority.'36 The conditions of slavery were for a long time harsh and
relatively unchanging. "For more than three thousand years," ob-
serves Davis, the "legal characteristics of bondage changed very
little."'3 7 There was, however, a slow movement toward ameliora-
tion. Thus, although describing the slave "as property and economic
asset rather than as human being,' 3 the Hammurabi Code ac-
corded considerable rights to slaves. Among those rights were "the
right of intermarriage with free women, the right to engage in busi-
ness and to acquire property, and protection of slave concubines
when they had given birth to children.' 39 Similarly, under the He-
brew law a slave of Hebrew origin could be released after six years
of servitude, and any slave, Hebrew or not, was granted manumis-
sion upon a permanent injury by maltreatment."'
In ancient Greek law the slave was viewed on one hand as "a legal
object" and on the other as "a legal subject"-as "a man as well as
a thing."'' Thus a slave was partly free. Establishing an elaborate
set of legal regulations, the Roman law did not admit different
degrees of slavery, but maintained that human beings were either
free or slaves.4 2 While slavery was not regarded as being in contrav-
ention of the ius gentium, 1 3 provision was made for the protection
of slaves and the amelioration of their conditions. Thus, masters
whereas slavery is a flagrant violation of the republican maxims of Liberty,
Equality, and Fraternity ... slavery shall be totally abolished in all French
colonies and possessions.
H. LAUTERPACHT, AN INTERNATIONAL BIL OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN 100 n.10 (1945)
(quoting the Decree) [hereinafter cited as H. LAUTERPAcHT, AN INTERNATIONAL
BILL].
136. See generally L. HOBHOUSE, MORALS IN EVOLUTION 270-317 (1915); SLAVERY
IN CLASSICAL ANTIQurrY (Finley ed. 1968); W. WESTERMANN, SLAVE SYSTEMS, note 112
supra; Finley, Between Slavery and Freedom, 6 CoMP. STUDIES IN Soc'Y & HIST.
233 (1964).
137. D. DAVIS, WESTERN CULTURE, supra note 80, at 32.
138. Westermann, Slavery: Ancient, 14 ENCYC. SocL Sci. 74, 75 (1939).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 76. See also G. MORROW, PLATO'S LAW OF SLAVERY IN ITS RELATION TO
GREEK LAW (1939); W. WESTERMANN, SLAVE SYSTEMS, supra note 112, at 1-57.
142. See W. BUCKLAND, ROMAN LAW, supra note 80, at 1; W. BUCKLAND, A TEXT-
BOOK OF ROMAN LAW 65-67 (1964 ed.).
143. See Slavery, supra note 105, at 631; D. DAVIS, supra note 80, at 83; W.
WESTERMANN, SLAVE SYSTEMS, supra note 112, at 57.
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were forbidden to "punish slaves by making them fight with
beasts;"' " a sick slave would become "free and a Latin" upon aban-
donment by his master;' masters were forbidden to "kill slaves
without magisterial sanction;"' 4" a slave, if cruelly treated, could
"take sanctuary at a temple or the statue of the Emperor;"'4 and
in the case of proven cruelty, the slave was not to be returned or sold
to his old master.148
The most important amelioration related to the manumission of
individual slaves. In ancient Greece, the practice of manumission
was widespread, resulting in what Westermann called the "incon-
stancy of status and fluidity of movement from slavery to free-
dom."' 49 Mass manumission was made possible through state and
individual actions. The slave was given a manumission price, which
the master could not reject.' 0 Special funds, contributed by free
persons, were set up so that slaves could borrow, without interest,
to redeem themselves. 5' For the purpose of redemption, slaves were
also allowed to work part-time for third parties to accumulate funds.
And after a slave gained his freedom, no stigma was attached to
him.'5 2 Through a long history, in deference to natural law notions
of equality, Roman law afforded procedures for facilitating manum-
ission in large numbers. 53 Talented freedmen were commonly ac-
cepted into the "political and economic life" of the Roman com-
munity "without any manifestations of prejudice arising from their
former status." '54 The liberality of Roman law set a pattern for the
Middle Ages. "[I]n the Western world," Davis indicates, "it was
the Roman law that gave a systematic and enduring form to the
rights of masters and slaves."'55 In more recent times, manumission
144. W. BUCKLAND, A TExT-BOOK OF ROMAN LAW 64 (1964 ed.).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 64-65.
147. Id. at 65.
148. Id.
149. W. WESTERMANN, SLAVE SYSTEMS, supra note 112, at 18.
150. See M. KONVITZ & T. LESKES, A CENTURY OF CIVIL RIGHTS 22 (1961).
151. W. WESTERMANN, SLAVE SYSTEMS, supra note 112, at 23.
152. See R. BARROW, SLAVERY IN THE ROMAN EMPIRE 173-207 (1968 ed.); W.
BUCKLAND, ROMAN LAW, supra note 80, at 437-597.
153. W. WESTERMANN, SLAVE SYSTEMS, supra note 112, at 34-36.
154. Id. at 79.
155. D. DAVIS, WESTERN CULTURE, supra note 80, at 32. "By a remarkable coinci-
dence," Davis has noted, "a variety of laws designed to protect slaves appeared at
about the same time in China, India, Ptolemaic Egypt, and Rome." D. DAVIS,
WESTERN CULTURE, supra note 80, at 83 n.63. See also note 115 supra.
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was apparently made relatively easy in Latin America,'58 while in
the southern states of the United States "everything was done to
place obstacles in the way of manumission."' 51
Because of the historic difficulties in securing the abolition of
slavery and the slow progress toward amelioration of its incidents,
international efforts at the turn of the nineteenth century were di-
rected principally toward prohibiting the slave trade so as to reduce
the number of slaves.'58 Thus, in 1807, Great Britain forbade the
slave trade in all its colonies.'59 In 1814, Britain and France under-
took joint endeavors, through the Treaty of Paris, to suppress the
slave trade.'60 This joint effort was soon translated into an eight-
power declaration at the Congress of Vienna in 1815.11 The Vienna
Declaration characterized the slave trade "as repugnant to the prin-
ciples of humanity and universal morality,"'82 and as "a scourge
which has so long desolated Africa, degraded Europe, and afflicted
156. "See M. KONVITZ & T. LESKES, A CENTURY OF CIVIL RIGHTS 25-36 (1961).
157. Id. at 33. "[To the Negro in Brazil, slavery was an open system; to the
Negro in the South, slavery was a closed system." Id. Cf. C. DEGLER, NEITHER
BLACK NOR WHITE: SLAVERY AND RACE RELATIONS IN BRAZIL AND THE UNITED STATES
(1971); S. ELKINS, SLAVERY 239-53 (2d ed. 1968); H. KLEIN, SLAVERY IN THE AMERI-
CAS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF VmGINIA AND CUBA (1967); F. TANNENBAUM, SLAVE AND
CITIZEN: THE NEGRO IN THE AMERICAS (1946); P. Murray, supra note 83, at 252-84.
158. The anti-slavery movement at the turn of the nineteenth century was most
powerful in Great Britain where William Wilberforce was the acknowledged leader.
See generally R. COUPLAND, THE BRITISH ANTI-SLAVERY MOVEMENT (1933); R. CoUP-
LAND, WILBERFORCE: A NARRATIVE (1923); J. HARRIS, A CENTURY OF EMANCIPATION
1-52 (1933); F. KLINGBERG, THE ANTI-SLAVERY MOVEMENT IN ENGLAND (1968 ed.);
0. SHERRARD, FREEDOM FROM FEAR: THE SLAVE AND HIS EMANCIPATION (1959).
For a concise and useful account of international efforts to suppress slavery and
the slave trade see UNITED NATIONS, THE SUPPRESSION OF SLAVERY, U.N. Doc.
ST/SOA/4 (1951) (Memorandum submitted by the Secretary-General) [hereinafter
cited as U.N. MEMORANDUM ON SLAVERY]. See also M. GANJI, INTERNATIONAL PRO-
TECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 87-112 (1962); C. GREENIDGE, supra note 81, at
171-200; Nanda & Bassiouni, Slavery and Slave Trade: Steps Toward
Eradication, 12 SANTA CLARA LAWYER 424 (1972).
159. A. ROBERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD 15 (1972).
160. See 1 E. HERTSLET, THE MAP OF EUROPE BY TREATY 20 (1875) [hereinafter
cited as HERTSLET'S TREATY COLLECTION]; 1 KEY TREATIES FOR THE GREAT POWERS
1814-1914, at 15-16 (M. Hurst ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as KEY TREATIES].
Additional Articles between France and Great Britain-Paris, 30th May, 1814, 1
BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 1812-1814, at 172 (1841).
161. See 3 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS, 1815-1816, at 971 (1838); 1
HERTSLET'S TREATY COLLECTION, supra note 160, at 60. The eight declarants were:
Austria, France, Great Britain, Portugal, Prussia, Russia, Spain, and Sweden. For
a diplomatic account see H. NICOLSON, THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA-A STUDY IN
ALLIED UNITY: 1812-1822, at 209-14, 292-93 (Viking Compass ed. 1961).
162. 1 HERTSLET'S TREATY COLLECTION, supra note 160, at 60.
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humanity.""'63 It then expressed the common desire for "prompt and
effective" measures toward "the universal abolition of' the Slave
Trade.""' The Declaration, however, was toned down in deference
to "the interests, the habits, and even the prejudices" of the signa-
tory states,'65 with the understanding that it could not "prejudge the
period that each particular Power may consider as most advisable
for the definitive abolition of the Slave Trade.""' The Vienna Decla-
ration of 1815 was reaffirmed by Austria, France, Great Britain,
Prussia, and Russia in 1822 at Verona,"' when those countries ex-
pressed their readiness to "concur in everything that may secure
and accelerate the complete and final abolition" of the traffic in
slaves.""'
Moving from separate national action toward joint action, inter-
national measures in the middle of the nineteenth century included
attempts to police the slave trade on the high seas by providing a
right of visit, search, and seizure. '"' In this regard, the leading initia-
tives of Great Britain met with very considerable opposition because
both the United States and France were deeply suspicious of British
naval power. Though it was controversial whether the right of visit
and search for suppression of the slave trade was in accord with
customary international law,'70 significant efforts were made to se-
cure this right by agreement, culminating in a number of bilateral
and multilateral treaties that explicitly confirmed mutual rights of
visit and search. The Treaty of 1831 between France and Great
Britain 7' stipulated that the "mutual right of search may be exer-
cised on board the Vessels of each of the two Nations,"'7 2 but con-
fined it to the waters specified in the Treaty, i.e., areas along the
western coast of Africa, around Madagascar, and similar areas
around Brazil, Cuba, and Puerto Rico.13
163. Id.
164. Id. at 61.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 695.
168. Id. at 696.
169. See generally T. LAWRENCE, VISITATION AND SEARCH (1858); H. SOULSBY, THE
RIGHT OF SEARCH AND THE SLAVE TRADE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS 1814-1862
(1933).
170. See M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 881-82
(1962).
171. 18 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 1830-1831, at 641 (1833). The Treaty
was signed at Paris on November 30, 1831.
172. Id. at 642 (art. 1).
173. Id.
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Modeled upon the earlier treaties between Great Britain and
France, the Treaty of London of 1841,174 signed by Austria, Great
Britain, Prussia, Russia, and France, was to set a pattern for subse-
quent agreements. The treaty obliged the signatory states to "pro-
hibit all trade in slaves, either by their respective subjects, or under
their respective flags, or by means of capital belonging to their
respective subjects; and to declare such traffic piracy." '175 "[Any
vessel which may attempt to carry on the Slave Trade," it added,
"shall, by that fact alone, lose all right to the protection of their
flag."'76 Warships of any of the signatory states were empowered to
visit and search such vessels. If the vessels were found to be trans-
porting slaves, they were to be seized and handed over to the appro-
priate tribunals of the states to which they belonged.1 17
Prior to President Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation, 17 the
United States and Great Britain concluded the Treaty of Washing-
ton of 1862,179 conferring upon each other a reciprocal right of visit,
search, and detention of ships suspected of engaging in the slave
trade on the high seas.18 The exercise of this right was, however,
restricted to an area "within the distance of 200 miles from the coast
of Africa, and to the southward of the 32 parallel of north latitude;
and within 30 leagues from the coast of the island of Cuba."8 1 Cap-
tured vessels were to be brought before a Mixed Court of Justice,
"formed of an equal number of individuals of the two nations,""1 2
which would employ a procedure different from that of the federal
or state courts, and be authorized to pronounce judgment without
174. 30 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 1841-1842, at 269 (1858). The Treaty
was signed at London on December 20, 1841.
175. Id. at 272 (art. 1).
176. Id.
177. See id. at 272-84 (arts. 2-14).
178. Proclamation of January 1, 1863, 12 Stat. 1268. For the background and the
aftermath of the Proclamation see J. FRANKLIN, THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION
(1963); J. FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM 239-338 (1956); Dillard, The
Emancipation Proclamation in the Perspective of Time, 23 LAW IN TRANSITION 95
(1963).
179. 52 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 1861-1862, at 50 (1868). The Treaty
was signed at Washington on April 7, 1862, and became effective when ratifications
were exchanged at London on May 20, 1862.
180. Id. at 50-51 (art. 1).
181. Id. at 51 (art. 1(4)).
182. Id. at 53 (art. 4). These courts were located at Sierra Leone, the Cape of
Good Hope, and New York. Id. See also id. at 51-53 (arts. 2-3).
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appeal. 113
In the late nineteenth century, important progress was made with
the adoption of the General Act of the Berlin Conference on Central
Africa of 18854 and the General Act of the Brussels Conference of
1890,1 both of which sought to eradicate slavery and to suppress the
slave trade. The General Act of Berlin of 1885, after expressing the
signatories' pledge to "strive for the suppression of slavery and esp-
cially of the Negro-slave trade,"'' 8 affirmed that "trading in slaves
is forbidden in conformity with the principles of international law
as recognized by the signatory powers."' 8 It further declared that
the territories of the Congo basin were not to "serve as a market or
way of transit for the trade in slaves of any race whatever.""'8 The
contracting states were to employ all means at their disposal to
terminate the slave trade and to punish those engaged in it.' s9
The General Act of the Brussels Conference of 1890, called "the
Magna Carta of the African slave trade,"'80 was the high point in
international efforts to suppress the slave trade before World War
I. Signed and ratified by 17 states, the General Act contained 100
articles under seven chapters, embodying a number of military,
legislative, and economic measures.'91 The Act condemned slavery
and the slave trade,'92 though it failed to define these terms, and
183. For detail see id. at 58 (ANNEX B-Regulations for the Mixed Courts of
Justice).
184. GENERAL ACT of the Conference of Berlin, Relative to the Development
of Trade and Civilization in Africa; the free Navigation of the Rivers Congo, Niger,
&c; the Suppression of the Slave Trade by Sea and Land; the Occupation of
Territory on the African Coasts &c; Signed at Berlin, 26th February 1885. 2 KEY
TREATIES, supra note 160, at 880.
185. 82 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 1889-1890, at 55 (1896). For its text
in English see U.N. MEMORANDUM ON SLAVERY, supra note 158, at 46-68; 3 AM. J.
INT'L L. 29 (1909).
186. U.N. MEMORANDUM ON SLAVERY, supra note 158, at 9 (art. 6). Compare id.,
with the other translated versions in 2 KEY TREATIES, supra note 160, at 885-86; 3
AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 35 (1909).
187. U.N. MEMORANDUM ON SLAVERY, supra note 158, at 9 (art. 9).
188. Id.
189. See id.
190. C. GREENIDGE, supra note 81, at 176.
191. A significant fact about the General Act of Brussels was the range of its
signatory states. They included not only all the major European powers and the
United States, but also Turkey, Persia, and Zanzibar; the latter three still recog-
nized slavery at the time.
192. Article 3 of the Act provides:
The powers exercising a sovereignty or a protectorate in Africa confirm and
give precision to their former declarations, and engage to proceed gradually,
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prohibited the trade in arms and ammunition which had been
closely linked to slave-raiding and slave-selling in Africa. 193
Though it fell short of offering a general right to visit and search,
the Brussels General Act contained detailed provisions on visit and
search of vessels of less than 500 tons within a specified maritime
zone in which the slave trade still existed.194 According to Article
XLII, if officers in command of a warship had reason to believe a
vessel of less than 500 tons in the maritime zone was "engaged in
the slave trade" or "guilty of the fraudulent use of a flag," they were
empowered to "examine the ship's papers."'95 This latter authority
was confined to examination of documents unless the flag state of
the suspected ship was a party to a special convention, in which case
the examining officers were authorized to call the roll of the passen-
gers and crew. 9' If the officer was "convinced" that an act con-
nected with the slave trade had occurred on board, the ship was
escorted into the nearest port where there was "a competent magis-
trate of the power whose flag has been used."'97
An important contribution of the Brussels General Act to the
transnational condemnation of slavery was the institutionalization
of an intelligence function,9 8 a function vital to combatting both
slavery and the slave trade. Two permanent agencies were estab-
lished. The first was an International Maritime Office at Zanzibar,
represented by a delegate from each of the contracting states, whose
as circumstances may permit, either by the means above indicated, or by any
other means that they may consider suitable, with the repression of the slave-
trade, each State in its respective possessions and under its own direction.
Whenever they consider it possible, they shall lend their good offices to such
powers as, with a purely humanitarian object, may be engaged in Africa in
the fulfillment of a similar mission.
U.N. MEMORANDUM ON SLAVERY, supra notd 158, at 47-48. Article 1(1) emphasizes
that among
the most effective means of counteracting the slave-trade in the interior of
Africa [is p]rogressive organization of the administration, judicial, religious,
and military services in the African territories placed under the sovereignty
or protectorate of civilized nations.
Id. at 46.
193. See id. at 49-51 (arts. 8-14).
194. See U.N. MEMORANDUM ON SLAVERY, supra note 158, at 57-59 (arts.
42-49). See also 1 UNITED NATIONS LEGISLATIVE SERIES, LAWS AND REGULATIONS ON
THE REGIME OF THE HIGH SEAS 273-74, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/1 (1951).
195. U.N. MEMORANDUM ON SLAvERY,supra note 158, at 57 (art. 42).
196. Id. at 57-58 (arts. 44-45).
197. Id. at 58 (art. 49).
198. On the intelligence function see McDougal, Lasswell & Reisnian, The Intel-
ligence Function and World Public Order, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 365 (1973).
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objective was to "centralize all documents and information of a
nature to facilitate the repression of the slave trade in the maritime
zone."' 9 9 Signatory states were required to furnish the following in-
formation: instructions given to the commanders of warships navi-
gating the seas of the Maritime Zone, summaries of reports to gov-
ernments regarding the grounds of seizure and of minutes indicating
the results of searches, lists of "territorial or consular authorities
and special delegates competent to take action as regards vessels
seized, '20 copies of judgments and condemnations of vessels, and
"[a]ll information that might lead to the discovery of persons en-
gaged in the slave trade" in the specified zone. 20' The second office
was an International Bureau at Brussels, attached to the Belgian
Foreign Office, whose objective was to facilitate exchange and circu-
lation of documents and information concerning the slave trade.2 12
The contracting states undertook to transmit to each other the text
of their laws and administrative regulations relating to -the General
Act °3 and all "[s]tatistical information concerning the slave trade,
slaves arrested and liberated, and the traffic in fire arms, ammuni-
tion, and alcoholic liquors. ' 24 The Zanzibar Office was to submit
annual reports to the Bureau at Brussels which was to be responsi-
ble for the collection and periodic publication of relevant documents
and information.20 5
The crystallization of transnational perspectives establishing the
unlawfulness of slavery was accelerated by the efforts of national
communities, paralleling the international efforts to suppress trade
in slaves, to abolish slavery itself. Thus in England, slavery seems
to have been regarded as unlawful at least since Somersett's case
in 1772.28 In 1791 the French Assembly proclaimed that "every
199. U.N. MEMORANDUM ON SLAVERY, supra note 158, at 63 (art. 77).
200. Id. at 63 (art. 77(3)).
201. Id. (art. 77(5)).
202. Id. at 64 (art. 82).
203. Id. (art. 81(1)).
204. Id. (art. 81(2)).
205. Id. at 64-65 (arts. 83-84). Because of the Brussels General Act, more had
been done by the international community to suppress the slave trade during the
period from its enactment to the outbreak of World War I than at any other
historical period.
206. Somerset v. Stewart, 98 ENG. REP. 499 (K.B. 1772). Cf. A. ROBERTSON,
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD 15 (1972); Fisher, The Suppression of Slavery in
International Law, 2 INT'L L.Q. 28, 31 (1950); Nadelhalft, The Somersett [sic]
Case and Slavery: Myth, Reality and Repercussions, 51 J. NEGRO HisT. 193 (1966).
For earlier efforts to abolish slavery in Europe see W. BROWNLOW, SLAVERY AND
SERFDOM IN EUROPE 204-43 (1969).
[Vol. 24:919
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
person is free as soon as he enters France.""2 7 When abolition laws
were extended to colonial territories or to the "overseas territories"
of the "metropolitan" powers, these laws, by the sheer scope of their
application, added new dimensions to transnational expectations.
Thus, by the Imperial Act of 1833, Great Britain made slavery un-
lawful throughout the British Empire .2 Similarly, France in 1848,29
the Netherlands in 1863,210 and Portugal in 187811 enacted national
laws to outlaw slavery in all their territories. In the United States
the abolition of slavery was an important issue preceding, and
coincided with, the Civil War.212 Other instances of the abolition of
slavery included: Austrial 3 and Chile214 in 1811, Peru in 1821,215
Guatemala in 1824, 21 Ceylon,217 and Dominican Republic21 in 1844,
Tunisia in 1846,211 Denmark2 and Hungary in 1848,221 Ecuador in
1851,222 Argentine in 1853,22 Venezuela in 1854,224 Brazil in 1871, 22
207. H. LAUTERPACHT, AN INTERNATIONAL BILL, supra note 135, at 100.
208. Suppression of Slavery, 2 GENEVA SPECIAL STUDIES No. 4, at 4 (1931)
[hereinafter cited as GENEVA STUDIES ON SLAVERY].
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. The thirteenth amendment, which was ratified on December 6, 1865, pro-
vides:
SECTION 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punish-
ment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist
within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
SECTION 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropri-
ate legislation.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
See generally 2 T. EMERSON, D. HABER & N. DORSEN, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS
IN THE UNITED STATES 1004-08 (student ed. 1967); Hamilton, The Legislative and
,Judicial History of the Thirteenth Amendment (pts. 1-2), 9 NAT'L B.J. 26 (1951)
& 10 NAT'L B.J. 7 (1952); tenBroek, The Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion of the United States, 39 CALIF. L. REV. 171 (1951).
213. See AWAD'S REPORT ON SLAVERY, supra note 128, at 18.
214. Id. at 31.
215. Id at 112.
216. Id. at 70.
217. Id. at 29-30.
218. id. at 55.
219. Id. at 134.
220. Id. at 53.
221. Id. at 73.
222. Id. at 55.
223. Id. at 16.
224. Id. at 161.
225. GENEVA STUDIES ON SLAVERY, supra note 208, at 4.
19751
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Cuba in 1886,211 Egypt in 189 6,2n Siam in 1905,21 and China in
1909.229 The virtual universal identity in national prescription
against slavery did not, however, succeed in abolishing it in fact. As
has been pointed out:
[T]o make slavery illegal and to stamp it out in practice were found
to be two different matters altogether. Laws exist almost everywhere,
but practices do not conform with them. It has become increasingly
clear, in recent decades, that national laws for the abolition of slavery
are not enough.?"
The more direct and explicit transnational perspectives against
slavery were revived after the establishment of the League of Na-
tions. Since activities under the Brussels General Act had been
disrupted by World War I, at the end of the war it was felt among
the state parties to this Act and to the General Act of Berlin of 1885
that a new convention was needed. Hence, the Convention of St.
Germain-en-Laye of 19192l was signed and ratified by Belgium,
France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Building upon and strengthening Article 6 of the Berlin Act of
188 5, 2 the contracting states pledged, according to Article 11 of the
St. Germain Convention,' 3 to exercise their continued vigilance
"over the preservation of the native populations [in Africa] and to
supervise the improvement of the conditions of their moral and
material well being," and to "secure the complete suppression of
slavery in all its forms," including forced labor, sham adoption of
children, involuntary concubinage, and debt bondage, and "of the
slave trade by land and sea."2 4 In widening the concept of slavery
to include its functional equivalents-"slavery in all its
forms"-this Convention was a step forward. It has, however, been
criticized on the grounds that it failed to embody provisions for
enforcement, and that it had, according to a widely subscribed in-
terpretation, the unfortunate effect of abrogating the Berlin Act of
1885 and the Brussels Act of 1890, at least among the immediately
226. AWAD's REPORT ON SLAVERY, supra note 128, at 49.
227. Id. at 139.
228. H. LAUTERPACHT, AN INTERNATIONAL BILL, supra note 135, at 101 n.11.
229. Id.
230. GENEVA STUDIES ON SLAVERY, supra note 208, at 4.
231. Convention with other Powers revising the General Act of Berlin, Sept. 10,
1919, 49 STAT. 3027, T.S. No. 877 (effective April 3, 1930).
232. See notes 184-89 & accompanying text supra; U.N. MEMORANDUM ON
SLAVERY, supra note 158, at 9.
233. U.N. MEMORANDUM ON SLAVERY, supra note 158, at 12.
234. Id.
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contracting parties. 5
The Covenant of the League of Nations touched upon slavery in
the context of the Mandates System which was purportedly de-
signed to fulfill "a sacred trust of civilisation" by promoting "the
well-being and development" of the inhabitants of the .mandated
territories.23 Article 22(5) of the Covenant proscribed practices
"such as the slave trade" in these territories.237 General interna-
tional conventions governing the slave trade, existing or prospec-
tive, were made applicable to all classes of Mandate. The special
charters for the "C" mandates stipulated, as a rule, that "the slave
trade shall be prohibited and no forced labor be permitted except
for essential public work and services, and then only in return for
adequate remuneration." ' In the case of the Class B mandates, it
was incumbent upon the mandatory power to facilitate the ultimate
emancipation of all slaves and the elimination of slavery, domestic
and other, as speedily as social conditions would permit. 9 The
mandatory powers were required to submit annual reports on their
administration, furnishing information relating to slavery and the
slave trade, and to forced labor and other forms of servitude, as well
as measures taken for their suppression. These reports were first
examined by the Permanent Mandates Commission, a body of ex-
perts, and then transmitted to the Council of the League for review
and recommendations. 240
In an effort to cope with the question of slavery on a wider scale,
235. See id. at 11; C. GREENIDGE, supra note 81, at 178-79.
236. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 22(1). See also J. HARRIS, SLAVERY OR
"SACRED TRUST?" (1926).
237. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 22(5).
238. GENEVA STUDIES ON SLAVERY, supra note 208, at 5.
239. See U.N. MEMORANDUM ON SLAVERY, supra note 158, at 12, 27-28.
These prescriptions about slavery were reinforced by Article 23 of the Covenant,
the applicability of which was not confined to mandated territories. Pursuant to
this Article, the Members of the League,
(a) will endeavour to secure and maintain fair and humane conditions of
labour for men, women, and children, both in their own countries and in all
countries to which their commercial and industrial relations extend, and for
that purpose will establish and maintain the necessary international organi-
zations;
(b) undertake to secure just treatment of the native inhabitants of territo-
ries under their control;
(c) will entrust the League with the general supervision over the execution
of agreements with regard to the traffic in women and children ....
LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 23(a)-(c).
240. See U.N. MEMORANDUM ON SLAVERY, supra note 158, at 28.
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rather than merely in the mandated territories, the League of Na-
tions in 1922 created the Temporary Slavery Commission to ap-
praise global conditions and to make recommendations. 4' The re-
port of the Commission in 192542 led to the adoption by the League
Assembly, on September 25, 1926, of a most important convention
which is still operative.243 The Slavery Convention of 1926244 contains
only twelve articles. At the outset, in Article 1, it seeks to clarify the
conception of the slavery that is being prohibited and to reconfirm
older perspectives against the slave trade:
(1) Slavery is the status or condition of a person over whom any or
all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised.
(2) The slave trade includes all acts involved in the capture, ac-
quisition or disposal of a person with intent to reduce him to slavery;
all acts involved in the acquisition of a slave with a view to selling or
exchanging him; all acts of disposal by sale or exchange of a slave
acquired with a view to being sold or exchanged, and, in general,
every act of trade or transport in slaves.245
In Article 2, the contracting parties undertake to "prevent and sup-
press the slave trade" and "bring about, progressively and as soon
as possible, the complete abolition of slavery in all its forms.
2 40
Slavery, as defined in Article 1(1), could be interpreted to confine
what is prohibited technically to "chattel slavery" only.2 41 Similarly,
the qualification, "bring about progressively and as soon as possi-
ble, 2 48 obviously weakens the commitment toward the "complete
241. See id. at 12; GENEVA STUDIES ON SLAVERY, supra note 208, at 7-8.
242. League of Nations Doc. A.19.1925. VI (1925). The Commission submitted
the Report to Sir Eric Drummond, Secretary-General of the League, on July 25,
1925. See 5 MONTHLY SUMMARY OF THE LEAGUE OF NATiONS 180-83 (Aug. 15, 1925).
243. See note 280 & accompanying text infra.
244. International Convention to Suppress Slave Trade and Slavery, adopted
Sept. 25, 1926, 46 Stat. 2183, T.S. No. 778, 60 L.N.T.S. 253 (entered into force Mar.
9, 1927) [hereinafter cited as Convention to Suppress Slave Trade]. For a com-
mentary see A. WARNSHUIS, J. CHAMBERLAIN & Q. WRIGHT, THE SLAVERY CONVENTION
OF GENEVA, SEPTEMBER 25, 1926 (International Conciliation No. 236, 1928).
245. Convention to Suppress Slave Trade, supra note 244, art. 1, 60 L.N.T.S. at
263.
246. Id. art. 2.
247. Regarding "chattel slavery" see C. GREENIDGE, supra note 81, at 36-48.
248. Such a gradual approach was justified on the ground that
sudden abolition would almost certainly result in social and economic dis-
turbances which would be more prejudicial to the development and well-
being of the peoples than the provisional continuation of the present state of
affairs.
U.N. MEMORANDUM ON SLAVERY, supra note 158, at 15.
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abolition of slavery." The choice words, "slavery in all its forms,"
is, however, of considerable significance, especially in the light of
Article 5 which concerns forced labor:
The High Contracting Parties recognize that recourse to compul-
sory or forced labour may have grave consequences and undertake,
each in respect of the territories placed under its sovereignty, jurisdic-
tion, protection, suzerainty or tutelage, to take all necessary mea-
sures to prevent compulsory or forced labour from developing into
conditions analogous to slavery. 249
Compulsory or forced labor, save in certain transitional circumstan-
ces, is to be exacted only for public purposes. Hence, in terms of
broadening the concept of slavery to include certain functional ap-
proximations, the 1926 Convention offers some augmentation to the
previous treaties concerning slavery and the slave trade, including
the General Act of Brussels of 1890.-1
Unfortunately, the measures of implementation achieved were
not adequate to support this policy. In an attempt to revive a right
to visit, search, and seize vessels carrying slaves, the British govern-
ment proposed before the Sixth Assembly of the League in 1925 that
provision be made to treat the transport of slaves as piracy, thereby
empowering public ships to exercise the same authority regarding
such vessels as for those engaged in piracy.2' The proposal was not
accepted.12 Instead, Article 3 of the Convention merely binds the
contracting parties to
adopt all appropriate measures with a view to preventing and sup-
pressing the embarkation, disembarkation and transport of slaves in
their territorial waters and upon all vessels flying their respective
flags.23
Article 3 further states that the parties "undertake to negotiate as
soon as possible a general Convention with regard to the slave
trade."' 4 This provision, as indicated in the United Nations Memo-
randum of 1951, "envisaged a revival with some modification of the
249. Convention to Suppress Slave Trade, supra note 244, art. 5, 60 L.N.T.S. at
265.
250. See notes 159-240 & accompanying text supra.
251. See Gutteridge, Supplementary Slavery Convention, 1956, 6 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 449, 454-56 (1957).
252. Id. See also M. McDouGAL & W. BURKE, THE PuBLIc ORDER OF THE OCEANS
883 (1962).
253. Convention to Suppress Slave Trade, supra note 244, art. 3, 60 L.N.T.S. at
263.
254. Id.
1975]
966 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
maritime provisions of the General Act of Brussels 1890 as regards
the Indian Ocean and Red Sea Coastal areas zone."25 The contem-
plated General Convention has, however, never materialized. Simi-
larly, no continuing agencies comparable to those under the General
Act of Brussels have been established.
The proscription of forced labor which, in the words of Article 5
of the 1926 Slavery Convention, tends to develop into "conditions
analogous to slavery,"' " was given further concrete expression when
the Convention concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour,257 under
the auspices of the International Labour Organization, was adopted
on June 28, 1930, and came int6 effect on May 1, 1932. This Conven-
tion is significant in its recognition that "direct slavery cannot be
overcome successfully until a way is found to deal with the variety
of forms of coercive labor which in many cases become analogous
to the root evil itself. ' 258 Article 1 of the Convention binds the con-
tracting parties "to suppress the use of forced or compulsory labour
in all its forms within the shortest possible period."2 9 "Forced or
compulsory labour" is defined as "all work or service which is ex-
acted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for
which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily. ' " 2 Article
2(2) explicitly exempts from this proscription "any work or service
exacted in virtue of compulsory military service laws, ' 261 "normal
civic obligations, '2 2 "a conviction in a court of law," '263 emergen-
cies, 2" and "minor communal services. 265 In sum, while the Con-
vention forbids forced labor "for private purposes" in unequivocal
terms, it adopts "a policy of gradual elimination" of forced labor
"for public purposes. '"266
255. U.N. MEMORANDUM ON SLAVERY, supra note 158, at 18.
256. Convention to Suppress Slave Trade, supra note 244, art. 5, 60 L.N.T.S. at
265.
257. Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, adopted June 28,
1930, 60 U.N.T.S. 55 (I.L.O. General Conference) (entered into force May 1, 1932).
258. GENEVA STUDIES ON SLAVERY, supra note 208, at 12.
259. Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, adopted June 28,
1930, art. 1(1), 60 L.N.T.S. 55, 56 (I.L.O. General Conference) (entered into force
May 1, 1932).
260. Id. art. 2(1), 60 L.N.T.S. at 58.
261. Id. art. 2(2)(a).
262. Id. art. 2(2)(b).
263. Id. art. 2(2)(c).
264. Id. art. 2(2)(d).
265. Id. art. 2(2)(e).
266. C. JENKS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL LABOUR STANDARDS 28-29
(1960). On the question of forced labor see W. KLOOSTERPOER, INVOLUNTARY LABOUR
[Vol. 24:919
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
The establishment of the United Nations brought a new intensity
to international efforts to eradicate slavery and suppress the slave
trade. Though the word "slavery" is not used in the Charter of the
United Nations, the provisions concerning human rights throughout
the document make slavery completely incompatible with the
Charter. 6 '
The Charter's fundamental thrust against slavery is made more
explicit in the words of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.28 Article 4 of this Declaration, an article acclaimed by one
commentator as "the cornerstone of all human rights, ' 29 states:
No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave
trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.
2 1
0
The legislative history of this Article establishes that the term "ser-
vitude" was intended to be so inclusive as to embrace the various
functional equivalents of slavery, such as traffic in women, forced
labor, and debt bondage. 271 In an instrument stressing that "[aill
human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights" 272 and
that "[e]veryone has the right to recognition everywhere as a per-
SINCE THE ABOLrrION OF SLAVERY (1960).
267. The Charter expresses its profound concern for human rights in its pream-
ble and in six different articles; U.N. CHARTER arts. 1(3), 3(1)(b), 55, 56, 62, & 76.
After reaffirming "faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of
the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and
small," the preamble projects, as one of its fundamental goals, international coop-
eration in "promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamen-
tal freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." Id.
preamble. Phrases such as "promoting and encouraging respect of human rights"
and "assisting in the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms" ap-
pear with slight variations elsewhere in the Charter. Under Article 56
[aill Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-
operation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth
in Article 55.
Id. art. 56.
Among the above-mentioned purposes of Article 55 is "universal respect for, and
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinctions
as to race, sex, language, or religion."
Id. art. 55.
268. Universal Declaration, note 55 supra.
269. N. ROBINSON, THE UNIvERsAL DECLARATION OF HuMAN RIGHTS 107 (1958).
270. Universal Declaration, supra note 55, art. 4, U.N. Doc. A/810 at 73.
271. N. ROBINSON, THE DELCARATION OF HuMAN RIGHTS 107-08 (1958).
272. Universal Declaration, supra note 55, art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/810 at 72.
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son before the law, '273 a less inclusive formulation could scarcely be
accepted.
In consolidation of earlier efforts, a new Convention for the Sup-
pression of the Traffic in Persons and the Exploitation of the Prosti-
tution of Others24 in 1949 proscribed an ancient form of human
bondage. This Convention records the agreement of the parties to
punish any person who, to gratify the passions of another:
1. Procures, entices or leads away, for purposes of prostitution,
another person, even with the consent of that person;
2. Exploits the prostitution of another person, even with the con-
sent of that personY5
The Convention also makes an offense of keeping or managing or
knowingly financing "a brothel," or knowingly letting or renting "a
building or other place" "for the purpose of the prostitution of oth-
ers. '276 These offenses are, further, made "extraditable offenses. '2 7
The Convention, unfortunately, relies largely upon penal sanctions
which have proved peculiarly inadequate in coping with this mode
of human bondage. In the words of Nanda and Bassiouni:
[T]he emphasis was on penal sanctions without giving adequate
consideration to the endemic social and psychological reasons for the
existence of the problem and without any serious attempts at chang-
ing subjectivities and mores .2 1
As a result of a number of surveys requested by the General As-
sembly and the Economic and Social Council,279 the United Nations
has formally assumed the functions of the League of Nations under
the 1926 Slavery Convention by virtue of a Protocol adopted by the
General Assembly in 1953.80 More importantly, the broad formula-
tion of slavery in Article 4 of the Universal Declaration of Human
273. Id. art. 6.
274. Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploi-
tation of the Prostitution of Others, opened for signature Mar. 21, 1950, 96
U.N.T.S. 271 (entered into force July 25, 1951).
275. Id. art. 1, 96 U.N.T.S. at 274.
276. Id. art. 2.
277. Id. art. 8, 96 U.N.T.S. at 276. We do not deal here with all aspects of this
Convention. Other dimensions will be dealt with in a separate study on the affec-
tion value.
278. Nanda & Bassiouni, Slavery and Slave Trade: Steps Toward Eradication,
12 SANTA CLARA LAWYER 424, 440 (1972).
279. See UNITED NATIONS, THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 17 (1973).
280. Protocol Amending the Slavery Convention, opened for signature Dec. 7,
1953, [1956] 1 U.S.T. 479, T.I.A.S. No. 3532, 212 U.N.T.S. 17 (entered into force
Dec. 7,1953).
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Rights has been put into convention form. The Supplementary Con-
vention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institu-
tions and Practices Similar to Slavery,81 adopted on April 30, 1956,
and entering into effect exactly a year later, seeks, as its lengthy
title and preamble show, to "supplement" and "augment," and not
to "abrogate," the 1926 Slavery Convention by according prominent
attention to efforts to eliminate "institutions and practices similar
to slavery," i.e., all the various functional approximations to slav-
ery. 182 Article 1 binds the contracting parties to
take all practicable and necessary legislative and other measures to
bring about progressively and as soon as possible the complete aboli-
tion or abandonment of the following institutions and practices ....
(a) Debt bondage, that is to say, the status or condition arising
from a pledge by a debtor of his personal services or of those of a
person under his control as security for a debt, if the value of those
services as reasonably assessed is not applied towards the liquidation
of the debt or the length and nature of those services are not respec-
tively limited and defined;
(b) Serfdom, that is to say, the condition or status of a tenant who
is by law, custom or agreement bound to live and labour on land
belonging to another person and to render some determinate service
to such other person, whether for reward or not, and is not free to
change his status;
(c) Any institution or practice whereby:
(i) A woman, without the right to refuse, is promised or given in
marriage on payment of a consideration in money or in kind to her
parents, guardian, family or any other person or group; or
(ii) The husband of a woman, his family, or his clan, has the right
to transfer her to another person for value received or otherwise; or
(iii) A woman on the death of her husband is liable to be inherited
by another person;
(d) Any institution or practice whereby a child or young person
under the age of 18 years is delivered by either or both of his natural
parents or by his guardian to another person, whether for reward or
not, with a view to the exploitation of the child or young person or of
his labour.2n
In other provisions, in order to minimize the bondage of women,
281. Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade,
and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, done Sept. 7, 1956, [1967] 3
U.S.T. 3201, T.I.A.S. No. 6418, 266 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Apr. 30, 1957)
[hereinafter cited as Supplementary Convention on Abolition of Slavery].
282. Id. preamble, [1967] 3 U.S.T. at 3204, 266 U.N.T.S. at 40-41.
283. Id. art. 1, [1967] 3 U.S.T. at 3204-05, 266 U.N.T.S. at 41'.
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the Convention stresses the importance of "consent" in marriages,
and encourages national prescription of "suitable minimum ages of
marriage" and "the registration of marriages." ' In broader reach,
Article 4 provides that "[a]ny slave who takes refuge on board any
vessel of a State Party to this Convention shall ipso facto be free.","
Article 5 forbids "mutilating, branding or otherwise marking a slave
or a person of servile status.""28 While the word "slavery" is em-
ployed, as under the 1926 Convention, to designate classic "chattel"
slavery, "a person of servile status" is made to refer to a victim of
practices analogous to slavery, as outlined in Article 1 of the
Convention.287
In measures toward implementation, the intelligence function is
emphasized, requiring both mutual exchanges of information
among the parties and active cooperation with the United Nations.
The parties undertake to communicate to the U.N. Secretary-
General, as a clearing center, "copies of any laws, regulations and
administrative measures enacted or put into effect to implement the
provisions of this Convention." '88 Despite efforts to revive a right of
visit and search for vessels engaged in the slave trade, equating such
ships with those engaged in piracy,"8 9 the 1956 Supplementary Con-
vention provides only Article 3(1) which reads:
The act of conveying or attempting to convey slaves from one country
to another by whatever means of transport, or of being accessory
thereto, shall be a criminal offense under the laws of the States Par-
ties to this Convention and persons convicted thereof shall be liable
to very severe penalties. '
The responsibility for punishment is, by this provision, confined to
the flag state. Fortunately, this gap was quickly remedied by the
Convention on the High Seas concluded in 1958.81 This Convention,
in addition to incorporating the substance of the 1956 Supplemen-
tary Convention,'9 2 stipulates in Article 22(1) a "reasonable ground
284. Id. art. 2, [1967] 3 U.S.T. at 3205, 266 U.N.T.S. at 42.
285. Id. art. 4.
286. Id. art. 5.
287. Id. art. 7, [1967] 3 U.S.T. at 3206, 266 U.N.T.S. at 43.
288. Id. art. 8(2), [1967] 3 U.S.T. at 3206, 266 U.N.T.S. at 44.
289. See Gutteridge, Supplementary Slavery Convention, 1956, 6 INT'L COMP.
L.Q. 449, 454-60, 465-69 (1957).
290. Supplementary Convention on Abolition of Slavery, supra note 281, art.
3(1), [1967] 3 U.S.T. at 3205, 266 U.N.T.S. at 42.
291. Convention on the High Seas, done Apr. 29, 1958, [1962] 2 U.S.T. 2313,
T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82.
292. Article 13 of the High Seas Convention reads:
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for suspecting" that "the ship is engaged in the slave trade," along
with suspicion of piracy, as among the exceptional circumstances
which justify a warship in boarding "a foreign merchant on the high
seas. "293
In response to the findings of the United Nations International
Labour Organization Ad Hoc Committee on Forced Labour regard-
ing the prevalence of "forced" or "corrective" labor as an instru-
ment of "political coercion" or for other purposes,2 94 a new
Convention concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour was unani-
mously adopted, on June 25, 1957, by the General Conference of the
International Labour Organization.2 95 Article 1 of the Convention
provides:
Each Member of the International Labour Organization which rati-
fies this Convention undertakes to suppress and not to make use of
any form of forced or compulsory labour:
(a) As a means of political coercion or education or as a punishment
for holding or expressing political views or views ideologically op-
posed to the established political, social or economic system;
(b) As a method of mobilising and using labour for purposes of
economic development;
(c) As a means of labour discipline;
(d) As a punishment for having participated in strikes;
Every state shall adopt effective measures to prevent and punish the trans-
port of slaves in ships authorized to fly its flag, and to prevent the unlawful
use of its flag for that purpose. Any slave taking refuge on board any ship,
whatever its flag, shall ipso facto be free.
Id. art. 13, [1962] 2 U.S.T. at 2316-17, 450 U.N.T.S. at 90.
Compare id., with Article 4 of the 1956 Supplementary Convention:
Any slave who takes refuge on board any vessel of a State Party to this
Convention shall ipso facto be free.
Supplementary Convention on Abolition of Slavery, supra note 281, art. 4, [1967]
3 U.S.T. at 3205, 266 U.N.T.S. at 42.
293. Convention on the High Seas, done Apr. 29, 1958, art. 22(1), [1962] 2
U.S.T. 2318, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82, 92.
294. See UNITED NATIONS & INTERNATIONAL LABoUR OFFICE, REPORT OF THE AD
Hoc CoMMIrrEE ON FORCED LABoUR, U.N. Doc. E/2431 (1953); International Labour
Conference, 39th Session, Geneva, 1956, Report VI (2) (Supplement), REPORT OF
THE ILO COMMITTEE ON FORCED LABOUR (1956); International Labour Conference,
40th Session, Geneva, 1957, Report IV (2) (Supplement), REPORT OF THE ILO COM-
MITTEE ON FORCED LABOUR (1957).
295. Convention Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour, adopted June 25,
1957, 320 U.N.T.S. 292 (entered into force Jan. 17, 1959) (I.L.O. General Confer-
ence). For a commentary see C. JENKS, HuMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL LABOUR
STANDARDs 25-46 (1960).
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(e) As a means of racial, social, national, or religious discrimina-
tion."'
The drive toward implementation similarly takes on added intens-
ity. Unlike the familiar phrases, "within the shortest possible pe-
riod" and "progressively and as soon as possible" employed in the
earlier Conventions, ' the contracting parties pledge themselves to
undertake "effective measures to secure the immediate and
complete abolition of forced or compulsory labour."98
The ever growing transnational perspectives of authority outlaw-
ing slavery in all its manifestations was consolidated in the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights adopted in 1966.99
Thus, Article 8 of the Covenant states:
1. No one shall be held in slavery; slavery and the slave trade in
all their forms shall be prohibited.
2. No one shall be held in servitude.
3. (a) No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory
labour . . . .300
The qualifications to this inclusiveness are that the "forced or com-
pulsory labor" specified in paragraph 3(a) of Article 8 is not to be
held "to preclude, in countries where imprisonment with hard la-
bour may be imposed as a punishment for a crime, the performance
of hard labour in pursuance of a sentence to such punishment by a
competent court," 3°1 and is not to include:
(i) Any work or service, not referred to in sub-paragraph b, nor-
mally required of a person who is under detention in consequence of
a lawful order of a court, or of a person during conditional release
from such detention;
(ii) Any service of a military character and, in countries where
conscientious objection is recognized, any national service required
by law of conscientious objectors;
(iii) Any service exacted in cases of emergency or calamity threat-
ening the life or well-being of the community;
(iv) Any work or service which forms part of normal civil obliga-
tions.20
296. Convention Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour, adopted June 25,
1957, art. 1, 320 U.N.T.S. 294-96 (entered into force Jan. 17, 1959) (I.L.Q. General
Conference).
297. See notes 159-266 & accompanying text supra.
298. Convention Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour, supra note 295, art.
2, 320 U.N.T.S. at 296 (emphasis added).
299. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, note 57 supra.
300. Id. art. 8(1)-(3)(a), U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 54.
301. Id. art. 8(3)(b).
302. Id. art. 8(3)(c).
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The legislative history of Article 8 establishes clearly that, even
if "slavery" is given a more "limited and technical" connotation,33
"servitude" is "a more general idea covering all possible forms of
man's domination of man."" 4 The proposed prohibition is described
as extending to "servitude in any form, whether involuntary or not,"
so as to make it impossible "for any person to contract himself into
bondage."305
On the regional level, comparable provisions, with the same de-
gree of specification and with slight variations in wording, are found
in Article 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights"6 and
Article 6 of the American Convention on Human Rights.3 7 Though
303. Annotations on the text of the Draft International Covenants on Human
Rights, 10 U.N. GAOR, Annexes, Agenda Item No. 28, at 33, U.N. Doc. A/2929
(1955) [hereinafter cited as Annotations on the Covenants].
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Article 4 of the European Convention reads:
(1) No one shall be held in slavery or servitude.
(2) No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour.
(3) For the purpose of this Article the term "forced or compulsory labour"
shall not include:
(a) any work required to be done in the ordinary course of detention im-
posed according to the provisions of Article 5 of this Convention or during
conditional release from such detention;
(b) any service of a military character or, in case of conscientious objectors
in countries where they are recognised, service exacted instead of compulsory
military service;
(c) any service exacted in case of an emergency or calamity threatening
the life or well-being of the community;
(d) any work or service which forms part of normal civic obligations.
European Convention, supra note 11, art. 4, 213 U.N.T.S. at 224-26.
307. Article 6 of the American Convention on Human Rights provides:
1. No one shall be subject to slavery or to involuntary servitude, which are
prohibited in all their forms, as are the slave trade and traffic in women.
2. No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour. This
provision shall not be interpreted to mean that, in those countries in which
the penalty established for certain crimes is deprivation of liberty at forced
labour, the carrying out of such a sentence imposed by a competent court is
prohibited. Forced labour shall not adversely affect the dignity or the physi-
cal or intellectual capacity of the prisoner.
3. For the purposes of this article the following do not constitute forced or
compulsory labour:
(a) work or service normally required of a person imprisoned in execution
of a sentence or formal decision passed by the competent judicial authority.
Such work or service shall be carried out under the supervision and control
of public authorities, and any persons performing such work or service shall
not be placed at the disposal of any private party, company, or juridical
19751
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Article 4 of the European Convention, for reasons unclear, omits
specific reference to "the slave trade," it can scarcely be interpreted
to make the slave trade permissible. Unlike the Covenant and the
European Convention, Article 6(1) of the American Convention"'
uses the wording "involuntary servitude" instead of "servitude" and
enumerates the prohibition of "traffic in women," together with
that of the slave trade. The use of the additional word "involuntary"
could lend support to restrictive interpretation that "voluntary"
servitude is permissible. Such a reading would obviously be a misin-
terpretation, however, in the light of the whole development in
transnational expectations of authority against slavery and servi-
tude . 30 9
The comprehensiveness with which slavery is prohibited is em-
phasized in Article 4(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights310 and in Article 15(2) of the European Conven-
tion,31' both of which provide that under no circumstances (includ-
ing even national emergencies) can there be derogation from the
prohibition of slavery, the slave trade, and servitude. Regrettably,
this restriction is not extended to the proscription of forced labor.3
person;
(b) military service and, in countries in which conscientious objectors are
recognized, national service that the law may provide for in lieu of military
service;
(c) service exacted in time of danger or calamity that threatens the exist-
ence or the well-being of the community; or
(d) work or service that forms part of normal civic obligations.
American Convention, supra note 59, art. 6, 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS at 103.
308. Id. art. 6(1).
309. See notes 158-305 & accompanying text supra.
310. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 57, art. 4(2), 21 U.N.
GAOR Supp. 16, at 53.
311. European Convention, supra note 11, art. 15(2), 213 U.N.T.S. at 232.
312. In the Iversen Case, brought before the European Commission on Human
Rights, Iversen contended that his compulsory assignment under Norway's Provi-
sional Act of 1956 to the public dental service in the Moskenes district in northern
Norway constituted forced or compulsory labor in contravention of Article 4(2) of
the European Convention. Drawing upon "the provisions and application of ILO
Conventions and Resolutions on Forced Labour," the Commission identified the
following two elements as essential to the concept of forced or compulsory labor:
1) "the work or service is performed by the worker against his will," and 2) the work
or service performed "is unjust or oppressive" or "involves avoidable hardship."
Iversen Case, [1963] Y.B. EuR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 278, 328. Applying these
criteria, the Commission concluded that Iversen's service was not forced or compul-
sory labor under Article 14, paragraph (2) of the Convention. The decision was
based on the findings that
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Such deficiency in prohibition is remedied in Article 27 of the Amer-
ican Convention '13 which specifies immunity from derogation for the
prohibition of "forced or compulsory labor," as well as that of slav-
ery, involuntary servitude, or the slave trade.
The continuing need for more effective measures of implementa-
tion to eradicate all forms of slavery has been underscored by insis-
tent demands within the United Nations for further study. At the
request of the Economic and Social Council in July, 1963, the
Secretary-General appointed Mohamed Awad as Special Rappor-
teur on Slavery. 34 Based upon the responses of the member states
of the United Nations, the specialized agencies, and interested non-
governmental organizations with consultative status, the Special
Rapporteur completed a comprehensive survey, Report on
Slavery,3 5 in 1966. After reviewing Awad's report, the Economic and
Social Council, in July, 1966, decided to refer the "question of slav-
ery and the slave trade in all their practices and manifestations,
including the slavery-like practices of apartheid and colonialism ' '316
to the Commission on Human Rights for further study and specific
recommendations of measures of implementation.31 7 The Commis-
sion in turn entrusted this task to its Sub-Commission on Preven-
tion of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities.3 18 Thus, in 1968,
Mohamed Awad was again appointed Special Rapporteur and was
the Provisional Act of 1956 imposed obligatory service, but since such service
was for a short period, provided favourable remuneration, did not involve any
diversion from chosen professional work, was only applied in the case of posts
not filled after being duly advertised, and did not involve any discriminatory,
arbitrary or punitive application, the requirement to perform that service was
not unjust or oppressive; the Law of 1956 was properly applied to Iversen
when he was directed to take up the post at Moskenes; further, in the particu-
lar case of the Applicant, the hardship of the post was mitigated by the
reduction in the required term of his service from 2 years to 1 year.
Id.
An additional ground of justification, based on Article 4(3)(c), was the existence
of an emergency caused by "threat of a breakdown" in the public dental service in
northern Norway. Id. at 330.
313. American Convention, supra note 59, art. 27, 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS at
109.
314. ECOSOC Res. 960, 36 U.N. ECOSOC Supp. 1, at 26, U.N. Doc. E/3816
(1963).
315. AWAD'S REPORT ON SLAVERY, note 128 supra.
316. ECOSOC Res. 1126, 41 U.N. ECOSOC Supp. 1, at 16, U.N. Doc. E/4264
(1966).
317. Id. at 7.
318. Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Twenty-third Session, 20
Feb.-23 March, 1967, 42 U.N. ECOSOC Supp. 6, at 159-61 (1967).
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later instructed to study not only slavery but also "measures for
combating the manifestations of the slavery-like practices akin to
apartheid which exist in Southern Rhodesia and Namibia, espe-
cially the practices of forced, sweated African labour and the total
denial of trade union rights to Africans in those territories. 3'19 After
extensive consultations with the officials of many different
intergovernmental organizations, 320 the Special Rapporteur in 1971
submitted his report 31 which contained a number of concrete pro-
posals toward more effective implementation of the proscriptions of
slavery and the slave trade in all their forms.322
The culmination of these activities has been the adoption by the
Economic and Social Council on June 2, 1972, of an important
resolution, Resolution 1695 (LII) , 3 which incorporates and reflects
essentially, except in one most important point,324 the recommenda-
tions of the Special Rapporteur.32 In summary, the Resolution urges
the following:
1) wider ratifications of, or accession to, the 1926 Slavery Conven-
tion and the 1956 Supplementary Convention; 2
2) enactment of necessary national laws "to prohibit slavery and
the slave trade in all their practices and manifestations and to pro-
vide effective penal sanctions; ' '327
3) wider acceptance of the Forced Labor Convention of 1930, the
Abolition of Forced Labor Convention of 1957, and other related
319. Sub-Commission Resolution 4 (XXII) of 10 September 1969. See Question
of Slavery and the Slave Trade in All Their Practices and Manifestations, Includ-
ing the Slavery-like Practices of Apartheid and Colonialism 5-6, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/322 (1971) (Report submitted by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Mo-
hamed Awad) [hereinafter cited as Awad's 1971 Report].
320. The most important consultations were with officials of the International
Labor Organization, the Office of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,
Division of Narcotic Drugs, International Criminal Police Organization (INTER-
POL), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. See
Awad's 1970 Progress Report, supra note 126, at 11-43; Awad's 1971 Report, supra
note 319, at 9-29. Of non-governmental organizations, the Anti-Slavery Society
contributed most importantly to the Special Rapporteur's survey.
321. Awad's 1971 Report, note 319 supra.
322. See id. at 32-50. See also AwAD's REPORT ON SLAVERY, supra note 128, at
299-314; Awad's 1970 Progress Report, supra note 126, at 43-48.
323. ECOSOC Res. 1695, 52 U.N. ECOSOC Supp. 1, at 21, U. N. Doc. E/5183
(1972).
324. See text accompanying notes 337-51 infra.
325. See note 322 supra.
326. ECOSOC Res. 1695 1, 52 U.N. ECOSOC Supp. 1, at 21, U.N. Doc. E/5183
(1972).
327. Id. 3.
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Conventions and Recommendations adopted by the International
Labor Organization;311
4) the cooperation of the International Criminal Police Organiza-
tion (INTERPOL) with the United Nations, especially in furnishing
information regarding "the international traffic in persons; ' 29
5) transmission by the Secretary-General of relevant information
to the Sub-Commission; 330
6) acceleration of national efforts toward "total emancipation of
slaves and other persons of servile status" and absorption of such
persons into "the general labor force;33'
7) assistance to victimized persons by all specialized agencies,
intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental organiza-
tions concerned;"33 '
8) exploration by the Sub-Commission of the "possibility" of es-
tablishing "some form of permanent machinery; 3 3 3 and
9) preparation by the Secretary-General of "a survey on national
legislation" and "a plan of technical co-operation," and submission
of progress reports.34
iv. Appraisal and recommendations
From a perspective of many decades, there has been a conspicu-
ous and consistent movement in transnational prescription toward
the broad prohibition of servitude in all its many manifestations. 35
In substantive content, the contemporary prohibition would appear
sufficiently comprehensive to meet all pertinent requirements. The
more important community prescriptions most emphatically en-
dorse and reflect basic policies consonant with our fundamental
objectives and specifications honoring freedom of choice.36
In terms of implementation, however, achievements in the trans-
national arena have lagged. Undoubtedly, the adoption of the rec-
ommendations embodied in ECOSOC Resolution 1695 (LII) of
1972337 would contribute greatly toward the elimination of slavery
and the slave trade. The step most urgently required, however, is
the establishment of a permanent body to oversee the application
328. Id. 4, at 22.
329. Id. 6.
330. Id. 7.
331. Id. 8.
332. Id. 9.
333. Id. 12.
334. Id. 13(a)-(b).
335. See notes 136-334 & accompanying text supra.
336. See notes 18-52 & acompanying text supra.
337. See notes 323-34 & accompanying text supra.
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of all relevant international conventions. In this regard, it must be
conceded that the response of the Economic and Social Council has
been disappointing. When the Special Rapporteur of Slavery sub-
mitted his recommendations both in 196633 and in 1971,' 3 he took
occasion to emphasize, in the light of the earlier experience under
the 1890 General Act of Brussels and the League of Nations, the
overriding importance of establishing a standing committee of inde-
pendent experts on slavery. 4 This he insisted was "the one sugges-
tion which can be said to embrace all the other suggestions, '34 ' such
a committee "could help in promoting and supervising all the other
activities. ' 34 2 In 1966, however, the Economic and Social Council
avoided responsibility by referring "the question of slavery and the
slave trade in all their practices and manifestations, including the
slavery-like practices of apartheid and colonialism" to the Commis-
sion on Human Rights.343 The infusion of the issues of "apartheid
and colonialism," matters of proper and continuing concern to other
U.N. bodies, 34 has further had the unfortunate effect of dispersing
attention from the core question of slavery. Similarly, in 1972, the
Economic and Social Council, in its Resolution 1695(LII),340 instead
of establishing appropriate permanent machinery for supervision,
went no further than to order further study and exploration. For this
purpose, it directed
the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection
of Minorities to examine the possibility of the establishment of some
form of permanent machinery to give advice on the elimination of
slavery and on the suppression of the traffic in persons and exploita-
tion of the prostitution of others, and to make recommendations with
a view to seeking the better implementation of the United Nations
instruments concerned. 46
If the world community is genuinely interested in the complete
eradication of all manifestations of slavery, it is urgently necessary
to go beyond further studies and to establish without more delay a
338. AWAD'S REPORT ON SLAVERY, note 128 supra.
339. Awad's 1971 Report, note 319 supra.
340. See AWAD'S REPORT ON SLAVERY, supra note 128, at 307-09; Awad's 1971
Report, supra note 319, at 49-50.
341. AWAD'S REPORT ON SLAVERY, supra note 128, at 307.
342. Id.
343. See text accompanying note 317 supra.
344. See notes 505-650 & accompanying text infra.
345. ECOSOC Res. 1695, 52 U.N. ECOSOC Supp. 1, at 21, U.N. Doc. E/5183
(1972).
346. Id. 12, at 22.
[Vol. 24:919
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
permanent body of independent experts whose charter of authority
follows the guidelines proposed by the Special Rapporteur.3 47 Among
the essential activities of such a body would of course be the
intelligence function-the gathering, processing, and dissemination
of information relevant to decision-making.348 In a world whose crys-
tallized community expectations so thoroughly condemn slavery
and the slave trade, it is reasonable to anticipate that the authorita-
tive exposure of offending practices would be a long step toward
their eradication. The new body could also perform the promoting
function by addressing action recommendations to the United Na-
tions, to other inter-governmental organizations, and to the various
states. The permanent body could also be equipped to perform an
invoking function, if granted authority to bring complaints to the
Commission on Human Rights349 or other appropriate bodies. Simi-
larly, it could be directed to submit regular reports to the Economic
and Social Council35 in which appraisals are made of how states and
inter-governmental organizations are discharging their responsibili-
ties. Finally, the agency could design and supervise programs in
education calculated to instruct and mobilize both the general pub-
lic and effective elites toward more effective application of specific
policies in the sphere of human rights.3 5' Sustained by a vigilant
347. See AWAD'S REPORT ON SLAVERY, supra note 128, at 308-09.
348. See generally McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, The World Constitutive
Process of Authoritative Decision, in 1 THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
ORDER 73 (R. Falk & C. Black eds. 1969).
349. Regarding the procedures of complaints before the Comission on Human
Rights see L. SOHN & T. BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 739-856 (1973); Carey, Progress on Human Rights at the United Nations,
66 AM. J. INT'L L. 107 (1972); Cassese, The Admissibility of Communications to
the United Nations on Human Rights Violations, 5 HUMAN RIGHTS J. 375 (1972);
Humphrey, The Right of Petition in the United Nations, 4 HUMAN RIGHTS J. 463
(1971); Newman, The New U.N. Procedure for Human Rights Complaints: Reform,
Status Quo, or Chambers of Horror?, in Hearings on International Protection of
Human Rights Before the Subcomm. on International Organizations and Move-
ments of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 715-22 (1973);
Parsons, The Individual Right of Petition: A Study of Methods Used by Interna-
tional Organizations to Utilize the Individual as a Source of Information on the
Violations of Human Rights, 13 WAYNE L. REV. 678 (1967); Schwelb, The Abuse of
the Right of Petition, 3 HUMAN RIGHTS J. 313 (1970); Wilkoc, Procedures to Deal
with Individual Communications to International Bodies: The Subcommission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 1 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. &
POL. 277 (1968).
350. For the importance of the appraising function see Lasswell, Toward Con-
tinuing Appraisal of the Impact of Law on Society, 21 RUTGERS L. REV. 645 (1967).
351. See Awad's 1971 Report, supra note 319, at 47-49. See also J. CAREY, U.N.
PROTECTION OF CIVIL AND POLricAL RIGHTS 17-21 (1970).
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world public opinion, and working in close cooperation with related
entities, such as the International Labor Organization (regarding
forced labor),35 2 INTERPOL (regarding the traffic in persons),' and
the Food and Agriculture Organization (regarding debt bondage and
peonage),34 such a specialized permanent body might succeed in
accomplishing a great deal to make slavery in all its manifestations
a thing of the past.
c. Claims for Elimination of Caste
While slavery represents the most extreme deprivation of the fun-
damental freedom of choice for individuals, caste is a more limited
hierarchized, systematic deprivation of groups, as determined by
birth (parentage) . 5 In cruel paradox, the respect value itself is
employed to achieve and freeze hierarchical orderings and rankings,
and hence discriminations, among the designated groups, not only
in terms of respect, but also of all other values. A caste system
352. See Awad's 1971 Report, supra note 319, at 10-16; Awad's 1970 Progress
Report, supra note 126, at 12-23.
353. See Awad's 1971 Report, supra note 319, at 22-27; Awad's 1970 Progress
Report, supra note 126, at 32-39.
354. A crucial task is of course land reform. See Question of Slavery and the
Slave Trade in All Their Practices and Manifestations, Including the Slave-like
Practices of Apartheid and Colonialism 9-11, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/337 (1973)
(note by the Secretary-General).
355. For a discussion of the caste system see S. ANANT, THE CHANGING CONCEPT
OF CASTE IN INDIA (1972); A. BETEILLE, CASTES: OLD AND NEw (1969); SOCIAL
INEQUALITY (A. Beteille ed. 1969) (especially articles by Beteille, Dumont, and
Srinivas); C. BOUGLE, ESSAYS ON THE CASTE SYSTEM (D. Pocock transl. 1971); 0.
Cox, CASTE, CLASS, AND RACE (Modem Reader ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as 0.
Cox]; K. DAVIS, THE POPULATION OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN (1951); JAPAN'S INVISIBLE
RACE: CASTE IN CULTURE AND PERSONALITY (G. De Vos & H. Wagatsuma eds. 1966)
[hereinafter cited as JAPAN'S INVISIBLE RACE]; J. DOLLARD, CASTE AND CLASS IN A
SOUTHERN TOWN (3d ed. 1957); L. DUMONT, HoMo HIERARCHICUS: AN ESSAY ON THE
CASTE SYSTEM (M. Sainsubry transl. 1970) [hereinafter cited as L. DUMONT]; G.
GHURGE, CASTE AND CLASS IN INDIA (3d ed. 1957); A. HOCART, CASTE: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY (1950); J. HUTTON, CASTE IN INDIA: ITS NATURE, FUNCTION, AND ORIGINS (4th
ed. 1963) [hereinafter cited as J. HUrON]; G. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA
667-705 (1964); B. RYAN, CASTE IN MODERN CEYLON (1953); STRUCTURE AND CHANGE
IN INDIAN SOCIETY (M. Singer & B. Cohn eds. 1968); M. SRINIVAS, CASTE IN MODERN
INDIA (1962) [hereinafter cited as M. SRINIVAS]; M. TUMIN, CASTE IN A PEASANT
SocIETY (1952) [hereinafter cited as M. TUMIN]; S. VERBA, B. AHMED & A. BHATr,
CASTE, RACE, AND POLITICS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF INDIA AND THE UNITED STATES
(1971).
For a definitive historical account of castes in Indian society see 2 P. KANE,
HISTORY OF DHARMASASTRA (Ancient and Medieval Religions and Civil Law) 19-179
(1941) [hereinafter cited as P. KANE]; 5 id. at 1632-43 (1962).
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decrees and enforces an hereditary (ascriptive) transmission of inca-
pacity for freedom of choice. 5 In most societies a class structure
differentiates between individuals in terms of value position, poten-
tial, and expectancy. 57 What caste adds to class is the freezing, the
immobilization, of these differentiations.35 In a cognitive map of a
caste society the lines between castes are relatively clear. The lines
are sustained by customary community expectations and by varie-
gated sanctioning practices, and they are transmitted with little
change from generation to generation.3 9 Branded as inferior at
birth, members of the lower castes, especially the "untouchables"
or equivalents, are condemned in perpetuity to low position, poten-
tial, and expectancy in relation to all values.3
6
356. For a concise description see Berreman, The Concept of Caste, 2 INT'L
ENCYC. SOCIAL Sci. 333 (1968). See also Berreman, Structure and Function of Caste
Systems, in JAPAN'S INVISIBLE RACE, supra note 355, at 277-307.
357. The literature on social stratification is, of course, vast. See generally CLASS,
STATUS, AND POWER: SOCIAL STRATIFICATION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (2d ed. R.
Bendix & S. Lipset 1966); B. BERNARD, SOCIAL STRATIFICATION: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS OF STRUCTURE AND PROCESS (1957); SOCIAL INEQUALITY (A. Beteille ed.
1969); THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL CLASS (P. Blumberg ed. 1972); T. BoTrOMORE, CLASSES
IN MODERN SOCIETY (1965); R. DAHRENDORF, CLASSES AND CLASS CONFLICT IN IN-
DUSTRIAL SOCIETY (rev. ed. 1959); SOCIAL MOBILITY IN BRITAIN (D. Glass ed. 1954);
C. HELLER, STRUCTURED SOCIAL INEQUALITY (1968); A. HOLLINGSHEAD & F. REDLICH,
SOCIAL CLASS AND MENTAL ILLNESS (1958); G. LENSKI, POWER AND PRIVILEGE: A
THEORY OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION (1966); K. MAYER & W. BUCKLEY, CLASS AND
SocimrY (3d ed. 1969); C. MILLS, WHITE COLLAR: THE AMERICAN MIDDLE CLASS
(1951); M. MILNER, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY (1972); M. TUMIN, SOCIAL STRATIFICA-
TION: THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF INEQUALITY (1971); Parsons, Social Classes and
Class Conflict in the Light of Recent Sociological Theory, in ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL
THEORY 323 (rev. ed. 1954); Social Stratification, 15 INT'L ENCYC. SOCIAL Sc. 288
(1968).
358. As Dobzhansky has put it:
[A] person's caste is determined by that of his parents and by nothing else:
one cannot be promoted to a higher caste or demoted to a lower one by any
personal achievements or failures. A man of low caste could only hope that
good behavior in his present life might let him be reincarnated in a higher
caste. Class differentiation is, however, less rigid. Even the most rigid class
society allows some individuals of humble birth to climb and others of privi-
leged birth to slide down the social ladder.
T. DOBZHANSKY, supra note 40, at 242. See also H. LASSWELL & A. KAPLAN, POWER
AND SocIETY 62-69 (1950).
359. See 0. Cox, supra note 355, at 3-20.
360. Kane gave this succinct account:
In most of the works on the castes in India a few features are pointed out as
the characteristics of the caste system and as common to all castes and sub-
castes. They are: (1) heredity (i.e. in theory a man is assigned to a particular
caste by birth in that caste); (2) endogamy and exogamy (i.e. restriction as
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Formally, participation in the community power process in terms
of office-holding (elective as well as appointive) and voting may be
open to all members of society. In reality, however, members of the
lower castes are singularly handicapped by their lack of effective
power, especially by the lack of base values such as wealth, enlight-
enment, and skill, whose control is necessary to effectiveness."' The
perpetuation through the generations of a system of hierarchical
value deprivations is characteristically sustained by severe depriva-
tions of affection. Marriage is, as a rule, kept within the same caste
so as to make crossing of caste lines virtually impossible. "2 Indeed,
the whole range of an individual's permissible associations is deter-
mined by the group into which a person is born, with the barriers
enforced by the myth of "pollution." '63
to marrying in the same caste and not marrying certain relatives or other
persons, thought of the same caste); (3) restrictions as to food (i.e. what food
and water may be taken or not taken and from whom); (4) occupation (i.e.
members of most castes follow certain occupations and no others); (5) grada-
tion of castes, some being at the top in the social scale and others being
deemed to be so low that they are untouchable.
2 P. KANE, supra note 355, at 23. Cf. M. TUMIN, PATTERNS OF SOCIETY 91-102
(1973).
361. See M. SRINIVAS, supra note 355, 15-41; S. VERBA, B. AHMED & A. BHATT,
CASTE, RACE, AND POLITICS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF INDIA AND THE UNITED STATES
(1971).
362. See L. DUMONT, supra note 355, at 109-29; S. ANANT, T-uP CHANGING CON-
CEPT OF CASTE IN INDIA 104-18 (1972). For the invalidity of intercaste marriages
under the Hindu Law and Usage see N. AIYAR, MAYNE'S TREATISE ON HINDU LAW
AND USAGE 103, 164-72 (11th ed. 1950).
363. As Srinivas has put it:
The concept of pollution governs relations between different castes. This
concept is absolutely fundamental to the caste system, and along with the
concepts of karma and dharma it contributes to make caste the unique insti-
tution it is. Every type of inter-caste relation is governed by the concept of
pollution. Contact of any kind, touching, dining, sex and other relations
between castes which are structurally distant results in the higher of the two
castes being polluted.
Srinivas, The Caste System in India, in SOCIAL INEQUALITY 265, 267 (A. Beteille ed.
1969). In the context of the Far East Passin has observed:
Another common feature is that they are looked upon as inferior and pol-
luted, and in extreme cases perhaps not even quite human. 'In Japan, for
example, the itinerant outcastes were actually called Hinin, "nonhuman";
while the practice of calling the Eta "four", the judgment of the court that
they were worth only 1/7th of ordinary people, the use of the classifier for
animals in counting them-all bespeak this conception. In Korea, similarly,
the Paekchong were considered "barbarians" who had to be domesticated.
In all cases, they were considered so polluted that their very presence, not to
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Access to education and enlightenment may be formally reserved
to the higher castes. Even where access is theoretically available to
the lower castes, the lack of the other base values upon which the
opportunity and leisure for study and inquiry depend may keep the
victims of caste ignorant and content in the maintenance of a status
quo of rigid stratification.326 Members of an inferior caste are gener-
ally denied opportunity to discover and develop their latent talents
or to acquire and exercise many socially useful skills. Certain highly
regarded skills-those of the liberal professions, for example-may
be kept within the exclusive domain of members of a superior caste,
with monopolized transmission from generation to generation. The
occupations open to different castes may not only be specialized,
but rigidly controlled, with the lower castes being permitted to per-
form only unskilled labor.365 This stratified division of occupations
and ascriptive transmission of occupational skills often result in
wide disparities in the distribution of wealth, with the lower castes
living in a poverty often bordering on debt bondage. 6
Conditioned early in life to view their superior or inferior status
as a "natural" or "divine" expression of God's will or as a "func-
tional necessity" of society,36 7 members of different castes are taught
to be content with their respective pre-fixed stations in society. This
acceptance of place and role, with its alleged avoidance of anxiety
and disorder, is thought to be a key to individual well-being. Thus,
life styles are made to differ significantly in terms of food, clothing,
appearance, demeanor, and so on.366 Very different considerations in
social life, with expressions of respect or disrespect, are extended to
the different castes. 9 The cumulative impact of these value depri-
vations tends to stifle even the development of appropriate norms
mention their touch, was a positive danger to ordinary people.
Passin, Untouchability in the Far East, 11 MONUMENTA NIPPONICA 247, 260 (1955).
364. Cf. A. BETEILLE, CASTES: OLD AND NEW 57- 86 (1969); N.Y. Times, Apr.
23, 1973, at 17, col. 1; id., Nov. 29, 1972, at 4, col. 3.
365. See C. BOUGLE, ESSAYS ON THE CASTE SYSTEM 29-40 (D. Pocock transl.
1971); 0. Cox, supra note 355, at 60-70.
366. See G. MYRDAL, ASIAN DRAMA: AN INQUIRY INTO THE POVERTY OF NATIONS
273-81, 745-49 (1971); N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1973, at 3, col. 1 (city ed.); N.Y.
Times, Oct. 5, 1973, at 10, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1968, at 7, col. 1.
367. For a brief summary of this theme see JAPAN'S INVISIBLE RACE, supra note
355, at xix-xxiii. See also note 379 infra.
368. See S. ANANT, THE CHANGING CONCEPT OF CASTE IN INDIA 73-89 (1972); L.
DUMONT, supra note 355, at 130-51; J. HUrroN, supra note 355, at 71-91; M.
TUMIN, supra note 355, at 84-108; Beteille, Caste in a South Indian Village, in
SOCIAL INEQUALITY 273, 278-90 (A. Beteille ed. 1969).
369. See note 368 supra.
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of responsible conduct. A person's religious belief and affiliation are
determined by birth; there is practically no avenue for changing
one's sacred or secular orientation. Should attempts to change be
made, the larger society commonly refuses to recognize or honor
them. Further, enforcement is simplified since caste members are
readily identifiable. 70
Historically, the caste system in the sense we have described has
existed in many different cultures throughout the history of human
society with varying degrees of approximation in value impact and
with highly diversified patterns of institutional detail.37' Without
questioning the often alleged "uniqueness" of each society in tradi-
tion and development, it may be observed that a caste society flour-
ishes best under the conditions of relative non-communication and
physical immobility resulting from an underdeveloped science and
technology, especially in terms of the relative lack of access to com-
munication and transportation. While accelerating developments in
science and technology have in recent decades released a new drive
for mobility and fostered a trend toward universalization of equal-
ity, many communities remain in the grip of rigidly stratified bar-
riers transmitted from the past. Though India is commonly singled
out by commentators as the contemporary paradigm of a caste so-
ciety'37 2 that country is not alone in exhibiting indicia of high strati-
fication and immobility.3 73 In many societies, severe class differen-
tiations approximate the hierarchical and hereditary deprivations
characteristic of "caste," and the children who begin with little
continue to be inordinately and permanently handicapped vis-a-vis
the children who begin with much. 74
370. See J. KITAGAWA, RELIGIONS OF THE EAST 99-154 (enlarged ed. 1968); M.
SRINIVAS, supra note 355, at 148-60.
371. See Kroeber, Caste, 3 ENCYC. SocIAL Sci. 254, 254-55 (1930); 2 P. KANE,
supra note 355, at 23; 5 id. at 1633.
372. See works cited in notes 355 & 366 supra.
373. See J. HUTrON, supra note 355, at 133-38; JAPAN'S INVISIBLE RACE, note
355 supra; B. RYAN, CASTE IN MODERN CEYLON (1954); M. TUMIN, note 355 supra;
Passin, Untouchability in the Far East, 11 MONUMENTA NIPPONICA 247, 260
(1955). See also 8 PEOPLES OF THE EARTH 66-68, 79-80 (E. Evans-Pritchard ed.
1973) (regarding Hawaiian Polynesia and Tahitian Polynesia); 10 id. at 114-16
(Indonesian Bali); 12 id. at 8-36, 44-53 (India), 110-13 (Tamiland), 114-27
(Sri Lanka); 13 id. at 88-95 (Nepal); 15 id. at 92-96 (Kabul and the Pahktun
Afghanistan).
374. Lenski has put it this way:
Actually, however, there is no need to treat caste and class as separate phe-
nomena. In the interest of conceptual parsimony one can quite legitimately
define caste as a special kind of class-at least when class is defined as
broadly as it has been here. Thus we may say that a class is a caste to the
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The practices of caste are as incompatible as those of slavery with
the basic policies of freedom of choice and equality of opportunity
essential to human dignity. 75 To deny individuals freedom of choice
on a collective basis determined by their birth is as invidious to
human dignity as denial based on any other group characteristic.
Such denial treats a human being as an appendage to a collectivity
instead of as a person capable of self-fulfillment and contribution
to society. The inherent contradiction in a system of caste is that it
manipulates the value of respect in ways that institutionalize and
perpetuate disrespect. 76
The same justification has been offered for caste differentiations
as for racism: that some people are inherently inferior because of
parentage. 77 This myth, like other elements of racism, runs afoul of
modern scientific findings. 78 Additional justification of caste is
degree that upward mobility into or out of it is forbidden by the mores.
G. LENSKI, POWER AND PRIVILEGE: A THEORY OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION 77 (1966).
375. See notes 18-52 & accompanying text supra.
376. In the words of Beteille:
Caste has often been viewed as the prototype of all hierarchical systems.
Principles of caste rank rest essentially on conceptions of social esteem. So-
cial esteem is attached to particular styles of life, and groups are ranked as
high or low according to how or whether they pursue such styles. What is
highly esteemed varies from one society to another and depends ultimately
on the value-system of the society. In India ritual elements (and, in particu-
lar, the ideas of purity and pollution) have historically occupied an important
place in styles of life which have enjoyed high social esteem.
Beteille, Caste in a South Indian Village, in SOCIAL INEQUALITY 273, 290 (A. Beteille
ed. 1969). See also notes 355-70 & accompanying text supra.
377. De Vos and Wagatsuma state:
In comparing systems of social segregation in various of the the world's
cultures, those based on alleged caste impurity and those based on alleged
racial inferiority are found to be the most fixed and immutable. One can too
quickly conclude that these two concepts have very different bases for the
classification and separation of two or more segments of a particular society.
Instead of stressing the obvious surface differences, one might do well to
consider whether there is a curious similarity between these concepts,
whether they are not indeed, two dissimilar faces of identical inner psychol-
ogical processes that seek external expression. . . . At first glance, racism
may seem to bear no direct resemblance to the social segregation found in a
caste system. But it is a major proposition of this volume that the contrary
is true, that from the viewpoint of comparative sociology or social anthropol-
ogy, and from the viewpoint of human social psychology, racism and caste
attitudes are one and the same phenomenon.
JAPAN'S INVISIBLE RACE, supra note 355, at xix-xx.
See also Beteille, Caste in a South Indian Village, in SocIAL INEQUALITY 273, 276-78
(A. Beteille ed. 1969); L. DUMONT, supra note 355, at 27-29.
378. See J. BAKER, RACE (1974) (contains a comprehensive bibliography); T.
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sometimes grounded in a sacred mythology that purports to reward
and punish people for acts committed in putative previous incarna-
tions. 379 The appeal of such a justification is unlikely to reach be-
yond the circle of "true believers," and is subject to a continuous
reinterpretation of fundamental assumptions.
As further justification, it is sometimes urged that caste is neces-
sary to the functional division of society.30 Yet, in the contemporary
world it requires no Marxist insight to recognize that, though caste
may sometimes be used as a form of economic exploitation,", a caste
DOBZHANSKY, note 40 supra; A. MONTAGUE, MAN'S MOST DANGEROUS MYTH: THE
FALLACY OF RACE (5th ed. 1974); A. MONTAGUE, STATEMENT OF RACE (3d ed. 1972).
379. Srinivas has observed:
A man is born into a sub-caste (iati) and this is the only way of acquiring
membership. According to the traditional view, however, birth is not an
accident. Certain Hindu theological notions like karma and dharma have
contributed very greatly to the strengthening of the idea of hierarchy which
is inherent in the caste system. The idea of karma teaches a Hindu that he
is born in a particular sub-caste because he deserves to be born there. The
actions he performed in a previous incarnation deserved such a reward or
punishment, as the case might be. If he had performed better actions in his
previous incarnation he would have been born in a higher caste. Thus the
caste hierarchy comes to be an index of the state of an individual's soul. It
also represents certain milestones on the soul's journey to God.
Thus the idea of deserts is associated with birth in a particular caste. A
man is born in a high caste because of the good actions performed by him in
his previous life, and another is born into a low caste because of bad actions
performed in his previous life.
Srinivas, The Caste System in India, in SOCIAL INEQUALITY 265, 266 (A. Beteille ed.
1969).
In the same vein, Passin has summarized:
In the Hindu conception, everyone's place in the scheme of things was or-
dained by fate, by the endless chain of causation. Any given point in the
unfolding of the universe was the effect of all preceding events. But cause and
effect were not merely material; there was also an endless chain of moral
cause and effect, and it was this chain of moral causation that affected the
status of individuals. What one had done in previous incarnations deter-
mined one's status in the present one. The low castes were therefore, in a
sense, serving penance in this life for their past sins and shortcomings, al-
though through virtue and good works they might be able to attain higher
status in their next incarnation.
Passin, Untouchability in the Far East, 11 MONUMENTA NIPPONICA 247, 252 (1955).
See also J. HUrON, supra note 355, at 189-91; Srinivas, The Caste System in
India, in SOCIAL INEQUALITY 265, 269-72 (A. Beteille ed. 1969).
380. See, e.g., L. DUMONT, supra note 355, at 92-108; J. HUTrroN, supra note 355,
at 111-32; Srinivas, The Caste System in India, in SOCIAL INEQUALITY 269-72 (A.
Beteille ed. 1969).
381. See JAPAN'S INVISIBLE RACE, supra note 355, at xxii.
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system must impair, rather than facilitate, the wide shaping and
sharing of wealth and other values. In a complex society, the great-
est aggregate production and widest distribution of wealth and other
values necessarily depends on a division of labor that lays aside the
rigidification of occupational roles by inheritance, and provides in-
dividuals with ample opportunity to fully develop their varied tal-
ents in an open, mobile society. "The drawback of the caste and
rigid class systems is," in the words of Dobzhansky, "precisely that
they induce people to take up functions for which they are incompe-
tent; hence so many worthless kings and barons. ' 8 2 In sum, it would
appear that there is no common interest which caste can today serve
in a society based upon human dignity.
In times when even slavery was still regarded as natural and
lawful, 383 it could scarcely have been expected that caste might be
regarded as unlawful. Beginning in the Far East and the ancient
Mediterranean world, various caste systems have been sustained
down through the centuries by customary expectations and prac-
tices in many different communities."4 These range from the total
and systematic stratification in India, through the "quasi-caste"
systems in medieval Europe ("with aristocratic rank and privileges,
sumptuary laws, feudalism, and occupation guilds in control of
much of industry")38 5 and in medieval Japan (with "sharp" and
elaborate "distinctions of hereditary rank") 88 to pockets of de facto
castes in recent times.38 7
In modern times, national community efforts to eradicate caste
find their most striking and, of course, most important exemplifica-
tion in India."8 More than half a century of anti-caste efforts culmi-
nated in the adoption of the 1949 Constitution of India which envis-
ages a fundamental reconstruction of the whole social structure of
the country.8 9 To secure "[e]quality of status and opportunity" for
382. T. DOBZHANSKY, supra note 40, at 244.
383. See notes 136-230 & accompanying text supra.
384. See Kroeber, Caste, 3 ENCYC. SOcIAL Sci. 254, 254-55 (1930).
385. Id. at 256.
386. Id.
387. See notes 372-74 supra.
388. See S. ANANT, THE CHANGING CONCEPT OF CASTE IN INDIA 14-37 (1972); 1
D. BASU, COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 287-543 (5th ed. 1965); C.
BOUGLE, ESSAYS ON THE CASTE SYSTEM 116-42 (D. Pocock transl. 1971); Galanter,
Changing Legal Conceptions of Caste, in STRUCTURE AND CHANGE IN INDIAN SOCIETY
299 (M. Singer & B. Cohn eds. 1968).
389. For the text on the Constitution of India, which is unusually long and
detailed, see 2 A. PEASLEE, CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS 308-438 (3d ed. 1966)
[hereinafter cited as A. PEASLEE]. For the provisions of the Indian Constitution
relating to the protection of fundamental human rights see BASIC DOCUMENTS ON
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"all its citizens, '390 the Indian Constitution, in section after section,
includes caste as one of the impermissible grounds for differentia-
tion in the treatment of people, 9' and strictly outlaws untouchabil-
ity. 9 The prohibition of discrimination by caste extends to acts
performed not only by "the State, '393 but also by private individu-
als. Article 15(2) stipulates that no citizen shall on account of caste
be subject to
any disability, liability, restriction or condition with regard to:
(a) access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places of public
entertainment; or
(b) the use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and places of public
resort maintained wholly or partly out of State funds or dedicated to
the use of the general public."4
Article 16(2) further states that no citizen shall on account of caste
be "ineligible for, or discriminated against in respect of, any em-
ployment or office under the State. '393 Article 17 declares the aboli-
tion of untouchability in these words:
'Untouchability' is abolished and its practice in any form is forbid-
den. The enforcement of any disability arising out of 'Untouchability'
shall be an offence punishable in accordance with law."'
To carry out the prohibition of untouchability, the Untouchabil-
ity (Offenses) Act was adopted in 1955.111 The Act prescribes punish-
HUMAN RIGHTS 29-45 (I. Brownlie ed. 1971). For an earlier attempt at reform, as
symbolized by the Caste Disabilities Removal Act (XXI of 1850) see N. AIYAR,
MAYNE'S TREATISE ON HINDU LAW AND USAGE 73, 716-18 (11th ed. 1950); 3 P. KANE,
supra note 355, at 547 n.1021, 616, 667. See also 2 id. at 177-79.
390. CONSTITUTION preamble (1949, amended 1963) (India), reprinted in 2 A.
PEASLEE, supra note 389, at 308.
391. See id. arts. 15-17, reprinted in 2 A. PEASLEE, supra note 389, at 312-13.
392. It reads:
"Untouchability" is abolished and its practice in any form is forbidden. The
enforcement of any disability arising out of "Untouchability" shall be an
offence punishable in accordance with law.
Id. art. 17, reprinted in 2 A. PEASLEE, supra note 389, at 312-13.
393. Article 15(1) provides: "The State shall not discriminate against any citizen
on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them." Id. art.
15(1), reprinted in 2 A. PEASLEE, supra note 389, at 312.
Article 16(2) further states that "No citizen shall, on grounds only of. . .caste
...be ineligible for, or discriminated against in respect of any employment or
office under the State." Id. art. 16(2)
394. Id. art. 15(2).
395. Id. art. 16(2).
396. Id. art. 17.
397. Untouchability (Offenses) Act, No. 22 of 8 May 1955, reprinted with corn-
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ment for those who seek to impose or enforce disabilities on the
ground of "untouchability" in regard to, inter alia, access to places
of public worship; access to shops and restaurants and-places of
public accommodation; use of utensils in public places; the practice
of professions, occupations, and trades; use of rivers, wells, and
other water resources; access to hospitals, educational institutions,
and charitable facilities; public transportation; housing; the prac-
tice of religious ceremonies and processions; and use of jewelry and
finery.0 8 Other measures have also been enacted to aid the "Sched-
uled Castes" and the "backward classes."3 Yet, despite these he-
roic governmental prescriptive efforts toward the elimination of
caste, the caste system, "so deeply entrenched in India's tradi-
tions,"4 ' continues to persist. "The caste system," observes Gunnar
Myrdal, in his monumental work, Asian Drama, "is probably
stronger today than it was at the time when India became indepen-
dent.""'' Such a phenomenon, Myrdal adds, "provides a striking
example of the divergence of precept and practice."4"2
Aside from India, concern for the eradication of caste has been
manifested in other territorial communities. Thus, for example, Ar-
ticle 17(1) of the 1962 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Paki-
stan states that "[n]o citizen otherwise qualified for appointment
in the service of Pakistan shall be discriminated against in respect
of any such appointment on the ground only of [inter alia]
caste.14 3 Article 10 of the 1962 Constitution of Nepal provides that
"[n]o discrimination shall be made against any citizen in the ap-
plication of general laws" and "in respect of appointment to the
government service or any other public service" on account of
"caste." 404 The 1948 Constitution of the Republic of Korea pro-
claims, in Article 9(2), that "[n]o privileged castes shall be recog-
nized, nor be ever established in any form. '405
mentary in UNITED NATIONS, YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS FOR 1955, 112, 120-22.
398. Id. §§ 3-4. The Act provides for up to six months imprisonment and/or a
fine of 500 rupees for its violation. Id.
399. See Galanter, Changing Legal Conceptions of Caste, in STRUCTURE AND
CHANGES IN INDIAN SoCrETY 299, 313-19 (M. Singer & B. Cohn eds. 1968).
400. G. MYRDAL, ASIAN DRAMA: AN INQUIRY INTO THE POVERTY OF NATIONS 278
(1971).
401. Id.
402. Id.
403. CONSTITUTION art. 17(1) (1962, amended 1964) (Pakistan), reprinted in 2 A.
PEASLEE, supra note 389, at 989.
404. CONSTITUTION art. 10 (Nepal, 1962), reprinted in 2 A. PEASLEE, supra note
389, at 774.
405. CONSTITUTION art. 9(2) (1948, amended 1962) (Republic of Korea), reprinted
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The more recent trends in transnational prescription exhibit an
increasing crystallization of larger community expectations that the
practice of caste is unlawful. Contemporary international prescrip-
tions have developed a peremptory norm of non-discrimination
which embodies a wide range of impermissible grounds for differen-
tiation." 6 Though the word "caste" is not always explicitly em-
ployed in describing the impermissible grounds, the consistent con-
demnation of differentiation by "social origin," "birth and other
status," and "descent" would appear to put beyond doubt the con-
clusion that caste is today prohibited on the transnational level.
The important contemporary prescription commonly construed to
condemn caste derives from the United Nations Charter ' and is
clearly articulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights'"
which, in Article 2, states:
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status.00
This same theme is pursued in the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights410 which incorporates identical or nearly identi-
cal language in several of its provisions. Article 26 of the Covenant
states:
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any
discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the
law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons
equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground
such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, property, birth or other status.4"
Article 2(1) of the Covenant provides:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and
to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its
jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or
other status.4"'
in 2 A. PEASLEE, supra note 389, at 579.
406. See notes 651-79 & accompanying text infra.
407. See note 267 supra.
408. Universal Declaration, note 55 supra.
409. Id. art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/810 at 72.
410. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, note 57 supra.
411. Id. art. 26, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 55-56.
412. Id. art. 2(1), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 53.
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Other provisions of the Covenant prohibit: discrimination on ac-
count of "social origin" in connection with permissible deroga-
tions;" 3 discrimination against children on grounds of "social ori-
gin" or "birth"; ' 4 and discrimination with regard to office-holding
and voting on the grounds specified in Article 2.415
Comparable provisions appear in other important conventions.
Thus, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights,"1 6 in Article 2(2), stipulates:
The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to guarantee
that the rights enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised
without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property,
birth or other status.417
The Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention of
19581's includes "social origin" among impermissible grounds of dif-
ferentiation in its definition of "discrimination" in Article 1(1).411
The Convention Against Discrimination in Education of 1960 in-
cludes "birth" as well as "social origin" in its definition of discrimi-
nation in Article 1(1).420 On the regional level, both the European
Convention on Human Rights 2 1 and the American Convention on
Human Rights4 22 have included both "social origin" and "birth" in
the formulation of their non-discrimination clauses.
The legislative history of Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the similar provisions in other conventions
amply establish that the prohibition of discrimination by "social
origin" and "birth and other status" indeed extends to differentia-
413. Id. art. 4(1).
414. Id. art. 24(1), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 55.
415. Id. art. 25.
416. Covenant on Economic Rights, note 58 supra.
417. Id. art. 2(2), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 49-50.
418. Convention Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and
Occupation, adopted June 25, 1958, 362 U.N.T.S. 31 (I.L.O. General Conference)
(entered into force June 15, 1960) [hereinafter cited as Discrimination Conven-
tion].
419. Id. art. 1(1), 362 U.N.T.S. at 32-34.
420. Convention Against Discrimination in Education, adopted Dec. 14, 1960,
art. 1(1), 429 U.N.T.S. 93, 96 (UNESCO General Conference) (entered into force
May 22, 1962) [hereinafter cited as Convention Against Discrimination in Educa-
tion]. "Birth" as well as "social origin" is included in its proscribed bases of
discrimination.
421. European Convention, supra note 11, art. 14, 213 U.N.T.S. at 232.
422. American Convention, supra note 59, arts. 1 & 27, 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS
at 101, 109.
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tion by "caste." Thus, when the Third Committee of the General
Assembly was considering Article 2 of the draft Universal Declara-
tion, the Indian delegation proposed the substitution of "caste" for
"birth, 42 3 and the Soviet delegation proposed the inclusion of
"class" among the impermissible grounds of differentiation. 24 Both
proposals were rejected because most of the Committee members
agreed that the words, "social origin" and "birth or other status,"
as proposed by the Informal Drafting Group, were adequate to cover
discrimination by caste or class. In the course of discussion, Mr.
Santa Cruz (Chile), and the Cuban representative, preferred the
wording "social status" or "sodial condition" to "birth," but agreed
that the former "expression was implied in the word 'birth.' "42 In
the view of Mr. Chang (China), "The concept of race, colour, social
origin, and in most cases sex, involved the question of birth, while
social origin also embraced the idea of class or caste.""42 Mr. Impe-
rial (Philippines) felt that "[tihe words 'class' and 'caste' referred
to certain specific systems while 'birth' applied to everyone."4 7 The
view of Mrs. Roosevelt (United States) was summarized in the Com-
mittee records in these words:
[Tihe declaration was intended for ordinary, not learned people and
from that point of view, the original text seemed the most satisfac-
tory. Although class and caste distinctions still existed, human
beings were trying to outgrow the use of such words. In her opinion,
the words 'property or other status' took into consideration the var-
ious new suggestions that had been made.4
Consequently, Mr. Appadorai (India) withdrew the Indian proposal
with the following explanation:
[H]is delegation had only proposed the word "caste" because it
objected to the word "birth." The words "other status" and "social
origin" were sufficiently broad to cover the whole field; the delegation
of India would not, therefore, insist on its proposal."
The comprehensive annotations on the draft International Cove-
nants, as prepared by the Secretary-General in 1955,110 explicitly
423. U.N. GAOR, 3D COMM. 138-39 (1948).
424. Id. at 126, 138.
425. Id. at 137-38.
426. Id. at 139.
427. Id.
428. Id. at 138.
429. Id. at 139.
430. Annotations on the Covenants, note 303 supra.
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state that the non-discrimination clauses in both Covenants "follow
that of Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, '43
1
and that the grounds of discrimination set forth in the Covenant
provisions "are the same as those enumerated in Article 2 of the
Declaration. 4 3 The same interpretation of other conventions influ-
enced in their comparable provisions by the Universal Declaration
would appear inescapable.
The International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Racial Discrimination 433 introduces still another concept- "de-
scent"-which equally serves the function of condemning the prac-
tice of caste. This new concept originated with the Indian delegation
when the Third Committee of the General Assembly was consider-
ing the adoption of the Convention. 43 14 As a consequence, the Con-
vention was made to define "racial discrimination" by juxtaposing
"descent" with "race, color, national or ethnic origin." Article 1(1)
of the Convention, in utmost reach, states:
In this Convention the term 'racial discrimination' shall mean any
distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour,
descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect
of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on
an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the
political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.43
Although the "record gives no indication of the situations the word
[descent] was intended to cover," '436 it is "reasonable to assume,"
as Dr. Schwelb has observed, "that the term 'descent' includes the
notion of 'caste.' 131 The inclusion of "descent" in the specification
of "racial discrimination," therefore, makes the Anti-Racial Dis-
crimination Convention still a further prescription in condemnation
of caste. 3
431. Id. at 17.
432. Id. at 61.
433. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into
force Jan. 4, 1969) [hereinafter cited as Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination].
434. Schwelb, The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination, 15 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 996, 1002-03 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as Schwelb].
435. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
supra note 433, art. 1(1), 660 U.N.T.S. at 216.
436. Schwelb, supra note 434, at 1003.
437. Id. at 1003 n.43.
438. For further elaboration see notes 768-963 & accompanying text infra.
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d. Claims for Elimination of Apartheid
i. Factual background
Apartheid is a comprehensive and systematic pattern of racial
discrimination, containing identifiable components of both slavery
and caste, which is prescribed and enforced by national law. 3 It has
439. On apartheid see H. ADAM, MODERNIZING RACIAL DOMINATION: SOUTH
AFRICA'S POLITICAL DYNAMICS (1971) [hereinafter cited as H. ADAM]; SOUTH AFRICA:
SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES (H. Adam ed. 1971); AFRICAN RESEARCH GROUP, RACE TO
POWER (1974); M. BALLINGER, FROM UNION TO APARTHEID (1969); E. BROOKES,
APARTHEID: A DOCUMENTARY STUDY OF MODERN SOUTH AFRICA (1968) [hereinafter
cited as E. BROOKES]; RACE, PEACE, LAW AND SOUTHERN AFRICA (J. Carey ed. 1968);
G. CARTER, THE POLITICS OF INEQUALITY: SOUTH AFRICA SINCE 1948 (rev. ed. 1959);
D. DE VILLIERS, THE CASE FOR SOUTH AFRICA (1970); THE SOUTH WEST AFRICA/
NAMIBIA DISPUTE (J. Dugard ed. 1973); W. FRYE, IN WHITEST AFRICA: THE DYNAMICS
OF APARTHEID (1968); A SURVEY OF RACE RELATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA (M.
Horrell comp. 1973); M. HORRELL, LEGISLATION AND RACE RELATIONS (rev. ed. 1971);
INTERNATIONAL COMM'N OF JURISTS, EROSION OF THE RULE OF LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA
(1968); INTERNATIONAL COMM'N OF JURISTS, SOUTH AFRICA AND THE RULE OF LAW
(1960); P. JOSHI, APARTHEID IN SOUTH AFRICA (1950); L. KUPER, AN AFRICAN BOUR-
GEOISIE: RACE, CLASS, AND POLITICS IN SOUTH AFRICA (1965); L. KUPER, PASSIVE
RESISTANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA (1956); APARTHEID (A. La Guma ed. 1971); APARTHEID
AND UNITED NATIONS COLLECTIVE MEASURES (A. Leiss ed. 1965); A. MATHEWS, LAW,
ORDER AND LIBERTY IN SOUTH AFRICA (1972); J. NGUBANE, AN AFRICAN EXPLAINS
APARTHEID (1963); SOUTHERN AFRICA IN PERSPECTIVE (C. Potholm & R. Dale eds.
1972); P. RANDALL, A TASTE OF POWER (1973); N. RHOODIE, APARTIIEID AND RACIAL
PARTNERSHIP IN SOUTHERN AFRICA (1969); SOUTH AFRICAN DIALOGUE (N. Rhoodie ed.
1973); A. SACHS, JUSTICE IN SOUTH AFRICA (1973); S. SLONIM, SOUTH WEST AFRICA
AND THE UNITED NATIONS: AN INTERNATIONAL MANDATE IN DISPUTE (1973)
[hereinafter cited as S. SLONIM]; SOUTH AFRICA DEP'T OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SOUTH
AFRICA AND THE RULE OF LAW (1968); P. TEMPELS, BANTU PHILOSOPHY (1971); L.
THOMPSON, POLITICS IN THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA (1966) [hereinafter cited as
L. THOMPSON]; UNESCO, APARTHEID (2d ed. 1972); P. VAN DEN BERGHE, RACE AND
RACISM: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 96-111 (1967); P. VAN DEN :BERGHE, SOUTH
AFRICA, A STUDY IN CONFLICT (1969) [hereinafter cited as P. VAN DEN BERGIIE]; A.
VANDENBOSCH, SOUTH AFRICA AND THE WORLD (1970); Ballinger, U.N. Action on
Human Rights in Southern Africa, in THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 248 (E. Luard ed. 1967); Legum, Color and Power in the South African
Situation, in COLOR AND RACE 205 (J. Franklin ed. 1968); International Comm'n of
Jurists, Apartheid in Namibia, 6 OBJECTIVE: JUSTICE No. 1, at 16-25 (1974);
Landis, South African Apartheid Legislation, 71 YALE L.J. 1, 437 (1961)
[hereinafter cited as Landis, Apartheid Legislation]; Mowle, The Infringement of
Human Rights in Nations of Southern Africa: The Response of the United Nations
and the United States, in Hearings on International Protection of Human Rights
Before the Subcomm. on International Organization and Movements of the House
Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 946-64 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as Hearings]; Suzman, Race Classification and Definition in the Legislation of the
Union of South Africa 1910-1960, ACTA JURIDICA 1960, at 339-67 (1961); U.N. and
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components of slavery in that there is a complete deprivation of
individual freedom of choice in regard to many values and that labor
may be forced."' It has components of caste in that its victims are
identified by birth or parentage and subjected to rigidified stratifi-
cation."' Some descriptions of apartheid, especially those.concerned
US. Response to Racial Discrimination in Southern Africa, in Hearings, supra, at
160-86.
The United Nations, through its various sub-units, has been the most important
source in the gathering, processing, and dissemination of information about aparth-
eid. Of its ever increasing production of documents, in book form or other, useful
citations include: REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITrEE ON THE POLICIES OF APARTHEID
OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, U.N. Doc. A/7254 (1968);
H. SANTA CRUZ, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/307/Rev.1 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as H. SANTA CRUZ]; UNITED NATIONS, APARTHEID AND RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, OPI/335 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
APARTHEID IN SOUTHERN AFRICA]; UNITED NATIONS, APARTHEID IN PRACTICE, OPI/53
(1971) [hereinafter cited as APARTHEID IN PRACTICE]; UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC
AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICES, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.14/132/Rev.1 (1963) [hereinafter cited as ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
CONSEQUENCES]; UNITED NATIONS, A PRINCIPLE IN TORMENT: ITH. THE UNITED NA-
TIONS AND NAMIBIA (1971) [hereinafter cited as UNITED NATIONS & NAMIBIA];
UNITED NATIONS, REPRESSIVE LEGISLATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, U.N.
Doc. ST/PSCA/SER.A/7 (1969); UNITED NATIONS, REVIEW OF UNITED NATIONS CON-
SIDERATION OF APARTHEID, U.N. Doc. ST/PSCA/SER.A/2 (1967); Interim Report of
the Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts Prepared in Accordance with Resolution 19
(XXIX) of the Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1135 (1974);
Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts Set Up under Resolution 2 (XXIII)
of the Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/950 (1967); Report of the
Secretary-General on the Policies of Apartheid of South Africa, U.N. Doc. A/9165
(1973); Report of the Special Committee on Apartheid, U.N. Doc. A18422/Rev.1
(1971); Report of the Special Committee on Apartheid on Policies of Apartheid of
the Government of South Africa, U.N. Doc. A/9168 (1973); Report of the Special
Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of
South Africa, 1963, 18th Session, U.N. Docs. A/5497 & Add.1 (1963); Report of the
United Nations Commission on the Racial Situation in the Union of South Africa,
8 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, U.N. Docs. A/2505 & A/2505/Add.1 (1953); Report of the
United Nations Council for Namibia, U.N. Doc. A/9024 (1973); Rubin, Law, Race
and Colour in South Africa, 6 OBJECTIVE: JUSTICE No. 1, at 29-35 (1974); Study of
Apartheid and Racial Discrimination in Southern Africa, U.N. Docs. E/CN.4/949
(1967) [hereinafter cited as Study of Apartheid]; U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/949/Add.1-Add.5 (1967-68).
440. Cf. notes 79-130 & accompanying text supra. See also Awad,
Apartheid-A Form of Slavery, 4 OBJECTIVE: JUSTICE No. 3, at 24-28 (1972).
Apartheid, in his words, "applies [even] to death, with burial grounds racially
zoned to ensure that the bodies remain as divided in death as they were in life
(Group Areas Act)." Id. at 25.
441. Cf. notes 355-74 & accompanying text supra. Using a simple chart, Leon-
ard Thompson has emphasized that
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with its lawfulness under international law, have emphasized its
racial segregation or separation features. 42 Apartheid is, however,
much more than mere racial discrimination, whether that discrimi-
nation be sporadic or routine; it comprises a complex set of practices
of domination and subjection, intensely hierarchised and sustained
by the whole apparatus of the state, which affects the distribution
of all values. 43
In paradigm form, apartheid begins in a fundamental deprivation
of respect, based upon group membership. Underlying its whole
operation is a racial classification.44 Value deprivations are linked
the primary ingredients of South African society are a dominant white group
and three subordinate nonwhite groups. Since the white group is wholly
endogamous by law and the nonwhite groups are almost wholly endogamous
by custom, we shall call the South African a caste society, and the Whites,
the Coloureds, the Asians, and the Africans the four South African castes,
even though not all the ingredients of the classic Indian caste system are
present in South Africa.
L. THOMPSON, supra note 439, at 96. Employing "a minimum definition of 'caste'
as an endogamous group, hierarchically ranked in relation to other groups, and
wherein membership is determined by birth and for life," Piere van den Berghe has
reached the same conclusion. P. VAN DEN BERGHE, supra note 439, at 52-53.
442. See, e.g., South West Africa Cases (Second Phase), [1966] I.C.J. 250,
284-316 (Tanaka, J., dissenting).
443. "Individual mobility which could cut across the ascribed race barriers is
legally excluded in the castelike structure." H. ADAM, supra note 439, at 8. In a
word, "the ascriptive criteria of race determine overall life chances." Id. at 9. A
common theme about South Africa runs this way:
What distinguishes the situation in South Africa from racial discrimination
elsewhere is that apartheid, or racial segregation, is an official and uncom-
promising governmental policy. South Africa's is the only government today
that makes racial discrimination the foundation of its philosophy and the
separation of races the basis of its conduct.
M. MOSKowrrz, THE POLICS AND DYNAMICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 177 (1968).
444. On the basis of race, the population of South Africa has officially been
divided into four groups: Whites (Europeans), Bantus (Africans, Natives), Col-
oureds, and Asians. These categories are officially defined in these terms:
"White person" means a person who-
(a) In appearance obviously is a white person and who is not generally
accepted as a coloured person; or
(b) Is generally accepted as a white person and is not in appearance ob-
viously not a white person; but does not include any person who for the
purposes of his classification under the Act, freely and voluntarily admits
that he is by descent a Bantu or a coloured person unless it is proved that
the admission is not based on fact.
"Bantu" means a person who in fact is or is generally accepted as a mem-
ber of any aboriginal race or tribe of Africa.
"Coloured person" means a person who is not a white person or a Bantu.
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to and imposed by formally dividing and classifying the population
into various racial groups, as officially prescribed. An individual is
given a racial classification that is recorded in the official popula-
tion register, and is required to carry an identity card stating that
classification.445 His participation in the different value processes of
the community is made to depend not upon his capability, but upon
the racial label assigned to him. In the words of a recent United
Nations study:
A person's racial classification is of the utmost importance to him,
for it decides, inter alia, where he may live, how he may live, what
work he may do, what sort of education he will receive, what political
rights he will have, if any, whom he may marry, the extent of the
social, cultural and recreational facilities open to him, and generally,
the extent of his freedom of action and movement.446
The basic deprivation of respect is sustained by an organization
of internal power processes designed to maintain and perpetuate the
domination of the ruling group.447 Power monopolization, not power
sharing, is the rule. Participation in community power processes is
minimal for deprived groups, both in terms of office-holding (elec-
"Asians" means Natives of Asia and their descendants, mainly Indians.
Quoted from H. SANTA CRUZ, supra note 439, at 149.
In 1970, the total population of South Africa was 21,448,169, of which 70.2 percent
were Africans, 17.5 percent were Whites, 9.4 percent were Coloureds, and 2.9 per-
cent were Asians. SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF RACE RELATIONS, A SURVEY OF RACE
RELATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1972 at 63 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 1972 SURVEY].
445. This is required by the Population Registration Act, No. 30 of 1950. See E.
BROOKES, supra note 439, at 19-25; H. SANTA CRUZ, supra note 439, at 149-50.
446. APARTHEID IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, supra note 439, at 6.
447. Heribert Adam has observed:
In South Africa domination is easily recbgnizable as direct personal exploita-
tion. The rulers are not hidden behind a sophisticated ideology or an anony-
mous bureaucratic apparatus. On the contrary, they are definable as a pre-
cise group visible even to the most politically naive. In contrast to Western
Countries, domination has been transformed into subtle manipulation but is
experienced in daily and vivid humiliations. Consequently, there are few
incentives for subordinates to identify with their rulers.
H. ADAM, supra note 439, at 5.
He further adds:
From the perspective of most authors in South Africa, two apparently dia-
metrically opposed race or class castes face each other in visible polarization:
white and non-white, ruler and ruled, privileged and underprivileged, ex-
ploiter and exploited, a numerical minority against a four-times stronger
majority which has the support of an almost unanimous world opinion and
is backed by the historical tendencies of a declining colonial era.
Id. at 9.
See also P. VAN DEN BERGHE, supra note 439, at 73-96.
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tive as well as appointive) and voting." ' Membership in the repre-
sentative government is open only to one ruling racial group.44" ' Free-
dom of movement, transnational and internal, is greatly curtailed."'
For deprived groups, movement within the national boundaries,
including choice of residence, is tightly controlled through an oppre-
sive "pass system. ' 41 People may thus be forcibly removed from
prohibited areas.452 Members of one racial group are forbidden to
participate in the activities of political parties or organizations of
another racial group.453 Individuals are subjected to arbitrary arrest
and detention.4"4 Differential justice in the courts is accorded to the
448. See H. SANTA CRUZ, supra note 439, at 162-68.
449. See APARTHEID IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, supra note 439, at 7; P. VAN DEN BERGHE,
supra note 439, at 75.
450. See APARTHEID IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, supra note 439, at 13-14, 37-38, 59.
451. The "pass system" is one of the cornerstones of the apartheid in South
Africa. In the words of Landis:
"Passes," broadly defined, include all documents required, under threat of
penal sanctions, to be carried on the person by adult Africans-that is, blacks
over 16-and to be presented upon command to any police official. They
include not only internal passports, without which Africans cannot leave
their home districts, but also permits to travel, to enter a city, to seek work,
to take a job, to be out after curfew, as well as identification papers, tax
receipts, rent receipts, et cetera. In particular, passes determine whether
Africans in the reserves can go up to the cities, where the jobs are, and can
take up employment if they find work. Apartheid theory treats Africans as
"transient labor units," allowed on sufferance to work a 1-year contract in a
city and then forced, by operation of the pass laws, to return to their reserves,
where they may apply for new permits to return to the city if their labor is
still needed. Without the revenue-meager as it is-from a city job an Afri-
can in the reserves who does not own a farm will be in desperate straits while
even a farmowner will rarely be able to reach subsistence level.
Pass raids by the police are a repeated form of harassment and source of
humiliation to Africans. From time to time these raids are conducted in
African "locations," where police break into homes and rouse their sleeping
occupants to check on passes. Arrests for pass-related offenses have num-
bered from 500,000 to a million annually in recent years-this out of a popu-
lation of 13 million African men, women, and children. (The number of
arrests and convictions is virtually identical in pass cases.)
Landis, Human Rights in Southern Africa and United States Policy in Relation
Thereto, in Hearings, supra note 439, at 164, 167. See also H. SANTA CRUZ, supra
note 439, at 156-57, 168-72.
452. See H. SANTA CRUZ, supra note 439, at 169; Interim Report of the Ad Hoc
Working Group of Experts Prepared in Accordance with Resolution 19 (XIX) of the
Commission on Human Rights, 17-18, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1135 (1974).
453. See APARTHEID IN PRACTICE, supra note 439, at 32-33; H. SANTA CRUZ, supra
note 439, at 166.
454. Joel Carlson, a courageous civil rights lawyer forced to exile from South
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various groups.455 Accumulated deprivations in all values, finally,
make impossible the participation in effective power processes nec-
essary for change in authoritative decisions.
In education, racial segregation is pervasive at all levels; enlight-
enment is made separate and unequal."6 Educational facilities are
inferior for the deprived groups whose members are educated differ-
ently for their different assigned roles in society."' Disproportionate
Africa in 1971, has given this vivid account:
Every single day, 365 days a year, seven days a week (Sundays included
despite the super-Calvinist nature of the regime), a daily average of 2,500
Africans are arrested under the Pass Laws in South Africa. The average time
for handling each of these cases is two minutes! In 1969, a parliamentarian
was shocked to discover that 1,777,662 Africans had been arrested during the
preceding year. On a daily average basis, the prison population is approxi-
mately 90,555 persons-two and one half times that of the United Kingdom,
which has a population more than double that of South Africa. Forty-seven
percent of the world's hangings take place in South Africa.
Carlson, South Africa Today: The Security of the State vs. The Liberty of the
Individual, 2 HUMAN RIGHTS 125, 129-30 (1972). See also INTERNATIONAL COMM'N
OF JURISTS, EROSION OF THE RULE OF LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA (1968); A. MATHEWS, LAW,
ORDER AND LmERTY IN SOUTH AFRICA 53-261 (1972); A. SACHS, JUSTICE IN SOUTH
AFRICA 230-63 (1973); Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts Set Up
Under Resolution 2 (XXIII) of the Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/950 (1967).
455. In the words of Awad's apt summary:
Justice is placed by law firmly in the hands of the whites. Judges, juries and
magistrates are always whites, as are also the prosecution. Nearly all court
officials are whites. There are separate docks for white and non-white ac-
cused; separate witness boxes for white and non-white witnesses; and sepa-
rate seating for white and non-white spectators.
Awad's 1971 Report, supra note 319, at 52.
See also Rubin, Law, Race and Colour in South Africa, 6 OBmjrrE : JUSTICE No.
1, at 32-34 (1974).
456. See UNESCO, APARTHEID (2d ed. 1972); L. THOMPSON, supra note 439, at
98-113.
457. South Africa's official policy on education has been declared in these words:
Education must train and teach people in accordance with their opportuni-
ties in life, according to the sphere in which they live. Good racial relations
cannot exist where education is given under the control of people who create
the wrong expectations on the part of the native itself. Native education
should be controlled in such a way that it should be in accordance with the
policy of the State . . . . Racial relations cannot improve if the result of the
native education is the creation of frustrated people.
Report of the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government
of the Republic of South Africa, at 90, U.N. Doc. A/5497 (1963). See also UNESCO,
APARTHEID 37 (2d ed. 1972); International Comn'n of Jurists, Apartheid in
Namibia, 6 OB.crTvE: JUSTICE No. 1, at 16, 21 (1974).
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levels of illiteracy are found within the deprived groups. '58 Censor-
ship of the press is an established practice and opposing views are
suppressed by coercion. 59 Similarly, members of deprived groups
are commonly denied the opportunity to discover and develop their
latent talents fully and to acquire and exercise a range of socially
useful skills. Lack of education, job reservations, and a discrimina-
tory apprenticeship system result in keeping skilled occupations
within the domain of the ruling group and in denying deprived
groups access to important skills, such as the managerial."'
In terms of wealth, deprivation is as intense as in other sectors.
Ownership of land is curtailed by racial and area restrictions.4"
Certain occupations may be reserved to a single racial group to the
exclusion of others ("job reservation").4"' There are tremendous dis-
parities in wage scales, with higher wages for "civilized labor" and
outrageously lower wages for "uncivilized labor." ' 3 Unequal pay for
equal work is the rule; race, not ability, is the determining factor."4
For the maintenance of "a permanent, abundant and cheap labour
force," individuals may be required to register for employment, and
may be forced to perform "compulsory and involuntary" labor.46'
458. See ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES, supra note 439, at 63-65.
459. See UNESCO, APARTHEID 233-53 (2d ed. 1972); Interim Report of the Ad
Hoc Working Group of Experts Prepared in Accordance with Resolution 19 (XXIX)
of the Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1135, at 38-43 (1974).
460. See ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES, supra note 439, at 48-52; L.
THOMPSON, supra note 439, at 55-56.
461. See T. VAN REENEN, LAND-ITS OWNERSHIP AND OCCUPATION IN SOUTH AFRICA
(1962); APARTHEID IN PRACTICE, supra note 439, at 36; ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
CONSEQUENCES, supra note 439, at 43; H. SANTA CRUZ, supra note 439, at 154-55;
Study of Apartheid and Racial Discrimination in Southern Africa, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/949, at 55-56 (1967).
462. See APARTHEID IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, supra note 439, at 20-21; ECONOMIC
AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES, supra note 439, at 48-52.
463. "In practice, 'civilized labour' meant White labour; 'uncivilized labour,'
Native labour." ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES, supra note 439, at 50. See
also First, Work Wages and Apartheid, U.N. UNIT ON APARTHEID, NOTES AND
DOCUMENTS, No. 22/70 (1970); Gervasi, Poverty, Apartheid and Economic Growth,
3 OnECTINE: JUSTICE No. 4, at 3 (1971); Rogers, The Standard of Living of Africans
in South Africa, U.N. UNIT ON APARTHEID, NOTES AND COMMENTS No. 45/71 (1971).
464. See ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES, supra note 439, at 56-60; Study
of Apartheid and Racial Discrimination in Southern Africa, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/949,
at 108-12; N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1973, at 63, col. 3.
465. UNITED NATIONS & INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, REPORT OF THE AD Hoc
COMMITTEE ON FORCED LABOUR 79, U.N. Doc. E/2431 (1953). The Report further
stated:
The ultimate consequence of the system is to compel the Native population
to contribute, by their labour, to the implementation of the economic policies
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Deprived groups are forbidden to form trade unions or to engage in
collective bargaining.466 Strikes are forbidden, and when they occur
they may be crushed by the police and armed forces.467
With respect to well-being, "poverty, malnutrition and disease
are widespread" among the deprived groups."' Torture may on
occasion be used as an instrument of apartheid."' Poor housing
conditions attend residential segregation and restrictions.4 70 Health
services for deprived groups are inferior, with an acute shortage of
medical personnel in their groups.47" ' Members of deprived groups
are more exposed to demanding manual work hazardous to health.
4 71
Endogamy is as much a requisite for apartheid as for caste.473
Members of different racial groups are forbidden to intermarry, to
live together, or to have any sexual contact. 74 Severe criminal pen-
alties are imposed for violations.4 75 Choice of mates within the same
racial group may also be curtailed by geographical restrictions.4 76
Families are forcibly split because of divergent racial classifications
of the country, but the compulsory and involuntary nature of this contribu-
tion results from the particular status and situation created by special legis-
lation applicable to the indigenous inhabitants alone, rather than from direct
coercive measures designed to compel them to work, although such measures,
which are the inevitable consequence of this status, were also found to exist.
It is in this indirect sense therefore that, in the Committee's vieW a system
of forced labor of significance to the national economy appears to exist in the
Union of South Africa.
Id. at 79-80.
See also Study of Apartheid, supra note 439, at 121.
466. See INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, FIGHTING DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
AND OCCUPATION 74-75 (1968); Allegations Regarding Infringements of Trade
Union Rights, U.N. Doc. E/5245 (1973).
467. See ALLEGATIONS REGARDING INFRINGEMENTS OF TRADE UNION RIGHTS, U.N.
Doc. E/5245, at 15-22, 29-30 (1973).
468. H. SANTA CRUZ, supra note 439, at 191.
469. See UNITED NATIONS, MALTREATMENT AND TORTURE OF PRISONERS IN SOUTH
AFRICA, U.N. Doc. ST/PSCA/SER.A/13 (1973); Ahmad, Maltreatment and Torture
of Prisoners in South Africa, 5 OBrECTIVE: JUSTICE No. 1, at 27-41 (1973).
470. See ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES, supra note 439, at 44-46.
471. Study of Apartheid, supra note 439, at 133-35.
472. Cf. Awad's 1971 Report, supra note 319, at 57; Diggs, Jr., Inhuman Condi-
tions in South Africa's Gold Mines, 5 OBJECTrvE: JUSTICE No. 1, 42-47 (1973); N.Y.
Times, Oct. 23, 1973, at 4, col. 3.
473. Cf. notes 362-63 & accompanying text supra.
474. G. CARTER, THE POLITICS OF INEQUALITY: SOUTH AFRICA SINCE 1948, at 76-81
(rev. ed. 1959); L. THOMPSON, supra note 439, at 32.
475. See Dugard, The Legal Framework of Apartheid, in SOUTH AFRICAN
DIALOGUE 80, 84 (N. Rhoodie ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Dugard].
476. See H. SANTA CRUZ, supra note 439, at 173.
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of family members or because of work needs.477 Wives may not be
able to live in urban areas with their working husbands."7 Children
may be required to obtain official permission in order to live with
their fathers.4 11 Congenial personal relationships of all kinds are
stifled. 80
The sense of responsibility and rectitude of individuals is im-
paired in many ways. Places of public worship are racially segre-
gated.' Individuals may be denied access to churches outside the
designated area.48 2 Traditional African religions are demeaned. The
cumulative impact of apartheid tends to create a negative self-
image within the deprived person, which in turn adversely affects
his ability to participate effectively in community processes." 3
Viewed in the aggregate, the practices of apartheid have created
an explosive situation in which value deprivations are all
pervasive, 48 4 both individually and collectively. To perpetuate the
domination of one race ("racial oligarchy"), 45 the deprived majority
477. See APARTHEID IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, supra note 439, at 12.
478. See id. at 12, 35-36.
479. See H. SANTA CRUZ, supra note 439, at 173.
480. In the words of Carlson:
The degradation of police and of their victims is an inevitable result. Pass
Laws and their execution act like acid corroding human relationships and
destroying all respect for law. People's feelings and concern for one another,
which I believe all men and women have and exhibit in all civilized society,
are eaten away in South Africa's violent, primitive society.
Carlson, South Africa Today: The Security of the State vs. The Liberty of the
Individual, 2 HUMAN RIGHTS 125, 131 (1972).
481. See APARTHEID AND THE CHURCH, SPRO-CAS Pub. No. 8 (1972); Landis,
Apartheid Legislation, supra note 439, at 452-53. Cf. Reeves, "Growing Tension"
between State and Church in South Africa, 4 OBJECTIVE: JUSTICE No. 3, at 32-40
(1972).
482. See APARTHEID IN PRAcTICE, supra note 439, at 37.
483. In the words of Representative Charles C. Diggs, Chairman of the Subcom-
mittee on Africa, United States House of Representatives:
It is quite impossible to convey here the degree of suffering imposed by the
system. It is not simply a matter of physical deprivation; it is a question also
of the mental suffering which results from the tearing apart of the fabric of
African society, just as in the days of the old slave trade.
Diggs, Jr., Inhuman Conditions in South Africa's Gold Mines, 5 OBJECTIVE: JUSTICE
No. 1, 42-47 (1973); N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1973, at 4, col. 3.
484. See P. VAN DEN BERGHE, RACE AND RACISM 110 (1967).
485. H. ADAM, supra note 439, at 42. Verwoerd officially characterized the situa-
tion in these words:
"Reduced to its simplest form the problem is nothing else than this: We want
to keep South Africa White . . . . 'Keeping it White' can only mean one
thing, namely White domination, not 'leadership,' not 'guidance,' but 'con-
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of the population is divided and fragmented by such devices as the
creation of "homelands" and "group areas.""48 The wholesale prac-
tice of discriminatory deprivations is sustained by an elaborate net-
work of oppressive laws, coercion, and "terror." '487 The victims are
thus rendered powerless in managing their own affairs. They are
deprived, in sum, of the right to shape their own destiny, of any
meaningful capability of self-determination. 88
trol,' 'supremacy.' If we are agreed that it is the desire of the people that the
White man should be able to continue to protect himself by White domina-
tion. . . we say that it can be achieved by separate development."
Reply of Ethiopia and Liberia, 4 South West Africa Cases, I.C.J. Pleadings 264
(1966).
486. See V. HiEMSTA, THE GROUP AREAS ACT (1953); F. ROUSSEAU, HANDBOOK ON
THE GROUP AREAS ACT (1960); P. VAN DEN BERGHE, supra note 439, at 110-54;
Apartheid in Namibia, supra note 439, at 22-23; Landis, Apartheid Legislation,
supra note 439, at 16-52; Rubin, Bantustan Policy: A Fantasy and a Fraud, U.N.
UNIT ON APARTHEID, NOTES AND COMMENTS, No. 12/71 (1971); N.Y. Times, Jan. 21,
1973, § 1, at 1, col. 6.
487. See Carlson, South Africa-A Police State, U.N. UNrr ON APARTHEID, NOTES
AND DOCUMENTS, No. 16/73 (1973); Carlson, South Africa Today: The Security of
the State vs. The Liberty of the Individual, 2 HUMAN RIGHTS 125 (1972). But see
SOUTH AFRICA DEP'T OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SOUTH AFRICA AND THE RULE OF LAW (1968).
Dugard, a leading international law scholar in South Africa, has concluded:
Apartheid is a creature of the law. Conceived in racial prejudice it is nurtured
in the womb of Parliament and brought forth in legislative form. It is not
merely declaratory of existing social convention; it is often constitutive of
new discriminatory practices. The law is as indispensable to apartheid as is
race prejudice itself. An understanding of the role of the law in South Africa
is essential for an understanding of apartheid.
Dugard, supra note 475, at 98.
Van den Berghe has divided oppressive laws within South Africa into two kinds:
Nationalist laws fall into two discernible categories. On the one hand, such
acts as the Population Registration Act, the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages
Act, the Group Areas Act, the Bantu Education Act, the Extension of Univer-
sity Education Act, and the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act all fall
into an internally consistent, long premeditated, and undeviating pattern,
namely the steadfast implementation of the ends of apartheid. On the other
hand, laws like the Public Safety Act, the Suppression of Communism Act,
the Criminal Law Amendment Act, the Riotous Assemblies Act, the Unlaw-
ful Organizations Act, the "Sabotage" Act of 1962, and the "No Trial" Act
of 1963 share the character of improvised, ad hoc, repressive measures, hur-
riedly passed during, or just after, crises, to give the police powers to crush
opposition.
P. VAN DEN BERGHE, supra note 439, at 85.
488. Cf. Gervasi, A Crisis of the Neo-Colonial System, 4 OBJEcrIvE: JUSTICE No.
3, at 21-24 (1972). For recent developments in South Africa see a series of detailed
reports by Charles Mohr, a reporter for the New York Times: N.Y. Times, Nov.
20, 1974, at 18, col. 3; id., Nov. 19, 1974, at 14, col. 1; id., Nov. 18, 1974, at 16, col.
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In the sense described above, apartheid has been, and may in the
future be, manifested, with varying degrees of approximation, in
differing communities. The practices presently imposed in South
Africa and extended to Namibia of course epitomize apartheid in
the contemporary world.48 In lesser degree, apartheid may also be
taking shape in Southern Rhodesia.49 Similar practices have existed
elsewhere as once, perhaps in more modest approximation, in the
United States49' and potentially may occur again.
ii. Basic community policies
In its aggregate patterns, apartheid would appear wholly contra-
dictory to that fundamental freedom of individual choice which is
inherent in shared respect.4 ' If slavery, caste, racial discrimination,
and other gross value deprivations are incompatible with human
dignity when taken separately,49 their comprehensive and system-
atic aggregation must a fortiori multiply such incompatibility.
In its origin, apartheid was sought to be justified upon the same
grounds as racial discrimination, that is, some ethnic gToups are by
nature inferior to others.494 It is, however, widely agreed today, as
has already been noted, that there is no scientific basis for such an
assumption.49
More recently, justifications have been offered for apartheid in
terms of the richer development and ultimate independence of
different ethnic groups.498 It has not, however, been made clear that
1; id., Nov. 17, 1974, § 1, at 1, col. 6.
489. Namibia is a territory under the "illegal" occupation of the government of
South Africa. In Namibia, South Africa has imposed apartheid as intensively and
extensively as in South Africa. For the controversy of South Africa's continued
control over Namibia see notes 533-63 & accompanying text infra.
490. See Study of Apartheid and Racial Discrimination in Southern Africa, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/949/Add.2 (1967); Study of Apartheid, supra note 439, at 47-69.
491. See, e.g., J. DENTON, APARTHEID AMERICAN STLE (1967). As the Kerner
Commission reported in 1968, the United States "is moving toward two societies,
one black, one white-separate and unequal." REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY
COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 1 (Bantam ed. 1968). In the view of van den Berghe,
"The closest historical parallel to the South African political system is found in
southern United States, and not in Nazi Germany." P. VAN DEN BEROHE, supra note
439, at 80.
492. See notes 18-54 & accompanying text supra.
493. See notes 79-438 & accompanying text supra.
494. See J. BALICKI, APARTHEID 343 (1967); P. JOSHI, APARTHEID IN SOUTH AFRICA
17-29 (1950); H. SANTA CRUZ, supra note 439, at 151.
495. See notes 377-78 & accompanying text supra; notes 733-44 & accompany-
ing text infra.
496. For a recent official statement by South Africa's Minister of Information
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the oppressive practices which comprise apartheid are necessary, or
even contributory, to such an objective.497
The suggestion is sometimes made that apartheid is necessary to
secure the survival of the ruling white group.49 It is not, however,
clearly established that common interest requires a single ruling
group to be able to maintain its historic form through posterity, or
that such maintenance is worth its costs in terms of the human
rights of others.499
The same policies, in sum, that comdemn slavery, caste, racial
discrimination, and other more particular value deprivations would
appear equally to condemn apartheid. In the words of a UNESCO
study:
and Minister of the Interior see Mulder, South Africa's Objectives, N.Y. Times,
May 14, 1974, at 37, col. 2. In Mulder's words:
The basic objectives of our policy include self-determination for the various
nations in South Africa, protection of the identity of all ethnic groups and
the elimination of domination of one people over others. This is a totally
different picture from the one accepted by so many United States commenta-
tors.
This transition from a single South Africa state consisting of black nations
and a white nation into a bloc of politically independent states, economically
interdependent, is taking place systematically and peacefully.
Id.
For brief summaries of South Africa's official position see H. ADAM, supra note
439, at 45-46; L. THOMPSON, supra note 439, at 13-17. For comprehensive, elabo-
rate expositions of this position see Counter Memorial of South Africa, 2 South
West Africa Cases, I.C.J. Pleadings 1, 457-88 (1966); Rejoinder of South Africa, 5
id. at 119-41, 242-47; Rejoinder of South Africa, 6 id. at 1, 149-65; Argument
of Mr. De Villiers, 8 id. at 611, 653-67; Argument of Mr. De Villiers, 9 id. at
94-114; Address by Mr. Muller (South Africa), 12 id. at 67-84; Comment by Mr.
De Villiers, 12 id. at 392-451. These complex, technical presentations have been
adapted into a popular version: D. DE VILLIERS, THE CASE FOR SOUTH AFRICA (1970).
See also THE CASE FOR SOUTH AFRICA AS PUT FORTH IN THE PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF
ERIC H. Louw, FOREIGN MINISTER OF SOUTH AFRICA (H. Biermann ed. 1963).
497. For elaborate expositions of this position see Memorial of Ethiopia, 1 South
West Africa Cases, I.C.J. Pleadings 32, 108-90 (1966); Reply of Ethiopia and
Liberia, 4 id. at 220, 476-512; Argument of Mr. Gross, 8 id. at 107, 111-24;
Argument of Mr. Gross, 8 id. at 167, 258-69.
Recently, a liberal South African lawyer, Jack Unterhalter, made the observation
that apartheid
sought to impose a system of "separate development" upon a majority with-
out its consent and to exclude it from the opportunities and benefits of the
largest, best developed and richest areas of the country.
N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1973, at 10, col. 1 (city ed.).
498. Cf. H. KATZEW, APARTHEID AND SURVIVAL (1965).
499. See note 497 supra.
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The image of man-to whatever ethnic group he belongs or is made
a part of-which results from the policy of apartheid in South Africa,
is an image which is clearly opposite the one to which the community
of nations is ethically and legally dedicated."'
iii. Trends in decision
The prescriptions which outlaw apartheid include those relating
to slavery, caste, racial discrimination, self-determination, and
other more particular human rights. Increasingly, United Nations
pronouncements also invoke certain prescriptions relating to crimes
against humanity and threats to peace."' With the prescriptions
relating to slavery and caste we have already dealt."' With the more
recent crystallizations concerning racial discrimination we will deal
in greater detail below."' In other contexts we propose, further, to
deal with the questions of self-determination and violations of more
particular human rights prescriptions." '
The immediate focus of attention here is upon those prescriptions
which, building upon and integrating all the other prescriptions,
uniquely condemn apartheid as a gross violation of human rights.
There has been a consistent flow of resolutions and decisions giving
authoritative interpretations of the Charter of the United Nations,
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Cove-
nants of Human Rights, and other relevant human rights prescrip-
tions, which characterize apartheid, in the aggregate, as unlawful
under international law.
The problem of apartheid has been before the United Nations
ever since the first session of the General Assembly in 1946.55 India
at that time complained that South Africa had discriminated
against South Africans of Indian origin. 8 From 1946 to 1952, the
discussion of the Assembly was confined to the "treatment of people
of Indian origin in the Union of South Africa.""5 ' In 1952, the larger
500. UNESCO, APARTHEID 255 (2d ed. 1972).
501. See notes 519-83 & accompanying text infra.
502. See notes 79-438 & accompanying text supra.
503. See notes 680-963 & accompanying text infra.
504. These will be treated in the chapters relating to power and other values.
505. For succinct accounts see UNITED NATIONS, ACTION AGAINST APARTHEID
(1969); UNITED NATIONS, THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 40-45 (1973);
UNITED NATIONS, REVIEW OF UNITED NATIONS CONSIDERATION OF APARTHEID, U.N.
Doc. ST/PSCA/SER.A/2 (1967).
506. See [1946-47] YEARBOOK OF THE UNITED NATIONS 144-48.
507. UNITED NATIONS, REVIEW OF UNITED NATIONS CONSIDERATION OF APARTHEID,
U.N. Doc. ST/PSCA/SER.A/2, at 3 (1967). Cf. S. MUKHERJI, INDIAN MINORITY IN
SOUTH AFRICA (1959); B. PACHAI, THE INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE AFRICAN INDIAN
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question of apartheid was inscribed as a separate item on the As-
sembly agenda under the title "Question of race conflict in South
Africa resulting from the policies of apartheid of the Government of
the Union of South Africa."5"8 These two items continued to be
considered separately until the seventeenth session (1962) when
they were combined into one item-"The policies of apartheid of the
Government of the Republic of South Africa.""5 9 This composite
item has been a fixture on the agenda of the General Assembly year
after year." ' Meanwhile, the Security Council, in response to the
world-wide indignation aroused by the Sharpeville incident,51' met
in March and April of 1960 to discuss the policies of apartheid. 12
Subsequently, the Council took up the same questions again in
1963, 1964, 1970, and 1972.5' 3 In recent years, several other bodies
of the United Nations have dealt with various aspects of the aparth-
eid question.514
Although the government of South Africa has consistently con-
tended that its policy of "separate development" (apartheid) is a
domestic matter outside the jurisdiction of the United Nations,51 5
QUESTION, 1860-1871 (1971).
508. See [1952] YEARBOOK OF THE UNITED NATIONS 297-306.
509. See [1962] YEARBOOK OF THE UNITED NATIONS 93-100.
510. See UNITED NATIONS, UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 40-45 (1973).
511. The incident took place on March 21, 1960, in South Africa. On that day,
large numbers of Africans staged peaceful protests against the new decree that all
Africans carry "reference books" at all times in order to move about within their
own country. The protesters left their "reference books" behind and presented
themselves at various police stations to invite arrest. In Sharpeville, an African
township of Vereeniging near Johannesburg, the police used armored vehicles and
shot at the crowd, while jet fighter planes flew overhead to frighten the demonstra-
tors. Sixty-nine Africans were killed and nearly 200 were wounded. The large dem-
onstrations which followed in many cities were again met with coercive suppression
by the South African government. See A. REEVES, SHOOTING AT SHARPEVILLE: THE
AGONY OF SOUTH AFRICA (1961).
512. See 15 U.N. SCOR, 851st-55th meetings (1960); [1960] YEARBOOK OF THE
UNITED NATIONS 142-47.
513. See Policies of Apartheid of the Government of Africa: Implementation by
States of United Nations Resolutions on Apartheid 2-5, 29-41, U.N. Doc. A/9168(1973) (Report of the Special Committee on Apartheid); Report of the Security
Council, 1963-1964, 19 U.N. GAOR Supp. 2, at 20-43, U.N. Doc. A/5802 (1964);
Report of the Security Council, 1970-71, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. 2, at 29-38, U.N.
Doc. A/8402 (1971).
514. For a very useful account see Co-ordination of United Nations Activities
with Regard to Policies of Apartheid and Racial Discrimination in Southern Africa,
U.N. Doc. E/4817/Corr. 1 (1970) (Report by the Secretary-General). See also notes
607-48 & accompanying text infra.
515. See 7 U.N. GAOR 53-69 (1952); R. HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNA-
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the U.N. organs have seen no legal difficulty in asserting their com-
petence over this matter.' While the government of South Africa
has exhibited continued defiance of the successive United Nations
resolutions urging discontinuation of its policies and practices," ' the
numerical majority of the African-Asian members has asserted an
increasing influence within the United Nations."8 As the years have
gone by, the United Nations, through various organs, has hardened
and made more strident its condemnation of apartheid. The charac-
teristic authoritative condemnations of apartheid make references
to "a crime against humanity,"5 '9 "a crime against the conscience
TIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 120-23 (1963).
516. See Report of the United Nations Commission on the Racial Situation in
the Union of South Africa, 8 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 15-34, 115, U.N. Docs.
A/2505 & A/2505/Add.1 (1953). We propose to deal in detail with the problem of
domestic jurisdiction in connection with human rights in chapters relating to the
constitutive process of authoritative decision. Regarding the question of domestic
jurisdiction see CORNELL LAW SCHOOL, THE STATUS OF DOMESTIC JURISDICTION, PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE FOURTH SUMMER CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW (1962); R.
HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS
OF THE UNITED NATIONS 58-130 (1963); H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
HUMAN RIGHTS 166-220 (1950); M. RAJAN, UNITED NATIONS AND DOMESTIC
JURISDICTION (2d ed. 1961); Fawcett, Human Rights and Domestic Jurisdiction, in
THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 286 (E. Luard ed. 1967); Erma-
cora, Human Rights and Domestic Jurisdiction, 124 Hague Recueil 371 (1968);
McDougal & Reisman, Rhodesia and the United Nations: The Lawfulness of Inter-
national Concern, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1968).
517. All the resolutions on South Africa, adopted up to 1972 by the General
Assembly and the Security Council, are conveniently itemized in Policies of
Apartheid of the Government of Africa: Implementation by States of United Na-
tions Resolutions on Apartheid 29-30, U.N. Doc. A/9168 (1973) (Report of the
Special Committee on Apartheid).
518. For the growing influence of the African-Asian members in the United
Nations see H. ALKER & B. RUSSETT, WORLD POLITICS IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
(1965); I. CLAUDE, SWORDS INTO PLOWSHARES: THE PROBLEMS AND PROGRESS OF INTER-
NATIONAL ORGANIZATION (4th ed. 1971); INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION: POLITICS &
PROCESS (L. Goodrich & D. Kay eds. 1973); J. HADWEN & J. KAUFMANN, How UNITED
NATIONS DECISIONS ARE MADE (2d ed. rev. 1962); T. HOVsT, BLOC POLITICS IN THE
UNITED NATIONS (1960); R. KEOHANE, POuTICAL INFLUENCE IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
(International Conciliation No. 557, 1966).
519. The formal condemnation by the General Assembly of apartheid as "a
crime against humanity" first appeared in G.A. Res. 2202A, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp.
16, at 20, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966). This characterization has been reaffirmed in
subsequent years: G.A. Res. 2307, 22 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 19, U.N. Doc. A/6716
(1967); G.A. Res. 2396, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. 18, at 19, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968);
G.A. Res. 2506B, 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 24, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969); G.A.
Res. 2671F, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 33, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970); G.A. Res.
2775F, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. 29, at 43, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971); G.A. Res. 2923E,
[Vol. 24:919
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
and dignity of mankind, ' 520 "a threat to international peace and
security, '521 and a "violation" of "the Charter of the United Na-
tions" and of "the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. ' 522 Thus, General Assembly Resolution 2923F (XXVII) of 15
November 1972 expresses grave concern "about the explosive situa-
tion in South Africa and in southern Africa as a whole resulting from
the inhuman and aggressive policies of apartheid pursued by the
Government of South Africa, a situation which constitutes a threat
to international peace and security," and reaffirms that "the prac-
tice of apartheid constitutes a crime against humanity." '523 In a spe-
cial declaration adopted on the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniver-
sary of the United Nations, the General Assembly again proclaimed:
We strongly condemn the evil policy of apartheid, which is a crime
against the conscience and dignity of mankind and, like nazism, is
contrary to the principles of the Charter.24
Similarly, the Security Council, in its Resolution 191 (1964) of June
18, 1964, expressed its conviction that "the situation in South Africa
is continuing seriously to disturb international peace and security,"
and pronounced that
the situation in South Africa arising out of the policies of apartheid
... [is] contrary to the principles and purposes of the Charter of
the United Nations and inconsistent with the provisions of the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights as well as South Africa's obliga-
tions under the Charter525
The thrust of all these authoritative condemnations, repeated
27 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 25, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972); G.A. Res. 3151G, 28 U.N.
GAOR Supp. 30, at 32, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973); G.A. Res. 3324E, Resolutions of
the General Assembly at its Twenty-Ninth Regular Session, at 98-100, U.N. Press
Release GA/5194 (20 Dec. 1974).
520. G.A. Res. 2627, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970);
G.A. Res. 2764, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. 29, at 39, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971).
521. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2054, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. 14, at 16, U.N. Doc. A/6014
(1965); G.A. Res. 2202A, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 20, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966);
G.A. Res. 2396, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. 18, at 19, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968); G.A. Res.
2923E, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 25, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972); G.A. Res. 3151G,
28 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 32, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973).
522. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 1663, 16 U.N. GAOR Supp. 17, at 10, U.N. Doc. A/5100
(1961); G.A. Res. 1761, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. 17, at 9, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962);
G.A. Res. 2671F, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 33, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
523. G.A. Res. 2923E, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 25, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972).
524. G.A. Res. 2627, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
525. S.C. Res. 191 (1964), Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council
1964, at 13 U.N. Doc. S/5773.
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again and again with only minor variations, is clearly toward the
crystallization of shared general community expectations that
apartheid, as an aggregate set of practices, is unlawful. Thus, as the
Proclamation of Teheran in 1968 makes summary:
Gross denials of human rights under the repugnant policy of
apartheid is a matter of the gravest concern to the international
community. This policy of apartheid, condemned as a crime against
humanity, continues seriously to disturb international peace and se-
curity. It is therefore imperative for the international community to
use every possible means to eradicate this evil. The struggle against
apartheid is recognized as legitimate .... "I
Similarly, Article 5 of the United Nations Declaration on the Elimi-
nation of All Forms of Racial Discrimination urges:
An end shall be put without delay to governmental and other public
policies of racial segregation and especially policies of apartheid, as
well as all forms of racial discrimination and separation resulting
from such policies.5n
This consensus in general community expectation is codified by the
enactment of the International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination.M Article 3 stipulates:
States Parties particularly condemn racial segregation and apartheid
and undertake to prevent, prohibit and eradicate all practices of this
nature in territories under their jurisdiction.52
Parallel with these developments, litigation has gone forward in
the International Court of Justice testing South Africa's control over
526. Proclamation of Teheran, Final Act of the International Conference on
Human Rights, Tehran, 22 April-13 May 1968, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.32/41, at 4
(1968).
527. United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination, adopted Nov. 20, 1963, art. 5, G.A. Res. 1904, 18 U.N. GAOR Supp.
15, at 35, 36, U.N. Doc. A/5515 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Declaration on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination].
528. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, note
433 supra.
529. Id. art. 3, 660 U.N.T.S. at 218. Further documentation of this expectation
may be found in the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations
to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, adopted Nov. 26, 1968, G.A. Res.
2391, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. 18, at 40, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968). Article 1(b) includes
"inhuman acts resulting from the policy of apartheid" among the crimes against
humanity. Id. art. 1(b). Hence, the Convention excludes such acts from statutory
limitation. For a detailed commentary see Miller, The Convention of the Non-
Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against
Humanity, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 476 (1971).
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Namibia (South West Africa).'" In this litigation, strong arguments
have been made, and ultimately affirmed by the Court, that the
extension of apartheid to Namibia by the Government of South
Africa is incompatible with the Charter of the United Nations and,
hence, with the Mandate under which South Africa holds Nami-
bia.5 31 The central position urged, and now established, is that the
unlawfulness of apartheid under international law renders unlawful
South Africa's continued control of Namibia.5 32
Like apartheid more generally, the dispute over South Africa's
continued control over Namibia has been a regular fixture on the
agenda of the General Assembly since its first session 113 In 1946, the
Assembly rejected South Africa's request to annex the mandated
territory. 534 Since 1968 this dispute about Namibia has also made an
annual appearance before the Security Council. 5 Concurrently,
Namibia has been the subject of litigation on which the Interna-
tional Court of Justice has rendered judgments or advisory opinions
on six different occasions-1950,536 1955,'3 1 1956,11 1962, 31 1966,540
and 1971.11'
Namibia, known as South West Africa until renamed by the Gen-
eral Assembly in 1968,542 is the only one of seven African territories
530. For a comprehensive historical and legal study see THE SOUTH WEST AF-
RICA/NAMIBIA DISPUTE (J. Dugard ed. 1973). See also S. SLONIM, supra note 439; L.
SOHN & T. BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 337-504
(1973) (comprehensive bibliography on Namibia presented at 499-504)
[hereinafter cited as L. SOHN & T. BUERGENTHAL]. For a brief account see UNITED
NATIONS & NAMIBIA, note 439 supra.
531. Advisory Opinion on Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Pres-
ence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security
Council Resolution 276 (1970), [1971] I.C.J. 16, 57-58 [hereinafter cited as ICJ
Advisory Opinion on Namibia].
532. Id. See also notes 561-63 & accompanying text infra.
533. See UNITED NATIONS & NAMIBIA, supra note 439.
534. See [1946-47] YEARBOOK OF THE UNITED NATIONS 205-08.
535. See L. SOHN & T. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 530, at 441-99. For the latest
developments see REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COUNCIL FOR NAMIBIA, U.N. Doc.
A/9024 (1973).
536. Advisory Opinion on International Status of South-West Africa, [1950]
I.C.J. 128.
537. Advisory Opinion on Voting Procedure on Questions Relating to Reports
and Petitions Concerning the Territory of South-West Africa, [1955] I.C.J. 67.
538. Advisory Opinion on Admissibility of Hearings of Petitioners by the
Committee on South-West Africa, [1956] I.C.J. 23.
539. South West Africa Cases, [1962] I.C.J. 319 (preliminary objections).
540. South West Africa Cases (Second Phase), [1966] I.C.J. 6.
541. ICJ Advisory Opinion in Namibia, note 531 supra.
542. The name has been changed "in accordance with the desires of its people."
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once under the Mandate system of the League of Nations which was
not put under the United Nations Trusteeship system 43 When the
League was dissolved after World War I1, no specific provision was
made regarding the future of the mandated territories; it was appar-
ently assumed that they would all be voluntarily transformed into
trust territories by the Mandatory Powers. 44 South Africa, however,
failed to make such transfer in regard to Namibia, and over the
years has intensified its control in defiance of the resolutions of U.N.
bodies and decisions of the International Court of Justice.5
45
In 1950, in Advisory Opinion on International Status of South-
West Africa,548 the International Court of Justice declared that
South Africa, having no unilateral "competence to modify the inter-
national status of the territory, ' 4 continued to be subject, in the
administration of South West Africa, to international obligations
expressed in the League Covenant and the Mandate,"' and that the
function of supervision was to be assumed by the United Nations. 4
This opinion laid the legal framework for subsequent United Na-
tions action in regard to Namibia.55
International concern deepened as the government of South Af-
rica extended its practices of apartheid to South West Africa. 5'
Thus, in 1960, Ethiopia and Liberia, two former members of the
G.A. Res. 2372, 22 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16A, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/6716/Add.1 (1968).
543. The other six African mandated territories placed under the international
trusteeship system were: Togoland under French administration; Togoland under
British administration; Cameroons under French administration; Cameroons
under British administration; Tanganyika under British administration; and
Ruanda-Urundi under Belgian administration.
544. Article 77(1)(a) of the Charter of the United Nations reads:
The trusteeship system shall apply to such territories in the following catego-
ries as may be placed thereunder by means of trusteeship agreements:
a. territories now held under mandate.
U.N. CHARTER art. 77(1)(a).
This provision is traceable to the agreement reached at the Yalta Conference. For
a brief legislative account see L. GOODRIcH, E. HAMBRO & A. SIMONS, CHARTER OF
THE UNITED NATIONS 478-80 (3d rev. ed. 1969). See also S. SLONIM, supra note 439,
at 59-72.
545. See UNrrED NATioNs & NAMIBIA, supra note 439, at 6-42. For "the Trustee-
ship Struggle" see S. SLONIM, supra note 439, at 75-122.
546. [1950] I.C.J. 128.
547. Id. at 144.
548. Id. at 143.
549. Id.
550. See notes 557-61 & accompanying text infra.
551. For the practices of apartheid in Namibia see APARTHEID IN SOUTHERN
AFRICA, supra note 439, at 28-46; Study of Apartheid and Racial Discrimination
in Southern Africa, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/949/Add.1 (1967).
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League, instituted contentious proceedings against South Africa
before the International Court of Justice,5 2 the unlawfulness of
apartheid under international law being a central theme of their
argument.5 53 In 1962, in South West Africa Cases (Preliminary
Objections),54 the Court dismissed South Africa's objections to its
jurisdiction, thus clearing obstacles to a consideration of the mer-
its.555 Unfortunately, in July of 1966, after six long years of proceed-
ings, the Court, patently contradicting its 1962 decision, simply
held that "the Applicants cannot be considered to have established
any legal right or interest appertaining to them in the subject-
matter of the present claims"5 ' and entirely evaded the substantive
issue.
Outraged delegations within the United Nations were quick and
decisive in their response 5 7 On October 27, 1966, the General As-
552. Ethiopia and Liberia asked the court to require South Africa to fulfill its
obligations and desist from violations of the Mandate, to abandon the policies and
practices of apartheid in South Africa, and to be held accountable to the United
Nations in its administration of the mandated territory.
553. Their central argument was that the policies and practices of apartheid are
inherently incompatible with the obligation to "promote to the utmost the material
and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants," required by the
Mandate. For a detailed elaboration of this theme see note 497 supra. For the text
of the Mandate for South-West Africa see BASIC DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 242-44 (L. Sohn & T. Buergenthal eds. 1973).
554. [19621 I.C.J. 319.
555. Id. at 347.
556. South West Africa Cases (Second Phase), [1966] I.C.J. 6, 51.
557. Reactions on the part of scholars were no less emphatic. See, e.g., ASIAN
AFRICAN LEGAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE, SOUTH WEST AFRICA CASES (1968); Alex-
androwicz, The Juridical Expression of the Sacred Trust of Civilization, 65 AM. J.
INT'L L. 149 (1971); Cheng, The 1966 South-West Africa Judgment of the World
Court, 20 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 181 (1967); D'Amato, Legal and Political Strat-
egies of the South West Africa Litigation, 4 LAW IN TRANSITION Q. 8 (1967); Dugard,
The South West Africa Cases, Second Phase, 83 S. AFR. L.J. 429 (1966); Falk, The
South West Africa Cases: An Appraisal, 21 INT'L ORG. 1 (1967); Friedmann, The
Jurisprudential Implications of the South West Africa Case, 6 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1967); Green, The United Nations, SouthWest Africa and the
World Court, 7 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 491 (1967); Gross, The South-West Africa Case,
1 INT'L LAWYER 256 (1967); Gross, The South-West Africa Case: What Happened?,
45 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 36 (1966); Higgins, The International Court and South West
Africa: The Implications of the Judgment, 8 J. INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS 3 (1967);
Landis, The South West African Cases: Remand to the United Nations, 52 CORN.
L.Q. 627 (1967); Pollock, The South West Africa Cases and the Jurisprudence of
International Law, 23 INT'L ORG. 767 (1967); Reisman, Revision of the South West
Africa Cases, 7 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (1966); Stone, Reflections on Apartheid After the
South West Africa Cases, 42 WASH. L. REV. 1069 (1967); Verzijl, The South West
Africa Cases: Second Phase, 3 INT'L RELATIONS 87 (1966); De Villiers & Grosskopf,
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sembly adopted a resolution, declaring that
the Mandate conferred upon His Britannic Majesty to be exercised
on his behalf by the Government of the Union of South Africa is
therefore terminated, that South Africa has no other right to adminis-
ter the Territory and that henceforth South West Africa comes under
the direct responsibility of the United Nations." '
Subsequently, the Security Council, in its resolution 264 (1969),
stated that it
1. Recognize[d] that the United Nations General Assembly ter-
minated the Mandate of South Africa over Namibia and assumed
direct responsibility for the Territory until its independence;
2. Consider[ed] that the continued presence of South Africa in
Namibia is illegal and contrary to the principles of the Charter and
the previous decisions of the United Nations and is detrimental to the
interests of the population of the Territory and those of the interna-
tional community;
3. Call[ed] upon the Government of South Africa to withdraw
immediately its administration from the Territory.'
Reiterating this resolution, the Security Council declared further, in
resolution 276 (1970), that
the continued presence of the South African authorities in Namibia
is illegal and that consequently all acts taken by the Government of
South Africa on behalf of or concerning Namibia after the termina-
tion of the Mandate are illegal and invalid."'
The continued defiance of the government of South Africa
prompted the Security Council to submit the following question to
the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion:
South West Africa Case: A Reply from South Africa, 1 INT'L LAWYER 457 (1967);
The World Court's Decision on South West Africa: A Symposium, 1 INT'L LAWYER
12 (1966).
558. G.A. Res. 2145, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
For comments on the effect and implications of the Assembly's decision to termi-
nate South Africa's mandate over South West Africa see J. DUGARD, supra note 439,
at 396-446; S. SLONIM, supra note 439, at 313-46; Crawford, South West Africa:
Mandate Termination in Historical Perspective, 6 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 91
(1967); Dugard, The Revocation of the Mandate for South West Africa, 62 AM. J.
INT'L L. 78 (1968); Hynning, The Future of South West Africa: A
Plebiscite?, [1971] PROCEEDINGS, AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 144; Khan & Kaur, Deadlock
over South-West Africa, 8 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 179 (1968); Monroe, Namibia-The
Quest for the Legal Status of a Mandate: An Impossible Dream?, 5 INT'L LAWYER
549 (1971).
559. S.C. Res. 264 (1969), 24 U.N. SCOR, Resolutions and Decision of the
Security Council 1969, at 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/INF/24/Rev.1.
560. S.C. Res. 276 (1970), 25 U.N. SCOR, Resolutions and Decisions of the
Security Council 1970, at 1, U.N. Doc. S/INF/25.
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What are the legal consequences for States of the continued presence
of South Africa in Namibia, notwithstanding Security Council reso-
lution 276 (1970)? 6'
In response, in 1971 the Court at long last dealt squarely with the
problems of apartheid both in fact and in law. In describing the
facts, the Court observed:
It is undisputed, and is amply supported by documents annexed
to South Africa's written statement in these proceedings, that the
official governmental policy pursued by South Africa in Namibia is
to achieve a complete physical separation of races and ethnic groups
in separate areas within the Territory. The application of this policy
has required, as has been conceded by South Africa, restrictive mea-
sures of control officially adopted and enforced in the Territory by the
coercive power of the former Mandatory. These measures establish
limitations, exclusions or restrictions for the members of the indigen-
ous population groups in respect of their participation in certain
types of activities, fields of study or of training, labour or employment
and also submit them to restrictions or exclusions of residence and
movement in large parts of the Territory.52
In clarifying the law, the Court emphatically stated that apartheid
is unlawful under international law:
Under the Charter of the United Nations, the former Mandatory
had pledged itself to observe and respect, in a territory having an
international status, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all
without distinction as to race. To establish instead, and to enforce,
distinctions, exclusions, restrictions and limitations exclusively
based on grounds of race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin
which constitute a denial of fundamental human rights is a flagrant
violation of the purposes and principles of the Charter.563
561. S.C. Res. 284 (1970), id. at 4.
562. ICJ Advisory Opinion on Namibia, supra note 531, at 57.
563. Id. For appraisals of the Advisory Opinion on Namibia see J. DUGARD, note
439 supra; THE CASE FOR SOUTH WEST AFRICA (A. Lejeune ed. 1971); SOUTH AFRICA
DEP'T OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SOUTH WEST AFRICA ADVISORY OPINION 1971: A STUDY IN
INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION (1972); Acheson & Marshall, Applying Dr. Johnson's
Advice, 11 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 193 (1972); Brown, The 1971 ICJ Advisory
Opinion on South West Africa (Namibia), 5 VANS. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 213 (1971);
Dugard, Namibia (South West Africa): The Court's Opinion, South Africa's Re-
sponse, and Prospects for the Future, 11 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 14 (1972); Gor-
don, Old Orthodoxies Amid New Experiences: The South West Africa (Namibia)
Litigation and the Uncertain Jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice,
1 DENVER J. INT'L L. & POLICY 65 (1971); Higgins, The Advisory Opinion on Nami-
bia: Which UN Resolutions are Binding under Article 25 of the Charter?, 21 INT'L
& COMP. L.Q. 270 (1972); Lissitzyn, International Law and Advisory Opinion on
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The growing insistence that apartheid constitutes a "crime
against humanity" reached a climax in the approval by the General
Assembly in 1973 of the International Convention on the Suppres-
sion and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid564 (Apartheid Con-
vention). This proposed agreement, building upon the Genocide
Convention, 565 seeks to make apartheid a crime against humanity,
subject to universal jurisdiction. Many provisions in the Apartheid
Convention are comparable to, or extend beyond, those in the Geno-
cide Convention. 6
Article 1 of the Apartheid Convention states:
1. The States Parties to the present Convention declare that
Namibia, 11 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 50 (1972); Rovine, The World Court Opinion
on Namibia, 11 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 203 (1972); Schwelb, The International
Court of Justice and the Human Rights Clauses of the Charter, (6 AM. J. INT'L L.
337 (1972).
564. International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime
of Apartheid, adopted Nov. 30, 1973, G.A. Res. 3068, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at
75, U.N. Doc. A/9030. The Convention was approved by a vote of 91 in favor, 4
against, with 26 abstentions. The four negative votes were cast by Portugal, South
Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
565. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
adopted Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951). For
discussion of the Convention see Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Conven-
tion on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, [1951] I.C.J.
23; R. LEMKIN, Axis RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE 79-95 (1944); N. ROBINSON, THE
GENOCIDE CONVENTION (1960); Hearings on Genocide Convention Before a Sub-
comm. of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970);
Study of the Question of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/L. 565 (1972) (Preliminary Report by Special Rapporteur,
N. Ruhashyankiko); Baade, Individual Responsibility, in 4 THE FUTURE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 291 (R. Falk & C. Black eds. 1972); Lemkin, Genocide
as a Crime under International Law, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 145 (1947); Reisman,
Responses to Crimes of Discrimination and Genocide: An Appraisal of the Conven-
tion on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 1 DENVER J. INT'L L. & POLICY
29 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Reisman]; Schwelb, Crimes Against Humanity, 23
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 178 (1946).
566. See International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the
Crime of Apartheid, adopted Nov. 30, 1973, art. 1, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 75,
U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973); Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, adopted Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan.
12, 1951). Compare in particular the following provisions of the International Con-
vention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid with those
of the Genocide Convention respectively: art. 1(1), with art. 1; art. 2(a)(ii), with
art. 2(b); art. 2(b), with art. 2(c); art. 3, with arts. 3 & 4; art. 4, with art. 5; art. 5,
with art. 6. Cf. Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts: Study Concerning
the Question of Apartheid from the Point of View of International Penal Law, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/1075 (1972).
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apartheid is a crime against humanity and that inhuman acts result-
ing from the policies and practices of apartheid and similar policies
and practices of racial segregation and discrimination, as defined in
article II of the Convention, are crimes violating the principles of
international law, in particular the purposes and principles of the
Charter of the United Nations, and constituting a serious threat to
international peace and security.
2. The States Parties to the present Convention declare criminal
those organizations, institutions and individuals committing the
crime of apartheid.67
Article 2 singles out "policies and practices of racial segregation and
discrimination as practiced in southern Africa" as an acute expres-
sion of the apartheid paradigm, and defines "the crime of apart-
heid" in very wide-ranging terms.-6 s The specification in definition
is of designated "inhuman acts" which are "committed for the pur-
pose of establishing and maintaining domination by one racial
group of persons over any other racial group of persons and system-
atically oppressing them." '569 The first two types of "inhuman acts"
are indicated as follows:
(a) Denial to a member or members of a racial group or groups of
the right to life and liberty of person:
(i) By murder of members of a racial group or groups;
(ii) By the infliction upon the members of a racial group or groups
of serious bodily or mental harm by the infringement of their freedom
or dignity, or by subjecting them to torture or to cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment;
(iii) By arbitrary arrest and illegal imprisonment of the members
of a racial group or groups;
(b) Deliberate imposition on a racial group or groups of living con-
ditions calculated to cause its or their physical destruction in whole
or in part."'
Paragraphs (a)(i), (ii) and (b) are comparable to provisions in Arti-
cle 2(a) (b) (c) of the Genocide Convention.5 71 "Persecution of organi-
zations and persons, by depriving them of fundamental rights and
freedoms, because they oppose apartheid" is also made a "crime of
567. Apartheid Convention, supra note 564, art. 1, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at
75.
568. Id. art. 2, at 75-76.
569. Id. at 76.
570. Id.
571. Compare id. art. 2(a)(i)-(ii), (b), with Genocide Convention, supra note
565, art. 2(a)-(c), 78 U.N.T.S. at 280.
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apartheid. 57 2 In recognition that apartheid may involve severe dep-
rivations of all values, the definition of what constitutes a "crime
of apartheid" ranges over the whole spectrum of values and many
of the specific practices by which different values are shaped and
shared. Thus, Article 2 of the Apartheid Convention specifies fur-
ther other "inhuman acts" constituting crimes of apartheid:
(c) Any legislative measures and other measures calculated to pre-
vent a racial group or groups from participation in the political, so-
cial, economic and cultural life of the country and the deliberate
creation of conditions preventing the full development of such a
group or groups, in particular by denying to members of a racial
group or groups basic human rights and freedoms, including the right
to work, the right to form recognized trade unions, the right to educa-
tion, the right to leave and return to their country, the right to a
nationality, the right to freedom of movement and residence, the
right to freedom of opinion and expression, and the right. to freedom
of peaceful assembly and association;
(d) Any measures, including legislative measures, designed to div-
ide the population along racial lines by the creation of separate re-
serves and ghettos for the members of a racial group or groups, the
prohibition of mixed marriages among members of various racial
groups, the expropriation of landed property belonging to a racial
group or groups or to members thereof;
(e) Exploitation of the labour of the members of a racial group or
groups, in particular by submitting them to forced labour.1
Under Article 3 of the Convention, "International criminal re-
sponsibility" is made to apply, "irrespective of the motive in-
volved," to "individuals, members of organizations and institutions
and representatives of the State," who "commit, participate in,
directly incite or conspire," or "directly abet, encourage or co-
operate" "in the commission of the crime of apartheid.""' 4 To sup-
press and eradicate the crime of apartheid, the contracting states
are obligated to undertake "legislative, judicial and administrative"
and "other measures" necessary to achieve a spectrum of sanction-
ing goals ranging from prevention and deterrence to prosecution,
trial and punishment.5 7 Article 5 declares that the crime of aparth-
eid imparts universal jurisdiction:
Persons charged with the acts enumerated in article Hl of the pres-
572. Apartheid Convention, supra note 564, art. 2(f), 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30,
at 76.
573. Id. arts. 2(c)-(e).
574. Id. art. 3.
575. Id. art. 4.
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ent Convention may be tried by a competent tribunal of any State
Party to the Convention which may acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the accused or by an international penal tribunal- having
jurisdiction with respect to those States Parties which shall have
accepted its jurisdiction.5 6
The Convention further urges the contracting states to implement
United Nations decisions regarding apartheid and to cooperate fully
with the competent U.N. organs. 577 The contracting states are also
required to "submit periodic reports" '78 for review by "a group con-
sisting of three members of the Commission of Human Rights," to
be appointed by the Commission's Chairman.575 The Commision on
Human Rights is charged with additional responsibilities. 8"
Though this condemnation of apartheid has won practically uni-
versal support, doubts have been expressed about the necessity and
practicability of making apartheid a crime against humanity sub-
ject to universal jurisdiction. The broad and highly general defini-
tion of the crime is seen to raise enormous difficulties, and perhaps
even dangers to human rights, in applications in specific instances.
Thus, when the General Assembly was considering the adoption of
the Convention, Mr. Ferguson stated the official position of the
United States:
A convention establishing apartheid as a crime against humanity
is not necessary in view of the broad, all-inclusive provisions of the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination. That Convention effectively outlaws all practices of
racial discrimination, specifically including that of apartheid. Moreo-
ver, the most serious offenses which may be associated with apartheid
are directed against racial groups and, as such, are already made
criminal and punishable under the Genocide Convention.
The proposed new draft convention purports to extend interna-
tional criminal jurisdiction in a broad and ill-defined manner and
seeks to rely upon present powers of domestic jurisdiction for its
enforcement ....
. . .Deplorable as it is, we cannot, from a legal point of view,
accept that apartheid can in this manner be made a crime against
humanity. Crimes against humanity are so grave in nature that they
must be meticulously elaborated and strictly construed under exist-
ing international law, as set forth primarily in the Nuremberg charter
576. Id. art. 5.
577. Id. art. 6.
578. Id. art. 7(1).
579. Id. art. 9(1).
580. Id. art. 10, at 76-77.
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and as applied by the Nuremberg tribunal.
[T]he broad extension of international jurisdiction under this
draft convention, even in cases where there are no significant contacts
between the offence and the forum State, and where the offender is
not a national of the forum State, makes it impossible for the United
States to accept this as consistent with the basic norms of fairness,
due process and notice so essential in criminal law. 81
Similarly, Mr. MacKenzie of the United Kingdom, in voting against
the adoption of the Convention, explained:
There are a number of features of the Convention which we find
entirely unsatisfactory and unacceptable. One of the most important
is that it contains provisions which would violate the principles of
international law concerning the proper exercise of criminal jurisdic-
tion, principles to which we attach the highest importance. The pro-
visions in question purport to authorize contracting States to exercise
criminal jurisdiction in respect of certain matter covered by the Con-
vention over acts done outside their jurisdiction by persons who are
not their nationals. That assertion of jurisdiction would be totally
inadmissible so far as my Government is concerned, and if this Con-
vention should enter into force, my Government reserves its rights in
relation to any attempt to assert such jurisdiction over United King-
dom nationals. We believe that many Governments share our posi-
tion. 8
2
Other delegations also voiced objections along similar lines.'
The important fact is, however, that whatever the merits or ex-
travagances of the Apartheid Convention, apartheid, taken as an
aggregate set of practices, violates practically every important par-
581. 28 U.N. GAOR (provisional), U.N. Doc. A/PV.2185, at 12-15 (1973).
582. Id. at 23-25.
583. See, e.g., Draft Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the
Crime of Apartheid 11-14, U.N. Doc. A/8768 (1972) (Note by the Secretary-
General) (views expressed by the delegations of Madagascar, Norway, and Swe-
den).
Notwithstanding these doubts and objections, it would be a mistake to discount
the importance of the Apartheid Convention. It is an intense ceremonialization of
the indignation that the people around the globe feel about apartheid. The charac-
terization of apartheid as a "crime" itself promises to exert a far-reaching impact.
In a comparable context, Reisman has incisively emphasized:
On the symbolic level, the characterization "crime" should convey maxi-
mum deterrence. Hence it is no surprise that the word "crime" is reserved
for that pattern of behavior which is considered either the greatest challenge
to elite objectives or most deleterious to group life.
Reisman, Responses to Crimes of Discrimination and Genocide: An Appraisal of
the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 1 DENwR J. INT'L L.
& POLicY 34 (1971).
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ticular prescription for the protection of specific rights embodied in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the International
Covenants on Human Rights. This comprehensive and systematic
violation of particular human rights prescriptions is fully docu-
mented, article by article, in the elaborate United Nations Study
of Apartheid and Racial Discrimination in Southern Africa, con-
ducted by Manouchehr Ganji, Special Rapporteur appointed by the
Commission on Human Rights. 84 In the same vein, Elizabeth S.
Landis, a leading expert on the matter of apartheid, has flatly
stated in recent testimony before the Sub-Committee on Interna-
tional Organizations and Movements of the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs:
Even a cursory analysis of the situation in southern Africa shows that
not a single one of the rights enumerated in the Declaration is ho-
nored by the white minority regimes of southern Africa."'
She has backed up her observation by various studies"6 and by an
impressive table juxtaposing, one by one, specific provisions with
specific violations.587
Some of the more important violations of the provisions of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights emphasized by the studies
of Ganji, Landis and others 8 include:
1) the basic equality and dignity of every person protected in Article
I and 2, violated by the deliberate systematic discriminations based
on race formalized by the Population Registration Act of 1950;589
2) the "right to life, liberty and the security of person" under Article
584. Study of Apartheid and Racial Discrimination in Southern Africa, U.N.
Docs. E/CN.4/949 & Add. 1-5 (1967-68) and U.N. Docs. E/CN.41979 & Add.1-8
(1968-69). For the summary report of the 1967-68 study see APARTHEID IN SOUTH-
ERN AFRICA, note 439 supra.
585. Landis, Human Rights in Southern Africa and United States Policy in
Relation Thereto, in Hearings, supra note 439, at 164.
586. See, e.g., Landis, Apartheid Legislation, note 439 supra; Landis, Human
Rights in Southern Africa and United States Policy in Relation Thereto, in
Hearings, supra note 439; UNITED NATIONS, REPRESSIVE LEGISLATION OF THE REPUBLIc
OF SouTH AFRICA, U.N. Doc. ST/PSCA/SER.A7 (1969) (a study prepared by Lan-
dis).
587. Landis, Human Rights in Southern Africa and United States Policy in
Relation Thereto, in Hearings, supra note 439, at 164-66.
588. In highlighting the following itemizations, we draw heavily on the studies
by Ganji, Landis, and Santa Cruz. See notes 584-87 supra; H. SANTA CRuz, supra
note 439, at 148-243. See also Advisory Opinion on Legal Consequences for States
of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Not-
withstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), [1971] I.C.J. 16, 83-84
(Separate Opinion of Vice President Ammoun).
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3, violated by "repressive laws," especially the Terrorism Act of
1967-11
3) the prohibition of "slavery or servitude" of Article 4, violated by
imposition of a criminal penalty for breach of an employment con-
tract under the Bantu Labor Act of 1964, allowing the renting of black
prisoners to private employers, thus constituting practices bordering
on forced labor;59'
4) the "equal protection of the law" under Article 7, violated by
separate and unequal public facilities provided in the Reservation of
Separate Amenities Act of 1953;512
5) "the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribun-
als" in Article 8, violated by exemption from judicial review "banning
orders" under the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950,111 and
detention under the Terrorism Act;594
6) the prohibition of "arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile" of Article
9, violated by a network of terror sustained by such measures as
"Terrorism Act" and 180-Day Law;595
7) the right to "a fair and public" trial under Article 10, violated by
the regularity and prevalence of arbitrary arrest, detention, and ban-
ning orders without judicial proceedings; 96
589. Population Registration Act, No. 30 of 1950, 7 STAT. REP. S. AFRICA 71
(Butterworth 1959) (effective July 7, 1950). For discussion see E. BROOKES, supra
note 439, at 109-25; M. HORRELL, LEGISLATION AND RACE RELATIONS 9-12 (rev. ed.
1971) [hereinafter cited as M. HORRELL]; H. SANTA CRUZ, supra note 439, at
148-50.
590. Terrorism Act, No. 83 of 1967, 9 STAT. REP. S. AFRICA 781 (Butterworth
1959) (effective June 27, 1967). See REPRESSIVE LEGISLATION, note 439 supra, for
treatment of additional "repressive laws" in South Africa.
591. Bantu (Abolition of Passes and Co-ordination of Documents) Act, No. 67
of 1952, 6 STAT. REP. S. AFRICA 971 (Butterworth 1959) (effective July 11, 1952).
See H. SANTA CRUZ, supra note 439, at 184-87; Apartheid in Namibia, supra note
439, at 20-21. See also notes 464-65 & accompanying text supra.
592. Reservation of Separate Amenities Act, No. 49 of 1953, 8 STAT. RE'. S.
AFRICA 311 (Butterworth 1959) (effective Oct. 9, 1953). For discussion see APARTHEID
IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, supra note 439, at 26-27; M. HORRELL, supra note 589, at
77-83.
593. Suppression of Communism Act, No. 44 of 1950, 9 STAT. REP. S. AFRICA 71
(Butterworth 1959) (effective July 17, 1950).
594. Terrorism Act, No. 83 of 1967, 9 STAT. REP. S. AFRICA 781 (Butterworth
1959) (effective June 27, 1967). See REPRESSIVE LEGISLATION, supra note 439, at
18-43, 80-91; "Banning Orders"Issued Against Opponents of Apartheid in South
Africa, U.N. UNIT ON APARTHEID, NOTES & DOCUMENTS No. 3/69 (1969).
595. See EROSION OF THE RULE OF LAw, supra note 439, at 7-30; REPRESSIVE
LEGISLATION, note 439 supra; Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group, supra note 439,
at 41-46; Repressive Measures Against Opponents of Apartheid, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.115/L.375 (1973).
596. See notes 454-55 supra.
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8) an individual's right to "privacy, family, home.or correspondence,"
or "honor and reputation," protected under Article 12, violated by
such measures as searches and seizures without warrant, night raids
of homes in the name of enforcing the Immorality Act prohibiting
interracial sexual relations;597
9) the "right to freedom of movement and residence" provided in
Article 13, violated by the restrictions imposed by the "pass system"
and the Group Areas Act; 98
10) the "right to marry and to found a family" protected under Arti-
cle 16, violated by forbidding interracial marriages through the Prohi-
bition of Mixed Marriages Act59 and by the pass laws system, sepa-
rating family members and restricting wives from living with hus-
bands in a specified area;"'
11) "the right to own property" under Article 17, violated by restric-
tions on land ownership and by forcible removal of Africans from
"Black spots"; 0'
12) the rights of "freedom of opinion and expression" of Article 19 and
"freedom of peaceful assembly and association" of Article 20, vio-
lated by the Suppression of Communism, Riotous Assemblies, and
Unlawful Organizations Acts;" 2
597. Immorality Act, No. 23 of 1957, 9 STAT. REP. S. AFRmCA 611 (Butterworth
1959) (effective Apr. 12, 1957). See M. HORRELL, supra note 589, at 8; Landis,
Human Rights in Southern Africa and United States Policy in Relation Thereto,
in Hearings on International Protection of Human Rights Before the Subcomm. on
International Organization and Movements of the House Comm. on Foreign
Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 165, 167 (1974); Study of Apartheid and Racial Dis-
crimination in Southern Africa 68-70, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/949 (1967).
598. Group Areas Act, No. 36 of 1966, 15 STAT. REP. S. AFRICA 121 (Butterworth
1959) (effective Oct. 26, 1966). See notes 450-55 supra.
599. Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act, No. 55 of 1949, 15 STAT. REP. S. AFRICA
91 (Butterworth 1959) (effective July 8, 1949).
600. See notes 474-79 supra; E. BROOKES, supra note 439, at 179-84; M.
HORRELL, supra note 589, at 13.
601. See notes 452 & 461 supra.
602. Suppression of Communism Act, No. 44 of 1950, 9 STAT. REP. S. AFRICA 71
(Butterworth 1959); Riotous Assemblies Act, No. 17 of 1956, id. at 571 (effective
Mar. 16, 1956); Unlawful Organizations Act, No. 34 of 1960, id. at 711 (effective
Apr. 7, 1960).
Section 6 of the Suppression of Communism Act provides:
If the State President is satisfied that any periodical or other publication-
(a) Professes, by its name or otherwise, to be a publication for propagating
the principles or promoting the spread of communism; or
(b) Is published or disseminated by or under the direction or guidance of
an organization which has been declared an unlawful organization by or
under section two, or was published or disseminated by or under the direction
or guidance of any such organization immediately prior to the date upon
which it became an unlawful organization; or
(c) Serves inter alia as a means for expressing views propagated by any
1975] 1023
1024 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
13) "the right to take part in the government" and "the right of equal
access to public service" under Article 21, violated by complete aboli-
tion of African representation in Parliament;" 3
14) the "right to work," the "right" to "just," "equal pay," and "the
right to form and to join trade unions" under Article 23, violated by
"job reservations," outrageously discriminatory wage differentials,
and the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1956;10"
15) the "right to education" under Article 25, violated by separate
and unequal educational facilities and opportunities through such
measures as the Bantu Education Act of 195305 and the Extension of
University Education Act of 1959.06
The success of the general community in formulating and clarify-
ing prescriptions designed to end apartheid has not, unfortunately,
been matched by a comparable success in the application of such
prescriptions. In the course of the struggle over the problems of
apartheid in South Africa and Namibia, there has been a continu-
ous flow of decisions in purported application and in performance
of related functions, such as intelligence, promotion, invocation,
and appraisal, in aid of application.0 7 Many authoritative bodies,
such organization, or did so serve immediately prior to the said date; or
(d) Serves inter alia as a means for expressing views or conveying informa-
tion, the publication of which is calculated to further the achievement of any
of the objects of communism; or
(e) Is a continuation or substitution, whether or not under another name,
of any periodical or other publication the printing, publication or dissemina-
tion whereof has been prohibited under this section, he may without notice
to any persons concerned, by proclamation in the Gazette prohibit the print-
ing, publication or dissemination of such periodical, publication or the dis-
semination of such publication; and the State President may in like manner
withdraw any such proclamation.
Suppression of Communism Act No. 44 of 1950, as amended by Act No. 50 of 1951
& Act. No. 76 of 1962, quoted in H. SANTA CRUZ, supra note 439, at 175. See also
REPRESSIVE LEGISLATION, supra note 439, at 18-46, 55-59.
603. See E. BROOKES, supra note 439, at 116-29; H. SANTA CRUZ, supra note 439,
at 162-68.
604. Industrial Conciliation Act, No. 28 of 1956, 18 STAT. REP. S. AFRICA 399
(Butterworth 1959) (effective Jan. 1, 1957). See notes 462-67 supra.
605. Bantu Education Act, No. 47 of 1953, 6 STAT. REP. S. AFRICA 1031 (Butter-
worth 1959) (effective Jan. 1, 1954).
606. Extension of University Education Act, No. 45 of 1959, 12 STAT. REP. S.
AFRICA 693 (Butterworth 1959) (effective June 19, 1959). See APARTHEID IN PRACTICE,
supra note 439, at 24-26; APARTHEID IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, supra note 439, at
44-45; E. BROOKES, supra note 439, at 41-71; M. HORRELL, supra note 589, at
64-73.
607. On the seven functions of decision-intelligence, promotion, prescription,
invocation, application, appraisal, and termination-consult McDougal, Lasswell
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including the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, the Economic and Social Council, the
Secretary-General, the Secretariat (especially the Unit on Aparth-
eid); the Commission on Human Rights, the Special Committee on
Apartheid, the Special Committee on Decolonization, .the Trust
Fund for South Africa, the United Nations Council on Namibia, and
many ad hoc committees of experts established under various reso-
lutions, as well as the Specialized Agencies such as FAO, ILO,
UNESCO, WHO, and the Universal Postal Union, have partici-
pated in these activities."'5 The General Assembly and the Security
Council have, of course, played the most important roles. A wide
range of sanctioning measures has been invoked, though without
much success, in a sequence of attempts to put the prescriptions
condemning apartheid into controlling practice in southern Af-
rica." 9 These attempted enforcement measures cover the whole
spectrum of the traditional instruments of policy-diplomatic, ideo-
logical, economic, and military.610
Prior to 1960, the General Assembly had placed most emphasis
on persuasive measures by repeatedly urging a peaceful settlement
through patient negotiations with the government of South Africa."'
Since 1960, however, as persuasion proved futile and the African-
Asian membership in the United Nations greatly increased, more
coercive measures have been sought. The intensity of the demand
& Reisman, The World Constitutive Process of Authoritative Decision, 19 J. LEGAL
ED. 253, 261 (1967).
608. See UNITED NATIONS, ACTION AGAINST APARTHEID (1969); Co-ordination of
United Nations Activities with Regard to Policies of Apartheid and Racial Discrim-
ination in Southern Africa, U.N. Doc. E/4817/Corr.1 (1970) (Report by the
Secretary-General).
609. See generally C. LEGUM & M. LEGUM, SOUTH AFRICA: CRISIS FOR THE WEST
(1964); APARTHEID AND UNITED NATIONS COLLECnmvE MEASURES: AN ANALYSIS (A.
Leiss ed. 1965); SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA (R. Segal ed. 1964); J. SPENCE,
REPUBLIC UNDER PRESSURE: A STUDY OF SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POUCY (1965); R.
TAUBENFELD & H. TAUBENFELD, RACE, PEACE, LAW, AND SOUTHERN AFRICA (1968); A.
VANDENBOSCH, SOUTH AFRICA AND THE WORLD (1970).
610. For a convenient summary of these proposed measures of enforcement see
Policies of Apartheid of the Government of Africa: Implementation by States of
United Nations Resolutions on Apartheid 29-41, U.N. Doc. A/9168 (1973) (Report
of the Special Committee on Apartheid). Concerning the four traditional instru-
ments of policy and sanction see M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 261-383 (1961).
611. See UNITED NATIONS, ACTION AGAINST APARTHEID 9-11 (1969); UNITED NA-
TIONS, REVIEW OF UNITED NATIONS CONSIDERATION OF APARTHEID, U.N. Doc.
ST/PSCA/SER.A/2, at 3-5 (1967).
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of the African-Asian members for such measures is well indicated
by Moskowitz:
What makes South Africa's racial policies a matter of such urgent
concern to the international community is the identification of the
non-White world with the cause of the Black man there. To the
overwhelming majority of the Afro-Asian nations, there is no conceiv-
able crime greater than apartheid.'
Thus, in 1962, for the first time, the General Assembly in Resolu-
tion 1761(XVII) requested member states to undertake, "separately
or collectively," the following specific measures to "bring about the
abandonment" of South Africa's apartheid policies: 13
(a) Breaking off diplomatic relations with the Government of the
Republic of South Africa or refraining from establishing such rela-
tions;
(b) Closing their ports to all vessels flying the South African flag;
(c) Enacting legislation prohibiting the ships from entering South
African ports;
(d) Boycotting all South African goods and refraining from export-
ing goods, including all arms and ammunition, to South Africa;
(e) Refusing landing and passage facilities to all aircraft belonging
to the Government of South Africa and companies registered under
the laws of South Africa. 14
In the same resolution the Assembly further approved the establish-
ment of a Special Committee to "keep the racial policies of the
Government of South Africa under review" and to report to the
Assembly and the Security Council."5 With the expansion of its
responsibilities through the years, the Special Committee on
Apartheid has performed vital functions in aid of the General As-
sembly and the Security Council.6"6
612. M. MOSKowiTz, THE POLITICS AND DYNAMICS OF HUMAN RIGHTs 177 (1968).
613. G.A. Res. 1761, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. 17, at 9, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962).
614. Id. 4.
615. Id. 5, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. 17, at 9-10.
616. First known as the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the
Government of the Republic of South Africa, its title has been shortened, since
December 8, 1970, to the Special Committee on Apartheid. For its activities see
its annual reports submitted to the General Assembly and the Security Council:
Report, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. 22, U.N. Doc. A/9622 (1974); Report, 28 U.N. GAOR
Supp. 22, U.N. Doc. A/9022 (1973); Report, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. 22, U.N. Doc.
A/8722 (1972); Report, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. 22, U.N. Doc. A/8422/Rev.1 (1971);
Report, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 22, U.N. Doc. A/8022/Rev.1 (1970); Report, 24 U.N.
GAOR Supp. 25, U.N. Doc. A/7625/Rev.1 (1969); Report, U.N. Doc. A/7254 (1968);
Report, U.N. Docs. A/6864 & A/6864/Add.1-S/8196 (1967); Report, U.N. Doc.
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In subsequent years, as the situation in South Africa has contin-
ued to deteriorate, the Assembly has repeatedly reaffirmed the mea-
sures recommended in Resolution 1761 (XVII) and urged fuller im-
plementation by member states.6 17 In 1969, the Assembly was more
detailed and specific in its recommendation of economic sanctions
by urging member states
(a) To desist from collaborating with the Government of South
Africa, by taking steps to prohibit financial and economic interests
under their national jurisdiction from co-operating with the Govern-
ment of South Africa and companies registered in South Africa;
(b) To prohibit airlines and shipping lines registered in their coun-
tries from providing services to and from South Africa and to deny
all facilities to air flights and shipping services to and from South
Africa;
(c) To refrain from extending loans, investments and technical
assistance to the Government of South Africa and companies regis-
tered in South Africa;
(d) To take appropriate measures to dissuade the main trading
partners of South Africa and economic and financial interests from
collaborating with the Government of South Africa and companies
registered in South Africa." '1
Other measures that have been urged by the Assembly include:
coordination of efforts by the specialized agencies; 19 rendering "re-
lief" and legal, educational, and other assistance to victims of
apartheid through the United Nations Trust Fund for South Af-
rica; 2' rendering "effective political, moral and material assistance
A6486-S/7565 (1966); Report, U.N. Doc. A/5957-S/6605 (1965); Report, U.N.
Docs. A/5825, AI5825/Add.1-S/6073 & S/5426/Add.1 (1964); Report, U.N. Docs.
A/5497, A/5497/Add.1-S/5426 & S/5426/Add.1 (1963).
617. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2144A, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 46, U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (1966); G.A. Res. 2439, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. 18, at 47, U.N. Doc. A/7218
(1968); G.A. Res. 2446, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. 18, at 51, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968);
G.A. Res. 2547B, 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 56, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969); G.A.
Res. 2646, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970); G.A. Res.
2671F, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 33, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970); G.A. Res. 2714,
25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 79, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
618. G.A. Res. 2506, 5, 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 23, U.N. Doc. A/7630
(1969). See also G.A. Res. 2671F, 7, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 33, U.N. Doc.
A/8028 (1970); G.A. Res. 2784, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. 29, at 79, U.N. Doc. A/8429
(1971); G.A. Res. 2923E, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 25, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972);
G.A. Res. 3151G, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 16-18, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973).
619. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2054A, 10, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. 14, at 16, U.N. Doc.
A/6014 (1965); G.A. Res. 3151D, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 31, U.N. Doc. A/9030
(1973).
620. G.A. Res. 2054B, 2, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. 14, at 17, U.N. Doc. A/6014
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to all those combatting the policies of apartheid; '6 2' a massive
continuing publicity campaign through the mass media, with inter-
national seminars and so on; 22 an international boycott of racially-
oriented sports teams;en discouragement of emigration to South Af-
rica;124 and the termination of "all cultural, educational and civic
contacts and exchanges with racist institutions in South Africa.''I '
In response to the requests of the Assembly and member states,
the Security Council, as indicated above, dealt with the apartheid
(1965). See also G.A. Res. 2144A, 7, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 46, U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (1966); G.A. Res. 2202B, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 21, U.N. Doe. A/6316
(1966); G.A. Res. 2397, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. 18, at 21, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968);
G.A. Res. 2547A, 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 55, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969); G.A.
Res. 2671E, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 33, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970); G.A. Res.
3151F, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 32, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973).
621. G.A. Res. 2202A, 5(c), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 20, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966). See also G.A. Res. 2307, 8, 22 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 20, U.N. Doc.
A/6716 (1967); G.A. Res. 2396, 7, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. 18, at 20, U.N. Doe.
A/7218 (1968); G.A. Res. 2446, 6, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. 18, at 51, U.N. Doc.
A/7218 (1968); G.A. Res. 2506B, 4, 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 24, U.N. Doc.
A/7630 (1969); G.A. Res. 2671B, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 32, U.N. Doe. A/8028
(1970); G.A. Res. 2775F, 6, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. 29, at 6, U.N. Doc. A/8429
(1971); G.A. Res. 2923E, 11, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 26, U.N. Doe. A/8730
(1972).
622. G.A. Res. 2054A, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. 14, at 16, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965),
urged all Member States to "co-operate with the Secretary-General and the Special
Committee" to achieve "the widest possible dissemination of information on the
policies of apartheid of the Government of South Africa and on United Nations
efforts to deal with the situation." Id. at 17. For reiteration of this call, see G.A.
Res. 25, 47B, 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 56, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969); G.A. Res.
2671C, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 32, U.N. Doe. A/8028 (1970); G.A. Res. 2775G,
26 U.N. GAOR Supp. 29, at 44, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971); G.A. Res. 3151C, 28 U.N.
GAOR Supp. 30, at 30-31, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973).
623. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2396, 12, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. 18, at 20, U.N. Doe.
A/7218 (1968); G.A. Res. 2671F, 8, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 34, U.N. Dec.
A/8028 (1970); G.A. Res. 2775D, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. 29, at 42, U.N. Doc. A/8429
(1971); G.A. Res. 2923E, 14, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 26, U.N. Doc. A/8730
(1972).
624. In 1968, the General Assembly requested all Member States to "discourage
the flow of immigrants, particularly skilled and technical personnel, to South Af-
rica." G.A. Res. 2396, 11, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. 18, at 19, U.N. Doc. A/7218
(1968). See also G.A. Res. 2775F, 9, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. 29, at 43, U.N. Doc.
A/8429 (1971).
625. G.A. Res. 3151G, 10(d), 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 33, U.N. Doe. A/9030
(1973). See also G.A. Res. 2396, 12, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. 18, at 20, U.N. Doc.
A/7218 (1968); G.A. Res. 2547B, 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 56, U.N. Doc. A/7630
(1969); G.A. Res. 2646, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970);
G.A. Res. 2671F, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 33, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
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problems in 1960, 1963, 1964, 1970 and 1972.162 The central call on
the part of the Security Council has been for an arms embargo.
Thus, the Security Council in Resolution 181 (1963) called upon "all
States to cease forthwith the sale and shipment of arms, ammuni-
tion of all types and military vehicles to South Africa, "627 and fur-
ther, in Resolution 182 (1963), called upon
all States to cease forthwith the sale and shipment of equipment and
materials for the manufacture and maintenance of arms and ammu-
nition in South Africa. 62
These resolutions calling for arms embargo have many times been
reaffirmed by the General Assembly 29 and were further strength-
ened by the Council itself in Resolution 282 (1970):13°
[This Resolution c]alls upon all States to strengthen the arms em-
bargo
(a) By implementing fully the arms embargo against South Africa
unconditionally and without reservations whatsoever;
(b) By withholding the supply of all vehicles and equipment for
use of the armed forces and paramilitary organizations of South Af-
rica;
(c) By ceasing the supply of spare parts for all vehicles and mili-
tary equipment used by the armed forces and paramilitary organiza-
tions of South Africa;
(d) By revoking all licenses and military patents granted to the
South African Government or to South African companies for the
manufacture of arms and ammunition, aircraft and naval craft or
other military vehicles and by refraining from further granting such
licenses and patents;
(e) By prohibiting investment in, or technical assistance for, the
manufacture of arms and ammunition, aircraft, naval craft, or other
military vehicles;
(f) By ceasing provision of military training for members of the
South African armed forces and all other forms of military co-
626. See notes 511-13 & accompanying text supra.
627. S.C. Res. 181 (1963), 18 U.N. SCOR, Resolutions and Decisions of the
Security Council 1963, at 7, U.N. Doc. S/INSIRev.1 (1963).
628. S.C. Res. 182 (1963), id. at 8-10.
629. See G.A. Res. 1978A, 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. 15, at 20, U.N. Doc. A/5515
(1963); G.A. Res. 2054A, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. 14, at 16, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965);
G.A. Res. 2144A, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 46, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); G.A.
Res. 2202A, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 20, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); G.A. Res.
2307, 22 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 19, U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1967); G.A. Res. 2506B,
24 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 24, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969).
630. S.C. Res. 282, 25 U.N. SCOR, Resolutions and Decisions of the Security
Council 1970, at 12, U.N. Doc. SIINF/25 (1970).
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operation with South Africa;
(g) By undertaking the appropriate action to give effect to the
above measures." '
Meanwhile, various supporting decisions were being made by the
specialized agencies. On December 5, 1963, the Conference of the
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations decided
not to invite the government of South Africa to participate in any
of the Organization's activities. South Africa thereupon withdrew
from FAO on December 18, 1963.632 After repeated condemnations
by the International Labor Conference, urging renunciation of the
apartheid policy, 33 the government of South Africa withdrew from
the International Labor Organization in March 1966.131 In 1964, the
Congress of the Universal Postal Union adopted a resolution de-
manding the expulsion of South Africa from the organization .31 In
April of 1955, South Africa withdrew from the United Nations Edu-
cational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, allegedly in protest
631. Id. 4. In October 1974, the Security Council rejected a draft resolution,
sponsored by Kenya, Mauritania, Cameroon, and Iraq, which would have had the
Council recommend to the General Assembly that South Africa be expelled from
the United Nations pursuant to Article 6 of the Charter. Although the vote was 10
in favor, 3 opposed, and 2 abstaining, the resolution was vetoed by the negative
votes of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. See UN MONTHLY
CHRONICLE, Nov. 1974, at 9-40. Shortly afterwards, on November 12, 1974, the
General Assembly upheld the following ruling of its President:
On the basis of the consistency with which the General Assembly has regu-
larly refused to accept the credentials of the delegation of South Africa, one
may legitimately infer that the General Assembly would in the same way
reject the credentials of any other delegation authorized by the Government
of the Republic of South Africa to represent it, which is tantamount to saying
in explicit terms that the General Assembly refuses to allow the delegation
of South Africa to participate in its work.
G.A. Res. 3324E, Resolutions of the General Assembly at its Twenty-Ninth Regu-
lar Session, at 27 U.N. Press Release GA/5194 (20 Dec. 1974). South Africa was
thus, in effect, suspended from the 29th Session of the General Assembly. See N.Y.
Times, Nov. 13, 1974, at 1, col. 2. See also id., Sept. 28, 1974, at 2, col. 7; id., Oct.
1, 1974, at 3, col. 1; id., Oct. 7, 1974, at 6, col. 4; id., Oct. 19, 1974, at 3, col. 1; id.,
Oct. 25, 1974, at 5, col. 1; id., Oct. 30, 1974, at 7, col. 1; id., Oct. 31, 1974, at 1,
col. 4.
632. Report of the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Govern-
ment of the Republic of South Africa 154, U.N. Doc. A/5825 (1964).
633. See notes 465-66 supra; INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, FIGHTING DISCRIMI-
NATION IN EMPLOYMENT AND OCCUPATION 72-81 (1968).
634. H. SANTA CRUZ, supra note 439, at 211-12.
635. Report of the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Govern-
ment of the Republic of South Africa 156-57, U.N. Doc. A/5825 (1964).
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of a number of UNESCO publications condemning apartheid. 36
The World Health Assembly, in March, 1964, decided to suspend
the voting privileges of South Africa 37 and, in 1965, adopted an
amendment to the Constitution of the World Health Organization
which empowered the Health Assembly with the authority to sus-
pend or exclude a member "deliberately practising a policy of racial
discrimination.' '638
Following the General Assembly's formal termination of South
Africa's Mandate over Namibia in 1966639 and the 1971 Advisory
Opinion of the International Court of Justice on Namibia, 4 ' many
member states of the United Nations sought sanctioning measures
designed to end the "illegal occupation" of that territory by the
government of South Africa. 41 As an instrument to facilitate termi-
nation of South Africa's effective control over Namibia, the United
Nations Council for Namibia was established pursuant to General
Assembly Resolution 2248 (S-V) of 1967.42 The Council is empow-
ered by the same Resolution to "administer" Namibia "until inde-
pendence, with the maximum possible participation" of its people,
to "promulgate" necessary "laws, decrees and administrative regu-
lations," to establish "a constituent assembly to draw up a constitu-
tion," to maintain "law and order in the Territory," and to "transfer
all powers to the people of the Territory upon the declaration of
636. See H. SANTA CRUZ, supra note 439, at 212; UNESCO, APARTHEID (2d ed.
1972).
637. Report of the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Govern-
ment of the Republic of South Africa 157, U.N. Doc. A/5825 (1964).
638. Article 7(b) of the Constitution of the World Health Organization as
amended, reads:
(b) If a Member ignores the humanitarian principles and the objectives
laid down in the Constitution, by deliberately practising a policy of racial
discrimination, the Health Assembly may suspend it or exclude it from the
World Health Organization.
Nevertheless, its rights and privileges, as well as its membership, may be
restored by the Health Assembly on the proposal of the Executive Board
following a detailed report proving that the State in question has renounced
the policy of discrimination which gave rise to its suspension or exclusion.
CONSTITUTION OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, as amended May 20, 1965, art.
7(b), reprinted in 4 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 745, 746 (1965).
639. G.A. Res. 2145, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
640. Advisory Opinion on Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Pres-
ence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security
Council Resolution 276 (1970), [1971] I.C.J. 16.
641. See note 609 supra.
642. G.A. Res. 2248 (S-V), 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. 1 (Spec. Sess.), at 1-2, U.N.
Doc. A/6657 (1967).
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independence." '643 The Council is charged by General Assembly Res-
olution 3031 (XXVII) of 1972"1 with additional responsibilities in
conducting the foreign affairs of Namibia and in arranging for
external assistance.64 Because of the vehement opposition of the
government of South Africa, the Council has not, however, been
able to assert its physical presence within Namibia.'
643. Id. (pt. II).
644. G.A. Res. 3031, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 88, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972).
645. These additional responsibilities are:
(a) To represent Namibia in international organizations, at conferences
and on any other occasion as may be required;
(b) To ensure the participation in an appropriate capacity of the represent-
atives of the Namibian people in its activities;
(c) To continue its consultations at the United Nations Headquarters, in
Africa or elsewhere with the representatives of the Namibian people and the
Organization of African Unity;
(d) To continue to assume responsibility for the urgent establishment of
short-term and long-term co-ordinated programmes of technical and finan-
cial assistance to Namibia in the light of the relevant provisions of resolution
2248 (S-V) and taking into account resolution 2872(XXVI) of 20 December
1971;
(e) To continue to expand the existing scheme for issuing identity certifi-
cates and travel documents to Namibians by concluding appropriate agree-
ments with Governments of Member States;
(f) To continue to promote publicity with regard to the question of Nami-
bia and to assist the Secretary-General in the discharge of the task entrusted
to him under paragraph 14 below;
(g) To undertake a study of the compliance of Member States with the
relevant United Nations resolutions, taking into account the advisory opinion
of the International Court of Justice relating to Namibia;
(h) To examine the question of foreign economic interests operating in
Namibia, and to seek effective means to regulate such activities as appropri-
ate;
(i) To continue to examine the question of bilateral and multilateral treat-
ies which explicitly or implicitly include Namibia, and to seek to replace
South Africa as the party representing Namibia in all relevant bilateral and
multilateral treaties.
Id. 9, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 89.
646. For the recent activities of the United Nations Council for Namibia see the
following reports of the Council: 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. 24, U.N. Doc. A/7624/Rev.1
(1969); 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 24, U.N. Doc. A/8024 (1970); 26 U.N. GAOR Supp.
24, U.N. Doc. A/8424 (1971); 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. 24, U.N. Doc. A/8724 (1972);
U.N. Doc. A/9024 (1973).
In 1972, the Security Council, pursuant to its resolution 309 (1972) of 4 February
1972, invited the Secretary-General
to initiate as soon as possible contacts with all parties concerned, with a view
to establishing the necessary conditions so as to enable the people of Nami-
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The failure of the various sanctioning measures designed to eradi-
cate apartheid in southern Africa is too conspicuous to require elab-
oration. 47 As the Special Committee on Apartheid has pointed out
in its 1973 Report:
[W]hile a large number of Member States have implemented these
resolutions, in some cases at great economic sacrifice, some other
States (particularly a few main trading partners of South Africa)
have ignored them. Some States have greatly increased their trade
with and investment in South Africa during the past decade. A few
States have even continued to provide military equipment to South
Africa. As a result, the United Nations action on apartheid has re-
mained far from effective.6
48
bia, freely and with strict regard to the principle of human equality, to
exercise their right to self-determination and independence, in accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations.
27 U.N. SCOR, Resolutions of the Security Council 1972, at 4, U.N. Doc. S/INF/28
(1972).
Hence, the Secretary-General established contacts with the government of South
Africa, and visited both South Africa and Namibia during March 6-10, 1972. After
receiving the initial encouraging report submitted by the Secretary-General, U.N.
Doc. S/10738 (1972), the Security Council urged the Secretary-General to continue
his contacts, assisted by a special representative. S.C. Res. 319 (1972), id. at 5.
Subsequently, the mandate of the Secretary-General was further extended by S.C.
Res. 323 (1972), id. at 6. Despite these efforts, the United Nations Council for
Namibia has concluded:
The contacts authorized by the Security Council between the Secretary-
General of the United Nations and the illegal South African occupation
regime have failed, clearly demonstrating the bad faith of the South African
regime in refusing to accept the last offer to negotiate a peaceful transfer of
power in Namibia. The failure of the contacts is due primarily to the fact that
South Africa clearly entered into them with the intention of using the con-
tacts to consolidate their domination over Namibia and to divert attention
from the problem, thus arresting the increasing pressure of the international
community. It is now incumbent on the Security Council, and particularly
those members who argued most forcefully for offering this chance of a "dia-
logue" to South Africa, to adopt whatever measures may be necessary to
enforce international law as defined by the International Court of Justice and
the relevant resolutions of the United Nations.
Report of the United Nations Council for Namibia 73, U.N. Doc. A/9024 (1973).
647. See note 609 supra.
648. Policies of Apartheid of the Government of Africa: Implementation by
States of United Nations Resolutions on Apartheid 5, U.N. Doc. A/9168 (1973)
(Report of the Special Committee on Apartheid).
See AFRICAN RESEARCH GRoup, RACE TO POWER (1974); D. AusTIN, BRITAIN AND
SOUTH AFRICA (1966); R. FIRST, J. STEELE & S. GuRNEY, THE SouTH AFRICAN CoNEc-
TION: WESTERN INVESTMENTS IN APARTHEID (1972); SoUTHERN AFRICA AND THE UNITED
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Such failure is perhaps but a dramatic demonstration of the charac-
teristic weaknesses of a world arena in which both authoritative
decision making and effective power are relatively decentralized." '
It remains for increasing global interdependence and the growing
consciousness, and conscience, of mankind to change the
outcome.650
2. Claims Relating to a Basic Equality of Opportunity in the En-
joyment of All Values, that is, Freedom from Discrimination for
Reasons Irrelevant to Capability
The deprivations with which we are here concerned are those,
whether imposed by state officials or others, which deny individuals
effective freedom of choice about participation in community value
processes because of alleged group characteristics which bear no
rational relation to the individuals' actual potentialities for such
participation. The individuals in any community may, of course,
differ greatly in their potentialities for participation in different
STATES (W. Hance ed. 1968); SOUTHERN AFRICA IN PERSPECTIVE (C. Potholm & R.
Dale eds. 1972); UNITED NATIONS, UNIT ON APARTHEID, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE
REPUBLIC OF SouTm AFRICA, U.N. Doc. ST/PSCA/SER.A/11 (1970); Hirschmann,
Pressure on Apartheid, 52 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 168 (1973); International Conference of
Trade Unions Against Apartheid, U.N. Doc. A/9169 (1973) (Report of the Special
Committee on Apartheid); Military Build-up in South Africa and Implementation
of the Arms Embargo Against South Africa, U.N. Docs. A/9180 & S/11005 (1973)
(Report of the Special Committee on Apartheid).
649. See generally M. BARKUN, LAW WITHOUT SANCTIONS: ORDER IN PRIMITIVE
SOCIETIES AND THE WORLD COMMUNITY (1968); 3 THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL ORDER (C. Black & R. Falk eds. 1971); J. CAREY, UN PROTECTION OF CIVIL
AND POLITICAL RIGHTS (1970); R. FALK, LEGAL ORDER IN A VIOLENT WORLD (1968); 1
THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (R. Falk & C. Black eds. 1969); R.
FALK, THE STATUS OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY (1970); W. FRIEDMANN, THE
CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1964); INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY (L. Gross ed. 1969); 0. LISSITSYN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A
DIVIDED WORLD 1 (International Conciliation No. 543, 1963); M. McDOUGAL &
ASSOCIATES, STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1960); W. REISMAN, NULLITY AND
REVISION: THE REVIEW AND ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL JUDGMENTS AND AWARDS
(1971); B. ROLING, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN AN EXPANDED WORLD (1960).
Some of the difficulties in enforcing prescriptions about threats to the peace are
illustrated by the futility in the attempts to apply sanctions in Southern Rhodesia.
See McDougal & Reisman, Rhodesia and the United Nations: The Lawfulness of
International Concern, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1968).
650. We will elaborate on this point in the chapters dealing with the world
constitutive process of authoritative decision. For indication of the difficulties see
McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, The World Constitutive Process of Authoritative
Decision, in 1 THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 73 (R. Falk & C.
Black eds. 1969).
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value processes or even in different phases of the same value pro-
cess. These differences in potentialities for participation do not,
however, vary uniformly and rationally with alleged group charac-
teristics described in terms of race, sex, religion, political opinion,
language, age, alienage, possession of property, birth, and other
status. Differentiation in the treatment of individuals based upon
group categorizations having no rational relation to the genuine
potential of the individual for contribution to common interest is
commonly described, in both legal and popular parlance, as dis-
crimination." ' Thus, a basic United Nations Study of 1949 recites:
[D]iscrimination includes any conduct based on a distinction made
on grounds of natural or social categories, which have no relation
either to individual capacities or merits, or to the concrete behaviour
of the individual person.52
651. See, e.g., a series of studies on discrimination undertaken under the aus-
pices of the United Nations: C. AMMoUN, STUDY OF DISCRIMINATION IN EDUCATION,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/18/Rev.1 (1957); J. INGLES, STUDY OF DISCRIMINATION IN
RESPECT OF THE RIGHT OF EVERYONE TO LEAVE ANY COUNTRY, INCLUDING His
OWN, AND TO RETURN TO His COUNTRY, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/220/Rev.1 (1963);
A. KRISHNASWAMI, STUDY OF DISCRIMINATION IN THE MATTER OF RELIGrOUS RIGHTS AND
PRACTICES, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/200/Rev.1 (1960); M. RANNAT, STUDY ON
EQUALITY IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/296/Rev.1
(1972); V. SAARIO, STUDY OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PERSONS BORN OUT OF
WEDLOCK, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/265/Rev.1 (1967); H. SANTA CRUZ, note 439
supra; H. SANTA CRUZ, STUDY OF DISCRIMINATION IN THE MATTER OF POLITICAL
RIGHTS, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/213/Rev.1 (1962); UNITED NATIONS, THE MAIN
TYPES AND CAUSES OF DISCRIMINATION, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/40/Rev.1 (1949)
(Memorandum submitted by the Secretary-General).
See also E. VIERDAG, THE CONCEPT OF DISCRIMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1973) [hereinafter cited as E. VIERDAG]; McKean, The Meaning of Discrimina-
tion in International and Municipal Law, 44 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 177 (1970) ; Soren-
sen, The Quest for Equality, 507 INT'L CONCILIATION 289 (1956); Van Dyke, Human
Rights Without Discrimination, 67 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1267 (1973).
For a discussion of positive programs to remove the causes of inequality and of
the importance of managing all phases of the constitutive process to prevent, deter,
restore, rehabilitate, and reconstruct instances of discriminatioh, see notes 918-63
& accompanying text infra. See also note 52 & accompanying text supra.
652. UNITED NATIONS, THE MAIN TYPES AND CAUSES OF DISCRIMINATION 9, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/40/Rev.1 (1949) (Memorandum submitted by the Secretary-
General). Based on the United Nations studies of various aspects of discrimina-
tion, McKean has summarized:
It was generally agreed that the term "discrimination" is not synonymous
with "differential treatment" or "distinction". Rather, in the sense used in
the studies, "discrimination" means some sort of distinction made against a
person according to his classification into a particular group or category
rather than by taking into account his individual merits or capacities.
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Though less extreme in its incidence than slavery,653 and less hierar-
chized in its differentiations than caste654 and apartheid,"' discrimi-
nation may still be most comprehensive, systematic, and severe in
the value deprivations it imposes.
The prevalence through history, even into contemporary life, of
wide-ranging discriminations, based upon many alleged group char-
acteristics and extending through all community value processes, is
a matter of common knowledge. The horrors of comprehensive and
systematic racial discrimination are matched only by the persistent
and equally destructive corrosions of its less institutionalized and
less routinized expression, with all such expression constituting a
deep and imminent threat to contemporary world public order. 56
McKean, The Meaning of Discrimination in International and Municipal Law, 44
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 177, 180 (1970) (footnote omitted).
653. See notes 79-354 & accompanying text supra.
654. See notes 355-438 & accompanying text supra.
655. See notes 439-650 & accompanying text supra.
656. The horror of racial discrimination in southern Africa, which has aroused
world-wide indignation, represents, of course, the most notorious, extreme case.
Racial discrimination exists elsewhere in less systematic and less routinized fash-
ions. Discrimination is practiced against the "colored" people of Great Britain, the
blacks and other minority groups of the United States, the overseas Chinese in
southeast Asia, the Indian settlers in East Africa, and the Aborigines in Australia.
Drawing largely upon a series of reports published by the Minority Rights Group
based in London, Dehner has given this summary account:
Aside from South Africa, there is virtually no concern expressed about dis-
criminatory practices of U.S.-controlled foreign companies. Yet, ethnic and
racial discrimination infests much of the world. Among the minorities which
commentators have found to be victims of economic discrimination are the
Burakumin (Eta) in Japan, the southern African tribes of the Sudan, the
Eritreans of Ethiopia, the Crimean Tatars and the Volga Germans in the
Soviet Union, the Basques of Spain and France, the Chinese in Southeast
Asia, the Biharis of Bangladesh, Oriental immigrants and Druzes in Israel,
the East Indians of Guyana and Trinidad, the non-white population of the
United Kingdom, Albanians in Yugoslavia, Indians in Burma and Malaya,
the Watusi of Rwanda, the Tamil-speaking Ceylonese of Ceylon, East Asians
in Kenya, French Canadians in Canada, Walloons in Belgium, various Indian
geographic and caste groups, and Arabs and Bretons in France. Even if some
of these charges of discrimination are untrue, it is clear that racial prejudice
is a global scourge.
Dehner, Multinational Enterprise and Racial Non-Discrimination: United States
Enforcement of an International Human Right, 15 HARv. INT'L L. J. 71, 81-82
(1974) (footnotes omitted).
The series of reports include: G. DEVOs, JAPAN's OUTCASTES-THE PROBLEM OF
THE BURAKUMIN (Rep. No. 3, 1971); A. DZIDZIENYo, THE POSITION OF BLACKS IN
BRAZILIAN SOCIETY (Rep. No. 7, 1971); Y. GHAI, THE ASIAN MINORITIES OF EAST AND
CENTRAL AFRICA (Rep. No. 4, 1971); G. GRANT, THE AFRICANS' PREDICAMENT IN
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The damage done to women, and .hence to the whole community,
by centuries-old practices of sex discrimination has just begun to
filter into the consciousness of both women and men in a few parts
of the world. The bloodiness of religious intolerance and oppression
has perhaps receded in geographic range, but continues to immerse
particular communities, while discriminations based upon unortho-
dox secular conceptions of rectitude are of abiding concern.61 7 Dis-
criminations, and even persecutions, arising from intolerance of dif-
fering political opinions are characteristic of totalitarian communi-
ties, past and present, and sometimes infect even communities
which upon occasion prize the wide sharing of power.61 8 Even a
factor so indifferent to human potentialities as language affiliation
or preference continues to give rise to varying discriminations in
many different parts of the world.659 Finally, many severe differen-
tiations, often amounting to discriminations and affecting access to
all value processes, continue to be made almost everywhere in terms
of such blanket categorizations as age, alienage, possession of prop-
erty, birth, or other status.660
It has been emphasized above," and reiterated in our condemna-
tions of caste and apartheid,662 that any differentiations in the treat-
ment of individuals based upon broad group memberships or alleged
characteristics, without regard to actual individual differences in
capabilities and potentialities, is highly destructive of that basic
freedom of choice which shared respect requires. The most funda-
mental meaning of human dignity is that individuals are to be re-
garded and treated as total personalities having their own unique
RHODESIA (Rep. No. 8, 1972); H. MABBE'r, P. MABBETrI & C. COPPEL, THE CHINESE
IN INDONESIA, THE PHILIPPINES AND MALAYSIA (Rep. No. 10, 1972); G. MORRISON, Tm
SOUTHERN SUDAN AND ERITREA: ASPECTS OF WIDER AFRICAN PROBLEMS (Rep. No. 5,
1971); A. SHEEHY, THE CRIMEAN TARTERS AND VOLGA GERMANS: SovIET TREATMENT
OF Twvo NATIONAL MINORITIES (Rep. No. 6, 1971); B. WHITAKER, THE BiHARis IN
BANGLADESH (Rep. No. 11, 1972).
657. Long after the religious wars of the past, religious tensions have persisted.
The bloodiness of the confrontation between Protestants and Catholics in Northern
Ireland has been protracted. Religious friction occurs elsewhere between Buddhists
and Catholics in South Vietnam, Hindus and Moslems in India and Pakistan,
Arabs and Jews in Israel and the Arab countries.
658. Witness, for instance, the recent political struggles in Chile, Greece, the
Philippines, South Korea, South Vietnam, and Taiwan.
659. Note, for example, India, Canada, and Belgium.
660. Deprivations based on these group characteristics extend to each of all the
values-power, enlightenment, wealth, well-being, and so on.
661. See notes 18-54 & accompanying text supra.
662. See notes 355-650 & accompanying text supra.
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characteristics and potentialities, and are not to be manipulated
and managed in mass in terms of putative characteristics assigned
through group labels. The only permissible differentiations between
individuals that a law of human dignity can honor for the recruit-
ment and training of people for performance of the many different
roles in our modern, complex society are very particular ones. These
differentiations must be based entirely upon a careful configurative
appraisal of the individual person with all his distinctive character-
istics, and of the range of opportunities for participation in social
processes that are either open or can be made open to him. An
effective collective effort to afford every individual the utmost op-
portunity to develop his latent talents into socially useful skills and
capabilities can only augment the aggregate production of all com-
munity values, including respect, which then become available for
cumulative commitment and immediate enjoyment.
It would appear that a general norm of non-discrimination, fully
expressive of these policies, is rapidly emerging as an accepted pre-
scription of international law. A major stated purpose of the United
Nations Charter, reinforced by more detailed provisions,"3 is to
"achieve international cooperation. . . in promoting and encourag-
ing respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion."" 4 The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 65 no less broad in its speci-
fication of purposes, expands the itemization of impermissible
group characterizations. Article 2 states:
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status.
Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the politi-
cal, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory
to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-
governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty. '
The thrust toward a general principle of non-discrimination is
strengthened by Article 7:
All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimina-
tion to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection
663. This objective has been repeated and reinforced throughout the Charter.
See U.N. CHARTER arts. 13(1), 55, 56, 62(2), 76(c).
664. Id. art. 1(3).
665. Universal Declaration, note 55 supra.
666. Id. art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/810 at 72.
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against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and
against any incitement to such discrimination." 7
Similarly, the International Covenants on Human Rights, though
purporting to confine their protection to broadly specified particular
rights, offer a broad and expandable itemization of impermissible
group characterizations. Thus, the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights states, in Article 2(1), that
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and
to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its
jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or
other status.68
It adds, in Article 26, that
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any
discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the
law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons
equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground
such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, property, birth of other status.669
Again, Article 2(2) of the International Covenant on Economic, So-
cial, and Cultural Rights provides:
The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to guarantee
that the rights enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised
without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property,
birth or other status.
67 0
The increasingly explicit aspiration of authoritative prescription
toward comprehensiveness, both in reference to protected rights and
to impermissible group characterizations, is illustrated in the Inter-
national Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination, 7 ' as well as in the Declaration, of the same title, which
667. Id. art. 7, U.N. Doc. A/810 at 73.
668. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 57, art. 2(1), 21 U.N.
GAOR Supp. 16, at 53.
669. Id. art. 26, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 55-56. Compare the principle
espoused by Article 26 with Article 7 of the Universal Declaration, note 55 supra.
670. Covenant on Economic Rights, supra note 58, art. 2(2), 21 U.N. GAOR
Supp. 16, at 49-50.
671. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, note
433 supra.
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preceded it.67 In practically identical terms, these influential for-
mulations affirm that
the Charter of the United Nations is based on the principles of dignity
and equality inherent in all human beings, and that all Member
States have pledged themselves to take joint and separate action, in
co-operation with the Organization, for the achievement of one of the
purposes of the United Nations which is to promote and encourage
universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamen-
tal freedoms for all, without distinction as to race, sex, language or
religion,7 3
and that
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims that all human
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights and that everyone
is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set out therein, without
distinction of any kind, in particular as to race, colour or national
origin, 74
and, further, that
all human beings are equal before the law and are entitled to equal
protection of the law against any discrimination and against any
incitement to discrimination. 75
The comprehensiveness of this norm of non-discrimination is fur-
ther documented and confirmed by recurring assertions in the Pro-
clamation of Teheran issued by the International Conference on
Human Rights in 1968.676 Among its various emphases, the
Proclamation solemnly states that:
It is imperative that the members of the international community
fulfill their solemn obligations to promote and encourage respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinctions
of any kind such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or
other opinions;7
and that:
The primary aim of the United Nations in the sphere of human rights
is the achievement by each individual of the maximum freedom and
672. Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, note
527 supra.
673. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, supra
note 433, preamble, 660 U.N.T.S. at 212-16.
674. Id. at 212-14.
675. Id. at 214.
676. Proclamation of Teheran, Final Act of the International Conference on
Human Rights, Teheran, 22 April to 13 May 1968, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.32/41 (1968).
677. Id. at 4.
[Vol. 24:919
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
dignity. For the realization of this objective, the laws of every country
should grant each individual, irrespective of race, language, religion
or political belief, freedom of expression, of information, of conscience
and of religion, as well as the right to participate in the political,
economic, cultural and social life of his country.8
It will be convenient to further document and illustrate the
emergence of this general norm of non-discrimination by reference
to the development of more specific prescriptions banning discrimi-
nations based upon certain alleged particular group characteristics:
race (including color, descent, national or ethnic origin), sex, reli-
gion, political opinion, language, age, alienage, possession of prop-
erty, birth and other status. '
678. Id. This norm of non-discrimination has been expressed in similar terms in
other universal and regional human rights conventions and declarations. See, e.g.,
International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
Apartheid, adopted Nov. 30, 1973, G.A. Res. 3068, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 75,
U.N. Doc. A19233/Add.1 (1973); American Convention, note 59 supra; Declaration
on Social Progress and Development, adopted Dec. 11, 1969, arts. 1 & 2, G.A. Res.
2542, 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969); Declaration on
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, adopted Nov. 7, 1967, G.A. Res.
2263, 22 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 35, U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1967); Declaration on the
Promotion Among Youth of the Ideals of Peace, Mutual Respect and Understand-
ing Between Peoples, adopted Dec. 7, 1965, principles 1 & 3, G.A. Res. 2037, 20
U.N. GAOR Supp. 14, at 40, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965); Employment Policy Conven-
tion, adopted July 9, 1964, art. 1(2)(c), 569 U.N.T.S. 65 (entered into force July
15, 1964); Protocol to the Convention Against Discrimination in Education,
adopted Dec. 10, 1962, [1969] U.N.T.S. No. 9423 (CMD. 3894); Convention Against
Discrimination in Education, note 420 supra; Declaration on the Rights of the
Child, adopted Nov. 20, 1959, principle 1, G.A. Res. 1386, 14 U.N. GAOR Supp.
16, at 19, U.N. Doc. A/4354 (1959); Discrimination Convention, note 418 supra;
Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, adopted Sept. 23, 1954, art.
3, 360 U.N.T.S. 117 (entered into force June 6, 1960); European Convention, note
11 supra; Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted July 25, 1951,
art. 3, 189 U.N.T.S. 137; Equal Remuneration Convention, adopted June 29, 1951,
165 U.N.T.S. 304 (entered into force May 23, 1953); Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277
(entered into force Jan. 12, 1951).
679. The complete documentation of this thesis would explore not only expecta-
tions created by agreements, but also those created by international and other
judicial authoritative decisions, as well as those created by the whole flow of deci-
sions, constitutional and other, within national communities. In other words, the
conclusion we suggest can be reached by reference to all the sources of international
law itemized in article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice:
international conventions, international custom, "the general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations," and "judicial decisions and the teachings of the
most highly qualified publicists of the various nations." I.C.J. STAT. art. 38. For
such an approach see South West African Cases, (Second Phase), [1966] I.C.J.
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a. Claims Relating to Race
i. Factual background
The deprivations imposed as "racial discrimination" are made
under the aegis of a group categorization which, even when "race"
is supplemented by such ancillary concepts as "color," "ethnic ori-
gin," "national origin," "descent," and "birth," ' makes a most
ambiguous and incomplete reference to empirical fact. The popular
categorizations of "race," whether by officials or non-officials when
indulging in "a man's most dangerous myth," '' are built upon
vague, shifting, and erratic references to such factors as skin color,
body build, eye cast or color, hair texture, nose shape, blood type,
genetic affiliation, and historical or cultural association. " ' "To most
people," a 1950 UNESCO statement realistically asserts, "a race is
any group of people whom they choose to describe as a race." ' The
statement elaborates:
Thus, many national, religious, geographic, linguistic or cultural
groups have, in such loose usage, been called 'race,' when obviously
Americans are not a race, nor are Englishmen, nor Frenchmen, nor
any other national group. Catholics, Protestants, Moslems, and Jews
are not races, nor are groups who speak English or any other language
thereby definable as a race; people who live in Iceland or England or
India are not races; nor are people who are culturally Turkish or
Chinese or the like thereby describable as races."
250, 284-316 (Tanaka, J., dissenting).
680. See notes 792-807 & accompanying text infra.
681. A. MONTAGU, MAN'S MOST DANGEROUS MYTH: THE FALLACY OF RACE (5th ed.
rev. 1974) .
682. For a fascinating and detailed description of the physical differences among
various human groups see J. BAKER, RACE 179-417 (1974). See also C. CooN, THE
LIVING RACES OF MAN (1965); C. COON, THE ORIGIN OF RACES (1962).
683. A. MONTAGU, STATEMENT ON RACE 8 (3d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as A.
MONTAGU]. The Statement was prepared by a panel of distinguished scientists,
representing various disciplines and regions, under the auspices of UNESCO. See
id. at 13 for the names of these distinguished scholars. Three additional statements
concerning race were subsequently issued by UNESCO: Statement on the Nature
of Race and Race Differences, June 1951, id. at 137-47; Proposals on the Biological
Aspects of Race, August 1964, id. at 148-55; and Statement on Race and Racial
Prejudice, September 1967, id. at 156-64.
684. A. MONTAGU, supra note 683, at 8. Additional complications are generated
by the imprecision with which these generic terms are used.
The layman's conception of "race" is so confused and emotionally muddled
that any attempt to modify it would seem to be met by the greatest obstacle
of all, the term "race" itself. This is another reason why the attempt to retain
the term "race" in popular parlance must fail. The term is a trigger word:
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Even the characterizations of "a race" offered by scientists,
though displaying a somewhat more stable reference to objectively
ascertainable factors, commonly admit of highly diverse application
to individual human beings.8 5 The core reference appears to be to
sub-groups within the closed species of man which are genetically
open but exhibit "some distinguishing genetic variability." '686 Thus,
Dobzhansky, in identifying mankind as "a complex Mendelian pop-
ulation, a reproductive community all members of which are con-
nected by ties of mating and parentage" 87 and describing a "Men-
delian population" as one which possesses "a common gene pool,"688
defines "races" as "arrays of Mendelian populations belonging to
the same biological species, but differing from each other in inci-
dence of some genetic variants." ' He adds that the "delimitation
of the Mendelian populations which are called races is always to
some extent vague, because their gene pools are not wholly dis-
junct." ' Similarly, Osborne emphasizes:
Most important is the fact that subspecies and races, unlike species,
utter it and a whole series of emotionally conditioned responses follow.
Id. at 65.
Hence, the proposal to substitute the term "ethnic group" for "race". See id. at
59-71. Cf. C. PUTNAM, RACE AND REAU'Ty (1967); P. RoSE, THE SUBJECT IS RACE
(1968) which deals with "traditional ideologies and the teaching of race relations."
685. See generally A. ALLAND, HuMAN DIvEasrrY (1971); T. DOBZHANSKY, note 40
supra; S. GARN, HUMAN RAcES (3d ed. 1971); READINGS ON RACES (2d ed. S. Gam
1968); R. GOLDSBY, RACE AND RACES (1971); J. KING, THE BIOLOGY OF RACE (1971);
M. KLASS & H. HELLMAN, THE KINDS OF MANKIND (1971); THE CONCEPT OF RACE (A.
Montagu ed. 1964); RACE: INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTV BEHAVIOR (E. Thompson &
E. Hughes eds. 1958); UNESCO, RACE AND SCIENCE (1969).
686. Osborne, The History and Nature of Race Classification, in THE BIOLOGICAL
AND SOCIAL MEANING OF RACE 159, 164 (R. Osborne ed. 1971). Similarly, the 1950
UNESCO statement on race, in identifying "race" as "one of the group of popula-
tions [capable of interbreeding] constituting the species Homo sapiens," further
defines it as
a group or population characterized by some concentrations relative as to
frequency and distribution, of hereditary particles (genes) or physical charac-
teristics, which appear, fluctuate, and often disappear in the course of time
by reason of geographical and/or cultural isolation.
A. MONTAGU, supra note 683, at 7-8, 36, 40-41, 46.
Mankind as a whole constitutes a single biological species which is a "genetically
closed system," whereas all races, whatever the usage of the word race, are "geneti-
cally open systems." T. DOBZHANSKY, supra note 40, at 183.
687. T. DOBZHANSKY, GENETIC DIVERSITY AND HUMAN EQUALITY 57 (1973).
688. Id.
689. Id. at 67.
690. Id. at 59.
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are not closed genetic or evolutionary units, but simply breeding
populations within which a significant number of individuals carry a
particular variant of a gene common to the species. 9 '
He also adds: "What is taken as a meaningful 'racial' differentiation
within any given species will depend entirely upon the classifier, the
circumstances, and the purposes of the classification." ' Further, it
would appear that even among scientists a diversity of references as
to the core meaning of race causes difficulties. Thus, Scott observes:
From a biological viewpoint the term race has become so encum-
bered with superfluous and contradictory meanings, erroneous con-
cepts, and emotional reactions that it has almost lost its utility. Any
scientist who continues to use it will run a major risk of being misun-
derstood, even if he rigorously limits his own definition. He will run
the additional risk in his own thinking of finding it difficult to avoid
past misconceptions.693
The value deprivations, both historical and continuing, imposed
through "racial" discrimination and its equivalences, always com-
prehensive and intensive, may be subtle and hidden or open and
horrendous. 94 When racial discrimination is a systematic instru-
691. Osborne, The History and Nature of Race Classification, in THE BIOLOGICAL
AND SOCIAL MEANING OF RACE 159, 161 (R. Osborne ed. 1971).
692. Id. at 164.
693. Scott, Discussion, in SCIENCE AND THE CONCEPT OF RACE 59 (M. Mead, T.
Dobzhansky, E. Tobach & R. Light eds. 1968). In the words of Clyde Kluckhohn,
a well-known anthropologist: "Though the concept of race is genuine enough, there
is perhaps no field of science in which the misunderstandings among educated
people are so frequent and so serious." G. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 106
(1958) (quoting Kluckhohn) .
The vagueness of "race," it may be observed, is attributable principally to two
reasons: 1) the vagueness written into the scientific definition, an 2) the bewilder-
ing diversity in the use of the word that ignores any scientific usage.
694. Some of these words are borrowed from Henkin, National and International
Perspectives in Racial Discrimination, 4 HUMAN RIGHTS J. 263 (1971).
As Judge Ammoun, Vice-President of the International Court of Justice, ob-
served in his Separate Opinion in the Namibia case of 1971:
The violation of human rights has not come to an end in any part of the
world: to realize that fact one need only consult the archives of the European
Court of Human Rights, the Human Rights Commission of the United Na-
tions or the International Commission of Jurists, or simply read the world
press. Violations of personal freedom and human dignity, the racial, social
or religious discrimination which constitutes the most serious of violations of
human rights since it annihiliates the two-fold basis provided by equality and
liberty, all still resist the curr6nts of liberation in each of the five continents.
I.C.J. Advisory Opinion on Namibia, supra note 531, at 75-76.
One of the outstanding features of the contemporary world is the revival
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ment of state policy, deprivations may begin by denying respect
through official classification of populations in racial terms, such as
the dichotomy of "Aryans" and "non-Aryans" under the Nazis695
and the fourfold classification employed in South Africa today. 96
Such classifications may be reinforced by elaborate systems of iden-
tification by which members of deprived groups are required to
carry identity cards and to wear specified insignia of humiliation. 97
of biological traits as psuedo-biological identity symbols. In the prophetic
words of DuBois:
[T]he problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the colour
line-the relation of the darker to the lighter races of men in Asia and Africa,
in America and in the Islands of the sea.
W. DuBois, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 13 (2d ed. 1903).
Similarly, Connor has given the following statistics:
Of a total of 132 contemporary states, only 12 (9.1 percent) can be described
as essentially homogeneous from an ethnic viewpoint. An additional 25 states
(18.9 per cent of the sample) contain an ethnic group accounting for more
than 90 per cent of the state's total population, and in still another 25 states
the largest element accounts for between 75 and 89 per cent of the population.
But in 31 states (23.5 per cent of the total), the largest ethnic element repre-
sents only 50 to 74 per cent of the population, and in 39 cases (29.5 per cent
of all states) the largest group fails to account for even half of the state's
population. Moreover, this portrait of ethnic diversity becomes more vivid
when the number of distinct ethnic groups within states is considered. In
some instances, the number of groups within a state runs into the hundreds,
and in 53 states (40.2 per cent of the total), the population is divided into
more than five significant groups.
Connor, Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?, 24 WORLD POLITICS 319, 320 (1972)
(footnote omitted).
695. On the atrocities associated with the racist policies of the Nazis see
AMERICAN JEWISH CONFERENCE, NAZI GERMANY'S WAR AGAINST THE JEWS (1947); H.
ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM (2d ed. 1958) ; THE THIRD REICH (M.
Beaumont, J. Fried & E. Vermeil eds. 1955) ; R. HILBERG, THE DESTRUCTION OF THE
EUROPEAN JEWS (1961) [hereinafter cited as R. HILBERG]; 0. JANOWSKY & M.
FAGEN, INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF GERMAN RACIAL POLICIES (1937) [hereinafter cited
as 0. JANOWSKY & M. FAGEN]; M. LOWENTHAL, THE JEWS OF GERMANY (1936); Nazi
Conspiracy and Aggression, Opinion and Judgment (U.S. Gov't Printing Office
1947); H. SANTA CRUZ, note 439 supra.
696. This fourfold classification is as follows: white persons (Europeans); Bantus
(Africans); coloured persons; and Asians. For a discussion of the wide range of
severe value deprivations associated with racial discrimination in the context of
apartheid see notes 444-86 & accompanying text supra.
697. See R. HILBERG, supra note 695, 118-21 for a discussion of the identifica-
tion system used by Nazi Germany. "The whole identification system," in the
words of Hilberg, "with its personal documents, specially assigned names, and
conspicuous tagging in public, was a powerful weapon in the hands of the police,"
facilitating the enforcement of residence and movement restrictions, generating
arbitrary arrests of non-Aryans, and causing "a paralyzing effect on its victims."
Id. at 121.
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In such regimes, the degree and scope of an individual's participa-
tion in the different community value processes are dictated more
by the arbitrary racial label attached to the individual than by his
or her unique capabilities and potentialities. The degree of re-
spect-the freedom of choice and esteem by self and others-which
a person may enjoy is determined by the group to which he or she
is assigned; segregation in access to public amenities and accommo-
dations, and compulsory gestures of submission may be constant
reminders of disrespect.698
The total domination by one racial group over another may epito-
mize deprivations in the power process. In the name of race, individ-
uals are often disfranchised outright or by such devices as weighted
voting;699 they also are denied access to office-holding-appointive
and elective, local and national, executive and judicial, civilian and
military. 700 Discriminatory measures may be taken to deprive
698. Cf. J. GREENBERG, RACE RELATIONS AND AMERICAN LAW 79-114 (1959)
[hereinafter cited as J. GREENBERG]; 2 G. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA (1964);
C. WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (2d ed. rev. 1966); Franklin,
History of Racial Segregation in the United States, 34 ANNALS 1 (1956).
Note the vivid description by Woodward:
The public symbols and constant reminders of his [the Negro's] inferior
position were the segregation statutes, or "Jim Crow" laws. They constituted
the most elaborate and formal expression of sovereign white opinion upon the
subject. In bulk and detail as well as in effectiveness of enforcement the
segregation codes were comparable with the black codes of the old regime,
though the laxity that mitigated the harshness of the black codes was re-
placed by a rigidity that was more typical of the segregation code. That code
lent the sanction of law to a racial ostracism that extended to churches and
schools, to housing and jobs, to eating and drinking. Whether by law or by
custom, that ostracism extended to virtually all forms of public transporta-
tion, to sports and recreations, to hospitals, orphanages, prisons, and asy-
lums, and ultimately to funeral homes, morgues, and cemeteries.
C. WOODWARD, supra at 7 (footnote omitted).
699. According to a study prepared by the United States Commission on Civil
Rights, the various devices employed to disfranchise the blacks in 10 southern
states of the United States include the following: "diluting the Negro vote," "pre-
venting Negroes from becoming candidates or obtaining office," "discrimination
against Negro registrants," "exclusion or an interference with Negro poll watch-
ers," "vote fraud," "discriminatory selection of election officials," and
"intimidation and economic dependence." UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 19-131 (1968). See also J. GREENBERG, supra note 698, at
133-53; L. LITWACK, NORTH OF SLAVERY 74-79 (1961), Comment, Representative
Government and Equal Protection, 5 HARv. Crv. RIGHTS-Civ. LIB. L. Rvv. 472
(1970).
700. See, e.g., 0. JANOWSKY & M. FAGEN, supra note 695, at 134-35, 146-54;
UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 40-59 (1968).
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individuals of nationality,"' to effect banishment (expulsion),702 or
to deny emigration or travel abroad.7 "3 For being or not being a
member of a specified racial group, individuals may also be denied
access, temporarily or permanently, to territorial communities.7 4
Other measures of power deprivation include arbitrary arrest and
detention, 75 police brutality and torture, 7  differential justice for
various groups through perversion of the judicial process, 77 and ex-
clusion from military training and service.7 8
Enlightenment is restricted when access to educational institu-
tions is denied because of racial group membership. This may take
the form of exclusion from higher education 709 or from elementary
701. See O. JANOWSKY & M. FAGEN, supra note 695, at 60-72, 134-35, 142-45;
McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, Nationality and Human Rights: The Protection of
the Individual in External Areas, 83 YALE L.J. 900, 947-48 (1974).
702. See R. HILBERG, supra note 695, at 137-44; 0. JANowsKY & M. FAGEN, supra
note 695, at 49-60.
703. See J. INGLES, STUDY OF DISCRIMINATION IN RESPECT OF THE RIGHT OF EVER-
YONE TO LEAVE ANY COUNTRY, INCLUDING His OWN, AND TO RETURN TO His COUNTRY
20-23, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/220/Rev.1 (1963).
704. A notorious example was, of course, the essentially whites-only immigration
policy in Australia. Other examples include discriminatory policies toward "col-
oured" immigrants in the United Kingdom and the national quota system used in
the United States prior to 1965. See generally M. BANTON, RACE RELATIONS 368-93
(1967); P. FOOT, IMMIGRATION AND RACE IN BRITISH POLITICS (1965); I. MACDONALD,
RACE RELATIONS AND IMMIGRATION LAW (1969) ; S. PATTERSON, IMMIGRATION AND RACE
RELATIONS IN BRITAIN 1960-1967 (1969); E. ROSE, COLOUR AND CITIZENSHIP (1969);
Patterson, Immigrants and Minority Groups in British Society, in THE PREVENTION
OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN BRTAIN 21 (S. Abbott ed. 1971).
See also Higham, American Immigration Policy in Historical Perspective, 21
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 213 (1956); Jaffe, The Philosophy of Our Immigration Law,
21 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 358 (1956); Scully, Is the Door Open Again?-A Survey
of Our New Immigration Law, 13 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 227 (1966).
705. See H. SANTA CRUZ, supra note 439, at 255.
706. Cf. id. at 256-57; NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIvIm DISORDERS, REPORT
299-336 (Bantam ed. 1968).
707. See 0. JANOWSKY & M. FAGEN, supra note 695, at 192-96; H. SANTA CRUZ,
supra note 439, at 260-63; UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, JUSTICE (1961).
708. For instance, the Nazi Conscription Law provided that "Aryan descent is
a pre-supposition for active military service." 0. JANOWSKY & M. FAGEN, supra note
695, at 154.
Instead of being denied access to military training and service, blacks in the
United States have in recent years complained that there have been proportion-
ately too many blacks in the combat forces, especially when the United States was
engaged in the Vietnam conflict. See Lee, The Draft and the Negro, in WHITE
RACISM 341 (B. Schwartz & R. Disch eds. 1970).
709. See C. AMMoUN, STUDY OF DISCRIMINATION IN EDUCATION 10-28, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/181Rev.1 (1957); ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES, supra note
439, at 69-72; L. LITWACK, NORTH OF SLAVERY 113-17, 120-21 (1961).
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and secondary schools,10 or exclusion from educational employment
such as teaching and research.7 1' A racial quota system may be
rigidly imposed for access to different educational institutions.,'
Separate and unequal educational opportunities and facilities pre-
vail where race is a critical factor in social process.71 1 Other forms
of privation include denial of access to the mass media and the
suppression of dissent.' In relation to skill, members of particular
groups may be denied opportunity to discover and fully develop
their latent talents. By being denied access to adequate schooling,
they are often deprived of the acquisition of socially significant
skills.7 5 Other forms include denial of the practice of the liberal
professions, notably law, medicine, and dentistry,' 6 and denial of
pursuit of "artistic or cultural activities.""
In deprivations of wealth, race may be employed to limit access
to resources and the enjoyment of income. Under the guise of an
economic "division of labor," race discrimination may become a
device for preserving an ample supply of cheap labor and perpetuat-
ing an inherited relationship of economic exploitation.7 18 Because of
racial groupings, individuals may be denied access to certain occu-
pations and professions; they may be underpaid in relation to others
for the same type of employment; and they may be denied job
advancement.71 9 The ownership, purchase, and sale of land and
710. See ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES, supra note 439, at 69-72; 0.
JANOWSKY & M. FAGEN, supra note 695, at 175-77.
711. 0. JANOWSKY & M. FAGEN, supra note 695, at 158-61.
712. Cf. W. KOREY, THE SOVIET CAGE: ANTI-SEMITISM IN RUSSIA 52 (1973); G.
SIMPSON & J. YINGER, RACIAL AND CULTURAL MINORITIES 454-57 (3d ed. 1965);
Braverman, Medical School Quotas, in BARRIERS: PATTERNS OP DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST JEWS 74-77 (N. Belth ed. 1958).
713. Cf. J. COLEMAN, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1966); J.
GREENBERG, supra note 698, at 208-74; C. JENCKS, INEQUALITY: A REASSESSMENT OF
THE EFFECT OF FAMILY AND SCHOOLING IN AMERICA (1972); G. SIMPSON & J. YINGER,
RACIAL AND CULTURAL MINORITIES 413-62 (3d ed. 1965).
714. R. HILBERG, supra note 695, at 650-53.
715. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, FIGHTING DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT AND
OCCUPATION 52-59 (1968).
716. See, e.g., O. JANOWSKY & M. FAGEN supra note 695, at 135, 155-58, 174-75.
717. See, e.g., id. at 160, 177-78.
718. See ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES, supra note 439, at 48-61.
719. See generally B. HEPPLE, RACE, JOBS AND THE LAW IN GREAT BRITAIN 180-226
(1972); EMPLOYMENT, RACE AND POVERTY (A. Ross & H. Hill eds. 1967); M. SOVERN,
LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT (1966); Hepple,
Employment, in THE PREVENTION OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN BRITAIN 155-74 (S.
Abbott ed. 1971); Jowell & Prescott-Clarke, Racial Discrimination and White-
Collar Workers in Britain, in id. at 175-93.
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other property may be curtailed or forbidden because of race.""
Practices bordering on forced labor may be visited upon deprived
racial groups.7 1' Other measures of wealth deprivation include ex-
propriation of property, freezing of personal assets, and imposition
of special taxes. 22
The extremes in deprivations of well-being on grounds of race may
include systematic extermination (genocide) and torture of all
types.723 Racially deprived groups, victims of poverty, suffer starva-
tion, malnutrition, diseases, and poor health services;724 they are
often excluded from necessary health facilities and left more ex-
posed to physical abuse and hazards. They sometimes become vic-
tims of human experimentation.725 They suffer a higher rate of mor-
tality, infant and adult alike, in comparison with other members of
the community.726 Racially segregated housing generally leads to the
concentration of deprived groups in ghettos.727
The shaping and sharing of affection may be drastically impaired
720. H. SANTA CRUZ, supra note 439, at 174, 218, 230.
721. Cf. UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, REPORT OF THE AD
Hoc COMMITTEE ON FORCED LABoUR 3-127, U.N. Doc. E/2431 (1953).
722. See R. HILBERG, supra note 695, at 54-101, 156-68.
723. The most notorious example is, of course, the extermination of six million
Jews under the Third Reich. For a detailed description of this destruction process
see id. at 177-256, 555-635. More recent examples of massive extermination
include the killing of Ibos in the Biafra conflict, the killing of Chinese in Indonesia,
and the killing of Bengals by the Pakistanis.
724. Id. at 101-74; H. SANTA CRUZ, supra note 439, at 257-60; NATIONAL ADVI-
SORY COMM'N ON Civn. DISORDERS, REPORT 269-73 (Bantam ed. 1968). In Nazi
Germany, for example, the government policy was to concentrate Jews in ghettos
and subject them to severe food rationing whereby many individuals died of starva-
tion.
725. H. SANTA CRUZ, supra note 439, at 258.
Note, for instance, this brief account of the Nazis:
The inmates were subjected to cruel experiments at Dachau in August 1942;
victims were immersed in cold water until their body temperature was re-
duced to 28°C, when they died immediately. Other experiments included
high altitude experiments in pressure chambers, experiments with
how long human beings could survive in freezing water, experiments with
poison bullets, experiments with contagious diseases, and experiments deal-
ing with sterilization of men and women by X-rays and other methods.
NAZI CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSION, OPINION AND JUDGMENT 81-82 (1947), quoted in
H. SANTA CRUZ, supra note 439, at 258.
726. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT 270-71 (Bantam
ed. 1968).
727. For a profile of the formation of racial ghettos see id. at 236-47. See also
R. HILBERG, supra note 695, at 106-25; 2 G. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA
618-27 (1964).
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because of racial categorizations. Deprivations include the prohibi-
tion of inter-racial marriages and sexual relations between people of
different races, and the termination of inter-racial marriages al-
ready consummated. 28 When segregated and isolated, people are
handicapped in developing genuinely congenial personal relation-
ships of any kind. Other forms of deprivation are the denial of cus-
todian rights to parents of an allegedly inferior race729 and the prohi-
bition of adoption crossing racial lines.73 Under the perverse influ-
ence of the race myth, even a community's norms of rectitude are
formulated and pursued under a double standard. What is permissi-
ble for one racial group may be forbidden to another. People may
not be permitted to worship the same god or even to go to churches;
places of public worship may be destroyed on account of race. 3 The
cumulative impact of racial discrimination tends to foster a nega-
tive self-image among members of deprived groups, further handi-
capping their responsible participation in community processes . 32
ii. Basic community policies
A basic policy in any community that honors shared respect must
be that of affording every individual member of the community full
728. See R. SICKELS, RACE, MARRIAGE AND THE LAW 10-91 (1972). See also 0.
JANOWSKY & M. FAGEN, supra note 695, at 196-99.
729. See 0. JANOWSKY & M. FAGEN, supra note 695, at 199-200.
730. See, e.g., id. at 199-201.
731. The destruction of synagogues by the Nazis is a notorious example. R.
HILBERG, supra note 695, at 5.
732. An inquiry into the causes of these multiple deprivations would require an
extensive scientific treatise. It is simplistic to suggest that most racial discrimina-
tions are caused by prejudices, since the concept of prejudice is ill-defined and
leaves open the question: what is the cause of prejudice? See generally G. ALLPORT,
note 695 supra; A. BURNS, COLOUR PREJUDICE (1948); D. CANTE, FRANTZ FANON
(1970); F. FANON, BLACK SKIN, WHITE MASKS (1967); F. FANON, THE WRETCHED OF
THE EARTH (1965); UNITED NATIONS, THE MAIN TYPES AND CAUSES OF DISCRIMINATION,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/40/Rev.1 (1949) (Memorandum submitted by the Secre-
tary General); G. SIMPSON & J. YINGER, RACIAL AND CULTURAL MINORITIES (3d ed.
1965); Schachter, How Effective are Measures Against Racial Discrimination?, 4
HUMAN RIGHTS J. 293 (1971).
For the importance of race in world affairs see RACE AMONG NATIONS: A CONCEP-
TUAL APPROACH (G. Shepherd & T. LeMelle eds. 1970).
Any serious investigation of the causes of racial discrimination would require a
comprehensive exploration of both predispositional and environmental factors. The
root causes of destructive impulses which find expression in discrimination are
traceable through the whole process through which people are socialized and in-
volve varying combinations of demands, identification, and expectations. The en-
vironmental variables are as multifaceted as the many differing features of man's
social process in exploitation of the vast complex global resources.
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opportunity to discover, mature, and exercise his or her capabilities
and potentialities, both for self-development and for contribution to
aggregrate common interest.733 All practices which differentiate be-
tween individuals upon the basis of alleged "racial" characteristics,
whether in popular or scientific conception, would appear to be
entirely destructive of this policy.
The justification commonly given for racial discrimination, as for
caste differentiation and the practices of apartheid, is that some
groups of people are inherently superior to other groups because of
their biological inheritances.734 Discrimination, it is argued, facili-
tates a more effective use of limited resources, in aggregate common
interest, if the alleged facts of inherent superiority and inferiority
among groups are accepted as a basis for differential treatment and
assignment of individuals' roles in ongoing social processes.
It should be obvious that none of the popular conceptions of race,
based upon random combinations of physical features and cultural
associations, bears any rational relation to the capabilities and po-
tentialities of an individual for either self-development or contribu-
tion to common interest. As Allport has observed:
Most people do not know the difference between race and ethnic
group, between race and social caste, between nurture and nature. It
makes for an economy of thought to ascribe peculiarities of appear-
ance, custom, values, to race. It is simpler to attribute differences to
733. See notes 19, 40-44 & accompanying text supra.
734. For the extreme view of Count Arthur de Gobineau, that "surpasses in scope
and sinister grandeur even the pages of Mein Kampf' see M. BIDDISs, FATHER OF
RACIST IDEOLOGY: THE SOCIAL D POLITICAL THOUGHT OF COUNT GOBiNEAU (1970).
In emphasizing the superiority of the Aryans, Gobineau asserted:
Everything great, noble and fruitful in the works of man on this earth, in
science, art and civilization, derives from a single starting point, is the devel-
opment of a single germ and the result of a single thought; it belongs to one
family alone, the different branches of which have reigned in all the civilized
countries of the universe.
Id. at 113.
For a convenient summary see Klineberg, Racialism in Nazi Germany, in THE
THIRD REICH at 852-63 (M. Beaumont, J. Fried & E. Vermeil eds. 1955). Note also
the following statement by Hermann Gauch:
The non-Nordic man occupies an intermediate position between the Nordics
and the animals, just about next to the anthropoid ape. He is therefore not
a complete man. He is really not a man at all in true contradistinction to
animals, but a transition, an intermediate stage. Better and more apt, there-
fore, is the designation "subhuman" (Untermensch).
Id. at 859 (quoting Gauch).
For historical accounts of racist ideology see H. ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF
TOTALITARIANISM 158-84 (2d ed. 1958); F. HERTZ, RACE AND CIVILZATION (1928).
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heredity than to juggle all the complex social grounds for differences
that exist. 73
When conceptions of this kind, of vague empirical references with
no scientific basis, are employed by officials and others to make
important differentiations among individuals, opportunities for ar-
bitrary deprivation and oppression abound.
It is scarcely less obvious that scientific conceptions of race, de-
signed roughly to distinguish large groups for broad purposes of
inquiry, can be made to differentiate individuals in terms of poten-
tialities only with great violence to fact. When creating racial cate-
gorizations scientists are, as Osborne emphasizes, " examining a
population as a whole and comparing the pattern of gene
frequencies of that entire population with another population;""73
they are not purporting to specify the detailed characteristics or
potentialities of any particular member of the group. In most scien-
tific conceptions, further, the differences in potentialities within
any particular group are greater than any of the differences between
groups. In the words of Dobzhansky,
the striking fact, which not even the racists can conceal, is that the
race differences in the averages are much smaller than the variations
within any race. In other words, large brains and high IQ's of persons
of every race are much larger and higher than averages for their own
or any other race. And conversely, the low variants in every race are
much below the average for any race.737
Similarly, after exhaustive inquiry, Baker concludes:
Every ethnic taxon of man includes many persons capable of living
responsible and useful lives in the communities to which they belong,
while even in those taxa that are best known for their contributions
to the world's store of intellectual wealth, there are many so mentally
deficient that they would be inadequate members of any society. It
follows that no one can claim superiority simply because he or she
belongs to a particular ethnic taxon.3
It remains unknown how such differences between individuals in
735. G. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 107-08 (1958). "An imaginative
person," he adds, "can twist the concept of race any way he wishes, and cause it
to configurate and 'explain' his prejudices." Id. at 108.
736. Osborne, The History and Nature of Race Classification, in THE BIOLOGICAL
AND SOCIAL MEANING OF RACE 161 (R. Osborne ed. 1971).
737. Dobzhansky, Biological Evolution and Human Equality, in SCIENCE AND THE
MODERN WORLD 15, 28 (J. Steinhardt ed. 1966).
738. J. BAKER, RACE 534 (1974).
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capabilities and potentialities as do exist differentially depend upon
heredity and environment. Dobzhansky is again excellent witness:
The plain truth is that it is not known just how influential are the
genetic variables in psychic or personality traits, or how plastic these
traits might be in different environments that can be contrived by
modern technology, medicine, and educational methods.3"
The continuing challenge for all dedicated to a commonwealth of
human dignity is, thus, that of creating and maintaining a society
which encourages and assists all individuals to develop and exercise
their fullest capabilities in the shaping and sharing of all values.
"The birthright of every human being," Ashley Montagu aptly as-
serts, "should be the recognition of his uniqueness, and the oppor-
tunity to develop that uniqueness to the optimum. ' 740 While ex-
traordinary opportunities may be afforded the extraordinarily
gifted, every effort should be made, in the interest both of shared
respect and of the greatest aggregate production of community val-
ues, to provide every individual with the opportunity and facilities
for overcoming any unique biological limitations, whether or not
associated with imputed genetic deficiencies. Shared respect re-
quires non-discrimination for reasons irrelevant to potentialities,
and shared respect is a fundamental component in any rational
739. Dobzhansky, Biological Evolution and Human Equality in SCIENCE AND THE
MODERN WORLD 15, 27 (J. Steinhardt ed. 1966). On the continuing debate of hered-
ity versus environment (nature or nuture) see B. BLOOM, STABILITY AND CHANGE IN
HUMAN CHARACTERISTICS (1964); J. CROW & M. KIMURA, AN INTRODUCTION TO POPU-
LATION GENETICS THEORY (1970); T. DOBZHANSKY, GENEMCS OF THE EVOLUTIONARY
PROCESS (1970); T. DOBZHANSKY, supra note 40, at 51-75; R. HERRNSTEIN, I.Q. IN
THE MERITOCRACY (1973); C. JENCKS, INEQUALITY: A REASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECT OF
FAMILY AND SCHOOLING IN AMERICA 64-84 (1972); A. JENSEN, GENETICS AND
EDUCATION (1972); Darlington, Race, Class, and Culture, in BIOLOGY AND THE
HUMAN SCIENCES 95 (J. Pringle ed. 1972); Jensen, How Much Can We Boost IQ and
Scientific Achievement?, 39 HARv. EDUCATIONAL REV. 1 (1969); Jensen, Reducing
the Heredity-Environment Uncertainty: A Reply, 39 HARv. EDUCATIONAL REV. 449
(1969); Shockley, Models, Mathematics, and the Moral Obligation to Diagnose the
Origin of Negro IQ Deficits, 41 REv. EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH 369 (1971).
740. A. MONTAGU, MAN'S MOST DANGEROUS MYTH: THE FALLACY OF RACE xiii (5th
ed. rev. 1974). Speaking of "the man of flesh and bone," instead of "political man,
social man, man in the abstract," Rene Dubos has observed:
All human beings are related, biologically and mentally, but no two of them
have exactly the same biological and mental constitution. Furthermore, the
individuality of any person living now is different from that of anyone who
has ever lived in the past or will live in the future. Each person is unique,
unprecedented, and unrepeatable.
Dubos, Biological Determinants of Individuality, in INDIVIDUALITY AND THE NEW
SoCIETY 148 (A. Kaplan ed. 1970).
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conception of human dignity. The important emphasis was made by
Charles Darwin a century ago:
Although the existing races of man differ in many respects, as in
colour, hair, shape of skull, proportions of the body, &c., yet if their
whole structure be taken into consideration they are found to resem-
ble each other closely in a multitude of points. Many of these are of
so unimportant or of so singular a nature, that it is extremely improb-
able that they should have been independently acquired by aborigi-
nally distinct species or races. The same remark holds good with
equal or greater force with respect to the numerous points of mental
similarity between the most distinct races of man. 4'
He added:
As man advances in civilization, and small tribes are united into
larger communities, the simplest reason would tell each individual
that he ought to extend his social instincts and sympathies to all
members of the same nation, though personally unknown to him.
This point being once reached, there is only an artificial barrier to
prevent his sympathies extending to the men of all nations and
races. 4 '
The significance for common interest of "the self-actualization of
human individuals and the fullest possible realization of their so-
cially valuable capacities and potentialities" ' has been well stated
by Dobzhansky:
Individuals and groups will arrange their lives differently, in accord-
ance with their diverse notions of what form of happiness they wish
to pursue. Their contributions to mankind's store of achievements
will be different in kind and different in magnitude. The point is,
however, that everybody should be able to contribute up to the limit
of his ability. To deny the equality of opportunity to persons or groups
is evil because this results in wastage of talent, ability, and aptitude,
besides being contrary to the basic ethic of humanity.4
iii. Trends in decision
The concerted community effort in recent decades to combat and
eradicate racial discrimination has been a driving force behind the
emergence of the more general norm of non-discrimination. Prior to
741. C. DARWIN, THE DESCENT OF MAN, AND SELECTION IN RELATION TO SEX 178
(1st Ams ed. 1972).
742. Id. at 122.
743. Dobzhansky, Biological Evolution and Human Equality, in SCIENCE AND THE
MODERN WORLD 15, 33 (J. Steinhardt ed. 1966).
744. Id.
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the establishment of the United Nations, the global community
provided individuals scant protection against discrimination on ra-
cial or other grounds. Some modest protection, "though hesitating
and infrequent, 7 5 was afforded by the doctrine of humanitarian
intervention. The early assertions of a right of humanitarian inter-
vention were made predominantly for the protection of oppressed
religious groups, 746 yet the victims for whom protection was ex-
tended upon occasion included groups of distinctive national or eth-
nic origin, such as the Greek people oppressed by Turkey from 1827
to 183071 and the Armenians oppressed by Turkey before World War
J.748
A more substantial step was taken when, following World War I,
the League of Nations was empowered to oversee an international
regime for the protection of "racial, religious or linguistic minori-
ties. ' 749 The victorious Principal Allied and Associated Powers
through treaty stipulations imposed upon Poland, Czechoslovakia,
the Serb-Croat-Slovene State (Yugoslavia), Romania, Greece, Aus-
tria, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Turkey special obligations to protect
minority groups within their respective boundaries.750 These states
undertook to "assure full and complete protection of life and lib-
745. H. LAUTERPACHT, AN INTERNATIONAL BILL, supra note 135, at 47; H. LAUTER-
PACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 68, at 120.
746. See M. GANJI, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HuMAN RIGHTS 17-43 (1962).
On humanitarian intervention see I. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF
FORCE BY STATES 338-42 (1963); HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED
NATIONS (R. Lillich ed. 1973); L. SOHN & T. BUERGENTHAL, supr& note 530, at
137-211; Bowett, The Use of Force in the Protection of Nationals, 43 GROTIUS
Soc'Y 111 (1957); Cabranes, Human Rights and Non-Intervention in the Inter-
American System, 65 MICH. L. REV. 1147 (1967); Claydon, Humanitarian Interven-
tion and International Law, 1 QUEEN'S INTRA. L.J. 36 (1969); Franck & Rodley,
After Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian Intervention by Military Force, 67
Am. J. INT'L L. 275 (1973); Lillich, Forcible Self-Help by States to Protect Human
Rights, 53 IowA L. REV. 325 (1967); Lillich, Intervention to Protect Human Rights,
15 MCGILL L.J. 205 (1969); Stowell, Humanitarian Intervention, 33 AM. J. INT'L L.
733 (1939); Wiseberg, Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from the Nigerian Civil
War, 7 HUMAN RIGHTS J. 61 (1974).
747. M. GANJI, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 22-24 (1962); H.
LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 68, at 120.
748. See L. SOHN & T. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 530, at 181-94.
749. We propose to deal with the question of minority protection in a later
article.
750. These treaty stipulations were conveniently compiled in LEAGUE OF NA-
TIONS, PROTECTION OF LINGUISTIC, RACIAL AND RELIGIOUS MINORITIES BY THE LEAGUE
OF NATIONS: PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE VARIOUS INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS AT
PRESENT IN FORCE, 1927, I.B.2.
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erty" to all their inhabitants "without distinction of birth, national-
ity, language, race or religion."7 5 Similar obligations were assumed
by Albania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Iraq upon their admis-
sion to the League of Nations. 752 To ensure the fulfillment of these
obligations, the provisions affecting "persons belonging to racial,
religious, or linguistic minorities" were made "obligations of inter-
national concern, 111 3 "placed under the guarantee of the League of
Nations," and could not be modified "without the assent of a major-
ity" of the League Council. 54 The Council was further authorized
to "take such action and give such directions as it may deem proper
and effective" when a complaint of violation was brought to its
attention. 5
The contemporary broad prescription against discriminations
imposed by group categorizations of "race" has its origins in the
United Nations Charter and certain authoritative ancillary expres-
sions and commitments. The importance which most of mankind
today ascribes to the prohibition of race as a ground for differentia-
tion is clearly evidenced by the prominent place accorded race and
its equivalents in all the various recent enumerations of impermissi-
ble grounds. Thus, the Charter of the United Nations, in Article
1(3), projects one of its purposes as "promoting and encouraging
respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all with-
out distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion" and restates
this concern in Articles 13(1)(b),56 55(c)757 and 76(c)758 in the chap-
751. Id. at 43 (The Treaty with Poland, art. 2). The treaty with Poland served
as the model for other comparable treaties. See also id. at 8 (The Peace Treaty with
Austria, art. 63); id. at 11 (The Peace Treaty with Bulgaria, art. 50); id. at 22 (The
Treaty with Greece, art. 2); id. at 29 (The Peace Treaty with Hungary, art. 55);
id. at 51 (The Treaty with Roumania, art. 2); id. at 61 (The Treaty with the Serb-
Croat-Slovene State, art. 2); id. at 92 (The Treaty with Czechoslovakia, art. 2);
id. at 97 (The Peace Treaty with Turkey, art. 38).
752. Id. at 4 (The Declaration made by Albania before the Council of the League
of Nations on October 2, 1921, art. 2); id. at 14 (Estonia); id. at 32 (Latvia); id. at
34 (Declaration of Lithuania, dated May 12, 1922, art. 2).
753. See, e.g., The Treaty with Poland, art. 12, id. at 44.
754. Id. (The Treaty with Poland, art. 12).
755. Id. at 45 (The Treaty with Poland, art. 12).
756. Article 13(1)(b) of the U.N. Charter reads:
1. The General Assembly shall initiate studies and make recommendations
for the purpose of:
b. promoting international cooperation in the economic, social, cultural,
educational, and health fields, and assisting in the realization of human
rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language, or religion.
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ters dealing with the functions of the General .Assembly, "Interna-
tional Economic and Social Co-operation," and "International
Trusteeship System." Similarly, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights stipulates, in Article 2, that its protections are to be
extended "without distinction of any kind, such as race, c.olour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status."'759 In Article 7 it provides for
equal protection before the law "without any discrimination.""76
This same theme is carried forward in the Discrimination (Em-
ployment and Occupation) Convention, adopted in June, 1958,
under the auspices of the International Labour Organization, which
was designed to ensure "equality of opportunity and treatment in
respect of employment and occupation . *... ,,7" This Convention
specifically prohibits, in Article 1(1)(a), any discrimination "on the
basis of race, colour, sex, religion, political opinion, national extrac-
tion or social origin .... ,,7"1 The Convention against Discrimina-
tion in Education, adopted in December 1960 under the auspices of
the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organiza-
tion, seeks to "promote eq'uality of opportunity and treatment for
all in education. ' '763 This Convention prohibits, in Article 1(1), any
U.N. CHARTER art. 13(1)(b).
757. Article 55(c) reads:
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which
are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on
respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the
United Nations shall promote:
c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.
Id. art. 55(c).
758. Article 76(c) reads:
The basic objectives of the trusteeship system, in accordance with the
Purposes of the United Nations laid down in Article 1 of the present Charter,
shall be:
c. to encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for
all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion, and to encourage
recognition of the interdependence of the peoples of the world.
Id. art. 76(c).
759. Universal Declaration, supra note 55, art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/810 at 72 (empha-
sis added).
760. Id. art. 7, U.N. Doc. A/810 at 73.
761. Discrimination Convention, supra note 418, art. 2, 362 U.N.T.S. at 34.
762. Id. art. 1(1)(a), 362 U.N.T.S. at 32 (emphasis added).
763. Convention Against Discrimination in Education, supra note 420, pream-
ble, 429 U.N.T.S. at 94.
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discrimination in the field of education because of "race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, economic condition or birth."'764
The more recent International Covenants on Human Rights, in-
corporating precisely the wording and order of Article 2 of the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights, also explicitly prohibit dis-
crimination on grounds of race. Thus, the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, in Article 2(1), requires that a state
ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdic-
tion the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinc-
tion of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political
or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other
status.765
The provision for equality before the law, in Article 26, guarantees
to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on
any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other
status."'
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, in Article 2(2), imposes a comparable prohibition upon
states for protection of all the rights which it enunciates.767
The general community prescription against racial discrimination
has been further articulated and fortified by the adoption of the
United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Ra-
cial Discrimination in November, 1963,768 and of the 'International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion in December, 1965.769 In the winter of 1959-1960, as "an epi-
demic of swastika-painting and other 'manifestations of anti-
764. Id. art. 1(1), 429 U.N.T.S. at 96 (emphasis added).
765. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 57, art. 2(1), 21 U.N.
GAOR Supp. 16, at 53 (emphasis added).
766. Id. art. 26, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 55-56 (emphasis added).
767. It reads:
The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to guarantee that
the rights enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without dis-
crimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political
or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
Covenant on Economic Rights, supra note 58, art. 2(2), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16,
at 49-50.
768. Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, note
527 supra.
769. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, note
433 supra.
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Semitism and other forms of racial and national hatred and reli-
gious and racial prejudices of a similar nature' ,,7"0 swept through a
number of states in Europe and Latin America, the Sub-Commis-
sion on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities
took the "unprecedented 771 step of condemning these manifesta-
tions as violations of the Charter of the United Nations and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 72 The Sub-Commission,
in gathering, processing, and studying all the relevant information,
brought the matter to the attention of its superior bodies and
urged effective measures of prevention and eradication, especially
the formulation of an international convention.773 The General As-
sembly, at its seventeenth session in 1962, decided to prepare two
separate sets of instruments: one set (a draft declaration and a draft
convention) on "the elimination of all forms of racial discrimina-
tion" and the other on "the elimination of all forms of religious
intolerance," with priority being accorded to the former.774 This
"compromise solution" 7 5 was reached largely because the Arab del-
egations wished to downplay the issue of anti-Semitism and because
770. Schwelb, supra note 434, at 996, 997. See also Deutsch, The 1960 Swastika-
Smearings: Analysis of the Apprehended Youth, MERRILL-PALMER Q. oF BEHAVIOR
& DEV. 1 (Apr. 1962), reprinted in MINORrrY PROBLEMS 341 (A. Rose & C. Rose eds.
1965); Moskowitz, The Narrowing Horizons of United Nations Concern with Racial
Discrimination, 4 HUMAN RIGHTS J. 278, 282-83 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Mos-
kowitz].
771. Humphrey, The United Nations Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Dis-
crimination and the Protection of Minorities, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 869, 882 (1968).
772. Report of the Twelfth Session of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities to the Commission on Human Rights
58, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/800 (E/CN.4/Sub.2/206) (1960).
773. Report of the Thirteenth Session of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities to the Commisssion on Human Rights
60, 63, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/815 (E/CN.4/Sub.2/211) (1961).
774. G.A. Res. 1780, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. 17, at 32, U.N. Doe. A/5217 (1962);
G.A. Res. 1781, id. at 33. It has been sharply pointed out that the decision to have
two separate sets of instruments was motivated by politics rather than merits.
Schwelb, supra note 434, at 999.
By drawing a line of demarcation separating discrimination on religious
grounds from discrimination on racial and ethnic grounds, the United Na-
tions departed radically from well-established and widely-accepted norms
which recognize that, apart from certain obvious cases, racial discrimination
was usually brought about not solely by differences in race or colour, but also
by cultural, religious and other differences which led to mistrust and preju-
dice.
Moskowitz, supra note 770, at 282.
775. Schwelb, supra note 434, at 999.
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the Eastern European and other delegations insisted that the ques-
tion of religious discrimination was far less important and urgent
than that of racial discrimination .7 7 Thereafter, on November 20,
1963, the General Assembly adopted the United Nations Declara-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.777
Meanwhile, the preparation of the draft convention on racial dis-
crimination was under way. The Commission on Human Rights,
building upon a text prepared by the Sub-Commission, completed
its draft in 1964,111 and the draft was considered by the Third Com-
mittee of the General Assembly in 1965.70 The General Assembly,
on December 21, 1965, adopted the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination . 78 As of this writ-
ing, the envisaged Declaration and Convention on the Elimination
of Religious Intolerance are yet to be adopted. 78 2
The Declaration on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, in
solemnly affirming "the necessity of speedily eliminating racial dis-
crimination throughout the world, in all its forms and
manifestations, ' '7  proclaims that discrimination on the ground of
"race, colour, or ethnic origin" is "an offense to human dignity," "a
denial of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations," and
"a violation" of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 84 The
Declaration, extending its concern to acts of states as well as of
private institutions or groups and individuals,78 urges that special
efforts be made to prevent racial discrimination, especially in "civil
776. See, id.; Moskowitz, supra note 770, at 282-84.
777. Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, note
527 supra.
778. Report of the Sixteenth Session of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities to the Commission on Human Rights
13-57, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/873 (E/CN.4/Sub.2/241) (1964).
779. Report on the Twentieth Session, Commission on Human Rights, 37 U.N.
ECOSOC Supp. 8, at 9, U.N. Doc. E/3873 (E/CN.4/874) (1964).
780. Report of the Third Committee, Draft International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 20 U.N. GAOR Annexes,
Agenda Item No. 58, at 13, U.N. Doc. A/6181 (1965). For a verbatim record of the
Third Committee's discussions see 20 U.N. GAOR, 3D COMM. 57-141, 147-52,
313-400, 419-66, 495-509 (1965).
781. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, note
433 supra.
782. See McDougal, Lasswell, and Chen, The Right to Religious Freedom and
World Public Order: The Emerging Norm of Non-Discrimination (forthcoming).
783. Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
supra note 527, preamble, 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. 15, at 36.
784. Id. art. 1.
785. Id. arts. 2(1)-(2).
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rights, access to citizenship, education, religion, employment,
occupation, and housing," '786 and in "equal access to any place or
facility intended for use by the general public. '787 The Declaration
condemns racist propaganda and organizations and urges that "all
incitement to or acts of violence" against any racial group be made
"punishable under law."78 States are further urged to take steps to
outlaw and prosecute racist organizations. 89 To ensure equal treat-
ment of individuals, states are urged to "take effective measures to
revise governmental and other public policies," "rescind" discrimi-
natory "laws and regulations," and "pass" necessary legislation of
protection .79
The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination, in reinforcing the preceding Declaration,
represents "the most comprehensive and unambiguous codification
in treaty form of the idea of the equality of races. '79' In spelling out
its prohibition of discrimination, the Convention specifies in com-
prehensive and detailed terms the impermissible grounds for differ-
entiation, the particular acts forbidden, and the various actors who
are precluded from engaging in discrimination. Beyond the mere
prohibition of activities, the bare characterization of unlawfulness,
the Convention further seeks to cope with some of the causes of
discrimination and to project procedures which may serve the pur-
poses of preventing and deterring discrimination, as well as of res-
toring and rehabilitating already exacerbated situations.
The group categorization of "race," offered by the Convention in
Article 1(1),792 is as broad and generous as the group characteriza-
tion commonly employed in discrimination is vague and arbitrary.
In implementing its stated objective of banning racial discrimina-
786. Id. arts. 3(1).
787. Id. art. 3(2).
788. Id. art. 9(1), (2), 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. 15, at 37.
789. Id. art. 9(3).
790. Id. art. 4, 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. 15, at 36.
791. Schwelb, supra note 434, at 1057.
792. Article 1(1) of the Convention reads:
In this Convention, the term "racial discrimination" shall mean any distinc-
tion, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or
national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or
impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of
human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social,
cultural or any other field of public life.
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, supra note
433, art. 1(1), 660 U.N.T.S. at 216.
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tion "in all its forms and manifestations, ' '9 the Convention adds
to "race" the ancillary concepts of "colour, descent, or national or
ethnic origin . . . ." Though the travaux preparatoires indicate
no very precise reference for "race, '795 it appears that the framers
of the Convention intended to catch all the traditional biological
and cultural meanings. The UNESCO statements on race were, as
several commentators have noted, 7 current at the time the Conven-
tion was prepared, and it would appear a reasonable interpretation,
in light of the major purposes of the Convention, that all the biologi-
cal and cultural categorizations included within these statements
are among those condemned by the Convention .T7 The reach of the
prohibited categorization of color-since people come in many gra-
dations of white, black, yellow, and brown, and since almost all
groups may be observed to have some uniqueness 798 -would appear
to be equally broad. The concept of "national origin," specified as
different from "nationality" in the sense of present membership in
a state, has been said to include both "politico-legal" and "ethno-
graphical" (or "historico-biological") senses.7 9 Deriving its vague-
ness from its origin in the minorities treaties after World War I,8"'
this concept apparently is intended to refer to a person's prior iden-
793. Id. preamble, 660 U.N.T.S. at 212-16.
794. Id. art. 1(1), 660 U.N.T.S. at 216.
795. The travaux preparatoires of the Convention are cited in notes 778-80
supra.
796. See, e.g., N. LERNER, THi U.N. CONVENTION ON THE ELImNATION OF ALL
FORMS OF RACIAL DIscRIMiNATION 41-42 (1970) [hereinafter cited as N. LERNER];
E. VIERDAG, supra note 651, at 89-90; Coleman, The Problem of Anti-Semitism
Under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, 2 HUMAN RIiGTs J. 609, 616-17 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Cole-
man]. These UNESCO statements on race are collected in A. MONTAGU, note 683
supra.
797. See notes 680-93 & accompanying text supra for a discussion of the con-
cept of race. See also E. VIERDAG, supra note 651, at 87-90; Coleman, supra note
796, at 616-19.
798. For a detailed description of the significance and variety of color of different
population groups see J. BAKER, RACE 149-60 (1974). See also E. VIERDAG, supra
note 651, at 97-99.
799. See Coleman, supra note 796, at 619-22; Schwelb, supra note 434, at
1006-07.
800. Cf. notes 749-55 & accompanying text supra. As Claude has observed:
The basic instruments of the League minority system purported to safeguard
certain rights of "racial, religious or linguistic minorities," but the framers
of the system made it clear that they regarded this terminology as synony-
mous with "national minorities."
I. CLAUDE, NATIONAL MINmRITS: AN INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM 17 (1955).
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tifications, whether chosen or ascribed, with states and with the
larger cultural groups (popularly known as nations) which tran-
scend any particular state.80 ' The words "ethnic origin," again, refer
to both biological and cultural characteristics with a diversity bewil-
dering even in scientific usage." 2 "Any discrimination," concludes
one commentator, "based on an individual's cultural identification
may be tantamount to discrimination on ethnic grounds. ' 83 The
group characterization unique to this Convention, that of "de-
scent," was, as previously elaborated, introduced by the delegation
of India to outlaw discrimination based on "caste.""8 4 Its ambigui-
ties are obviously sufficiently ample to cure any inadequacies of
reference that may inhere in the other concepts.
The broad sweep of prohibited grounds in the Convention-
whether its categorizations are taken separately or in the aggre-
gate-would thus appear to afford protection to a vast variety of
potential victims of discrimination. The complex of practices known
as "anti-Semitism," ' 5 for example, though not mentioned in the
801. During the debate before the Third Committee, Mr. Resich of Poland, in
emphasizing the importance of including "national origin" as a forbidden ground
in the Convention, stated:
A "nation" was created when persons organized themselves politically on
the basis of a common culture, common traditions or other factors. There
were nations that were made up of different ethnic groups, such as Switzer-
land. But there were also situations in which a politically organized nation
was included within a different State and continued to exist as a nation in
the social and cultural senses even though it had no government of its own.
The members of such a nation within a State might be discriminated against,
not as members of a particular race or as individuals, but as members of a
nation which existed in its former political form.
20 U.N. GAOR, 3d Comm. 83 (1965).
Similarly, Mr. Villgrattner of Austria indicated:
For half a century the terms "national origin" and "nationality" had been
widely used in literature and in international instruments as relating, not to
persons who were citizens of or held passports issued by a given State, but
to those having a certain culture, language and traditional way of life peculiar
to a nation but who lived within another State.
Id. at 84.
802. Cf. A. MONTAGU, supra note 683, at 59-71.
803. Coleman, supra note 796, at 623.
804. See notes 423-29 & accompanying text supra.
805. On anti-Semitism see A. FonTR & B. EPSTEN, THE NEW ANTI-SFmmsM
(1974); W. KoREY, THE SoviEr CAGE: ANIn-SFAsrnsM iN RussiA (1973); P. LENDVAI,
ANTI-SEMITISM WrrHoUT JEws (1971); H. LUMER, SoviET AN4rI-SmmsM-A COLD
WAR Myrn (1964); ANTI-SFATrrsm: A SocIAL DIsEASE (E. Simmel ed. 1946); Rogow,
Anti-Semitism, 1 INT'L ENCYC. SociAL Sci. 345 (1968).
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Convention," 6 might easily be outlawed under several of the Con-
vention's forbidden group categorizations." 7
The inclusive, open-ended compass of the rights the Convention
protects against discrimination is established both by broad gener-
alization and by detailed, illustrative specification. Thus, in Article
1(1) "racial discrimination" is defined as acts which have "the pur-
pose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment
806. In the Commission on Human Rights and at the Third Committee of the
General Assembly, the United States unsuccessfully sought to incorporate a clause
specifically condemning anti-Semitism in the Convention. For an account see
Schwelb, supra note 434, at 1011-15. Mr. Comay of Israel, in echoing the United
States proposal, emphasized that "anti-Semitism, with which the entire history
and fate of every generation of the Jewish people had been tragically bound up,
should be expressly mentioned in the draft Convention." 20 U.N. GAOR, 3d
Comm. 115 (1965).
The history of the Jewish people was that of a branch of the human family
which had been singled out for cruel hostility and savage persecution. Anti-
Semitism, which had assumed at different times religious, racial, economic
and cultural aspects, was unfortunately not something which belonged to the
remote past, for, after having reached its culminating horror in the twentieth
century with the atrocities of the Hitler regime, the declared aim of which
was to ensure the "final solution of the Jewish question" by systematically
exterminating all Jews in cold blood, anti-Semitism had now become the
stock-in-trade of every political group aiming to subvert democratic institu-
tions and freedoms. It was thus precisely because anti-Semitism continued
to exist in the world that it must be mentioned expressly in the Convention.
Id.
His lone voice was overshadowed, however. The Third Committee approved, in-
stead, the Greek-Hungarian proposal "not to include in the draft International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination any reference
to specific forms of racial discrimination." Id. at 113, 118. Mr. Rogers of the United
States, in expressing disappointment over the outcome, indicated that
his delegation was firmly convinced that anti-Semitism, which constituted
a particularly dangerous form of racial discrimination, deserved special men-
tion just as apartheid did. Thus, in conjunction with Brazil, his delegation
had submitted an amendment to include in the Convention an article con-
demning anti-Semitism. Anti-Semitism was one of the gravest and most
persistent problems facing humanity, dating back over 2,000 years. Histori-
cally, it had been a barometer of the political health of States: where Jews
had been unsafe, other minorities also soon found themselves in danger. That
was what had happened in 1939.
Id. at 119.
Finally, he stressed that "it was clear that there was a general feeling condemning
anti-Semitism and that anti-Semitism was covered by the terms of the Conven-
tion." Id.
807. See Coleman, note 796 supra; Schwelb, supra note 434, at 1014-15. See
also Lerner, Anti-Semitism as Racial and Religious Discrimination under United
Nations Conventions, 1 ISRAEL Y.B. ON HuMAN RIGHTS 103 (1971).
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or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental
freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other
field of public life. 8 °8 This is followed in Article 5 by further broad
generalization and a lengthy, minute itemization of protected
rights, clearly intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive. The initial
terms of Article 5 read:
In compliance with the fundamental obligations laid down in Article
2 of this Convention, States Parties undertake to prohibit and to
eliminate racial discrimination in all its forms and to guarantee the
right of everyone, without distinction as to race, colour, or national
or ethnic origin, to equality before the law, notably in the enjoyment
of the following rights . . . .
The detailed itemization of protected rights offered by Article 5
begins by indicating that all persons have the right to challenge
deprivations through appropriate tribunals and the "right to secu-
rity of person," then lists political rights in general and other civil
rights in particular, continues with economic, social, and cultural
rights, and concludes with the right of access to public accommoda-
tions and facilities .8  The right to challenge deprivations is recog-
nized as fundamental to the effective realization of the norm of non-
discrimination; hence, "the right to equal treatment before the tri-
bunals and all other organs administering justice" is accorded
prominence."' "The right to security of person" extends to "protec-
tion by the State against violence or bodily harm, whether inflicted
by government officials or by an individual group or institution. 81 2
Political rights include the right to voting and office-holding "at any
level," elective and appointive, and "equal access to public serv-
ice.1 81 1 Other civil rights include the "right to freedom of move-
ment," internal and transnational, 4 to "nationality,"8"5 to "mar-
riage and choice of spouse, 818 to "own property," ' 7 to "freedom of
thought" and "expression,111 8 and to "freedom of peaceful assembly
808. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, supra
note 433, art. 1(1), 660 U.N.T.S. at 216.
809. Id. art. 5, 660 U.N.T.S. at 220-22 (emphasis added).
810. Id.
811. Id. art. 5(a), 660 U.N.T.S. at 220.
812. Id. art. 5(b).
813. Id. art. 5(c).
814. Id. art. 5(d)(i), (ii).
815. Id. art. 5(d)(iii).
816. Id. art. 5(d)(iv).
817. Id. art. 5(d)(v).
818. Id. art. 5(d)(vii), (viii), 60 U.N.T.S. at 222.
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and association." ' "Economic, social and cultural rights" include
the "right to work," employment, "equal" and "just" remunera-
tion,8 21 the right to "form and join trade unions, 8' to "housing,"2'
to health care and "social security," ' "education and training, "' 24
and to "equal participation in cultural activities. 821 5 Not being tied
to any other particular human rights instrument, the Convention
further enumerates "the right to inherit" 2' and "the right of access
to any place or service intended for use by the general public, such
as transport, hotels, restaurants, cafes, theatres and parks," '27 two
items ostensibly missing from the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.
That all this itemization in Article 5 is intended to be illustrative,
not exhaustive, is abundantly demonstrated by the use in appropri-
ate contexts of such terms as "notably,8 28 "in particular,"82 and
"such as. '8 30 The placing of "notably" in the opening paragraph,
preceding any itemization, unequivocally expresses an intent for
comprehensiveness in the human rights protected. 831
It has been suggested that there might be "contradictions" be-
tween Article 1(1) and Article 5 on the grounds that while Article
1(1) employs the phrase "or any other field of public life" and omits
819. Id. art. 5(d)(ix).
820. Id. art. 5(e)(i).
821. Id. art. 5(e)(ii).
822. Id. art. 5(e)(iii).
823. Id. art. 5(e)(iv).
824. Id. art. 5(e)(v).
825. Id. art. 5(e)(vi).
826. Id. art. 5(d)(vi).
827. Id. art. 5(f).
828. See text accompanying note 809 supra.
829. This phrase is employed to illustrate "political rights," "civil rights," and
"economic, social and cultural rights" in Article 5(c)-(e). Thus, Article 5(c) reads:
Political rights, in particular the rights to participate in elections-to vote
and to stand for election-on the basis of universal and equal suffrage, to take
part in the Government as well as in the conduct of public affairs at any level
and to have equal access to public service.
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, supra note
433, art. 5(c), 660 U.N.T.S. at 220 (emphasis added).
830. Article 5(f) states:
The right of access to any place or service intended for use by the general
public, such as transport, hotels, restaurants, cafes, theatres and parks.
Id. art. 5(f), 660 U.N.T.S. at 222 (emphasis added).
831. Lerner has pointed out that "[tihe word 'notably' was used in order to
avoid a restrictive interpretation of the rights enumerated." N. LERNER, supra note
796, at 67.
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a reference to "civil rights,1132 Article 5 "lists several rights which
certainly do not come within the sphere of public life. 8 33 The word-
ing "any other field of public life" in Article 1(1) would not appear
to be used in any limiting or restrictive sense. 'Public life," an
innovative non-technical term, would appear placed on the same
general level as "the political, economic, social, cultural" fields so
that together they might encompass all sectors of organized life of
the community. The listing of many rights which would ordinarily
be described as "private" in Article 5 is clear indication that "public
life" in Article 1(1) is not used in contradistinction to "private"
rights. 34 The reference would appear rather as a generic summation
of all rights protectable by law, designed to be all inclusive in reach.
This interpretation is supported not only by the major purposes of
the Convention, but also by the explicit rejection of a proposal to
include in Article 1(1) the modifying clause, "set forth inter alia in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights," as originally proposed
in the Sub-Commission's draft. 35
At the eighth session of the Committee on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination in 1973, an attempt was made to undercut
the broad reach of the rights protected by the Convention by facti-
tious interpretation of Article 5.831 A member of the Committee' 7
suggested that Article 5 of the Convention did not establish any
particular human rights, even those explicitly enumerated, but only
a right to be free from racial discrimination and to equality before
the law."' "Its sole purpose," he reasoned, "was to establish the
obligation of states parties to ensure that there was no racial dis-
crimination in the enjoyment of those human rights and to 'guaran-
tee the right of everyone . . . to equality before the law' in the
enjoyment of those rights."8 39 He added:
832. See Schwelb, supra note 434, at 1005.
833. Id.
834. See Elkind, Discrimination: A Guide for the Fact Finder (International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination), 32 U. PITT.
L. REv. 307, 312-19 (1971).
835. Report of the Sixteenth Session of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities to the Commission on Human Rights,
draft art. 1(1), at 45-46, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/873 (E/CN.4/Sub.2/241) (1964). See
also N. LERNER, supra note 796, at 39-40, 43; Schwelb, supra note 434, at
1003-04.
836. See REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE ELIMINATION OF RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. 18, at 12-10, U.N. Doc. A/9018 (1973).
837. Mr. Fayez A. Sayegh of Kuwait.
838. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE ELIMINATION OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, 28
U.N. GAOR Supp. 18, at 12, U.N. Doc. A/9018 (1973).
839. Id.
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Article 5 did not purport to be an international convention on civil,
political, social, economic, cultural and other rights. Nor did it pur-
port to virtually transform the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights into an international convention, or to render the principles
of that Declaration legally binding upon any State which ratified or
acceded to the Convention. 4 °
The notion that a right of non-discrimination can be established
without establishing the rights protected from discrimination is
about as meaningful as the notion of minting a one-sided coin. The
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion is, of course, built upon the assumption that individuals al-
ready have a wide range of human rights which are protected by the
Charter of the United Nations, by many ancillary authoritative in-
struments and expressions, and by that consensus of general com-
munity expectations commonly known as customary international
law. 4 ' This particular Convention is itself an important expression
of this growing general community consensus; in this sense it clearly
establishes the rights it purports to secure. Neither tied to, nor
restricted by, any other particular human rights instrument,8 42 the
Convention is designed, in the words of the preamble, to eliminate
"racial discrimination in all its forms and manifestations" '84 3 in rela-
tion to all human rights, established by whatever authority. The
deliberate decision not to tie the Convention to other particular
instruments, including even the much venerated Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights, represents a shared aspiration to make its
protection as inclusive as possible of all rights, both present and
prospective. 4
The particular acts forbidden by the Convention are those which
arbitrarily differentiate between individuals in the enjoyment of
human rights. Article 1(1) makes the basic specification in terms of
"any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference. . . which has
840. Id.
841. See notes 651-79 & accompanying text supra.
842. See note 835 & accompanying text supra.
843. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, supra
note 433, preamble, 660 U.N.T.S. at 212-16.
844. When the Convention on Racial Discrimination was adopted in December
of 1965, the two draft International Covenants on Human Rights were nearing
completion in the protracted process of drafting and redrafting, which had com-
menced shortly after the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
in December of 1948. Subsequently, both draft Covenants were, on December 16,
1966, adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by the General
Assembly.
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the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, en-
joyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and funda-
mental freedoms . *.". ."I" It will be observed that this comprehen-
sive formulation, expressed in the fourfold categories of "distinc-
tion, exclusion, restriction or preference," seeks to catch every form
of deprivation that may be imposed in social process." These four
terms would appear to embrace both action and inaction and coer-
cive indulgence as well as deprivation.847 Even attempts to discrimi-
nate appear to be included by the reference to "purpose" as an
alternative to "effect." This alternative reference to purpose and
effect suggests that either alone is adequate to establish unlawful
discrimination: mere purpose, without proof of success, may suffice,
while effects, even in the absence of deliberate intent, are clearly
forbidden. This broad reach is further strengthened by the prohibi-
tion even of incitement to discrimination. Thus, Article 4 condemns
"all propaganda and all organizations" preaching the "superiority"
of one race and promoting "racial hatred and discrimination" and
seeks the eradication of "all incitement to, or acts of," racial dis-
crimination.48 In promotion of this end, the Article obliges contract-
ing states to
declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based
on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination,
as well as all acts of violence or incitement to such acts against any
race or group of persons of another colour or ethnic origin, and also
the provision of any assistance to racist activities, including the fi-
nancing thereof;4 '
and, further, to
declare illegal and prohibit organizations, and also organized and all
other propaganda activities, which promote and incite racial discrim-
ination, and shall recognize participation in such organizations or
activities as an offense punishable by law.85
Cognizant of the potentially intricate ramifications of such broad
845. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, supra
note 433, art. 1(1), 660 U.N.T.S. at 216.
846. "It was agreed finally," as Lerner has pointed out in his commentary, "that
the four mentioned terms would cover all aspects of discrimination which should
be taken into account." N. LENER, supra note 796, at 41.
847. Cf. id.; Schwelb, supra note 434, at 1001.
848. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, supra
note 433, art. 4, 660 U.N.T.S. at 218-20.
849. Id. art. 4(a), 660 U.N.T.S. at 220.
850. Id. art. 4(b).
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formulation, the Convention emphasizes at the same time that "due
regard" be given to "the principles embodied in the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights and the rights expressly set forth in Arti-
cle 5 of this Convention,"85' ostensibly with special reference to the
rights of "freedom of opinion and expression" and "freedom of
peaceful assembly and association." '
The Convention's broad formulation of forbidden acts is not, how-
ever, intended to prescribe that all differentiations are unlawful
discriminations. 53 The differentiations made impermissible are
those which fail to establish a demonstrable, rational relation to
individual potentialities for self-development and contribution to
the aggregate common interest.54 This basic requirement of ration-
851. Id. art. 4.
852. Id. arts. 5(d)(viii)-(ix), 660 U.N.T.S. at 222. Article 4 is a very controver-
sial provision and has provoked considerable apprehension, especially within the
United States, because of its potential incompatibility with broad freedom of ex-
pression. See, e.g., Hauser, United Nations Law on Racial Discrimination, [1970]
PROCEEDINGS, AM. Soc'Y INT. L., at 114, 117-18; Henkin, National and Interna-
tional Perspectives in Racial Discrimination, 4 HUMAN RIGHTS J. 263, 266 (1971).
But see Bitker, The International Treaty Against Racial Discrimination, 53 MARQ.
L. REV. 68, 75-76 (1970); Ferguson, The United Nations Convention on Racial
Discrimination: Civil Rights by Treaty, 1 LAW IN TRANSITON Q. 6[, 71-75 (1964);
Reisman, supra note 565, at 49-51.
853. McKean has aptly observed that
in international legal usage, "discrimination" has come to acquire a special
meaning. It does not mean any distinction or differentiation but only arbi-
trary, invidious or unjustified distinctions, unwanted by those made subject
to them. Moreover, it does not forbid special measures of protection designed
to aid depressed groups, classes or categories of individuals, so long as these
special measures are not carried on longer than is reasonably necessary ...
In this respect, the definition accepted in the international sphere is more
advanced and sophisticated than that adopted in most municipal legal sys-
tems. This is an important instance of international law and the work of
international institutions providing inspiration for municipal law, and a rev-
ersal of the usual situation whereby international law adapts principles of
municipal law by analogy to deal with international problems.
McKean, The Meaning of Discrimination in International and Municipal Law, 44
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 177, 185-86 (1970).
854. In the proceedings of the South West Africa Cases before the International
Court of Justice, the plea of Liberia and Ethiopia that a general norm of non-
discrimination existed under international law was repeatedly referred to by South
Africa as alleged norms of "non-differentiation," which would obviously be untena-
ble.
The response of Judge Tanaka in his dissenting opinion is illuminating:
Briefly, a different treatment is permitted when it can be justified by the
criterion of justice. One may replace justice by the concept of reasonableness
generally refered to by the Anglo-American school of law.
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ality, that is, an absence of arbitrariness, is implicit in the reference
in Article 1(1) to the impairment of "human rights and fundamental
freedoms" and is made explicit in Articles 1(4) and 2(2).1 Thus,
these Articles provide that appropriate measures of assistance to
traditionally deprived groups undertaken for the purpose of achiev-
ing genuinely effective equality of opportunity and treatment for all
members of the community do not come within the purview of the
prohibition established.81
In its effort to secure the complete eradication of racial discrimi-
nation, the Convention brings both official and non-official actors
within its purview. The ban upon official discriminatory actions is
extended to all levels of government. Thus, contracting states un-
dertake, under Articles 2(1)(a), (b), and (c),17 to
South West Africa Cases (Second Phase), [1966] I.C.J. 4, 306 (Tanaka, J., dissent-
ing). "Justice or reasonableness," he added, "as a criterion for the different treat-
ment logically excludes arbitrariness." Id. He further elaborated:
Equal treatment is a principle but its mechanical application ignoring all
concrete factors engenders injustice. Accordingly, it requires different treat-
ment, taken into consideration, of concrete circumstances of individual
cases. The different treatment is permissible and required by the considera-
tions of justice; it does not mean a disregard of'justice.
Id. at 308.
855. Article 1(4) reads:
Special measures taken for the sole purpose of securing adequate advance-
ment of certain racial or ethnic groups or individuals requiring such protec-
tion as may be necessary in order to ensure such groups or individuals equal
enjoyment or exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms shall not
be deemed racial discrimination, provided, however, that such measures do
not, as a consequence, lead to the maintenance of separate rights for different
racial groups and that they shall not be continued after the objectives for
which they were taken have been achieved.
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, supra note
433, art. 1(4), 660 U.N.T.S. at 216.
Article 2(2) reads:
States Parties shall, when the circumstances so warrant, take, in the social,
economic, cultural and other fields, special and concrete measures to ensure
the adequate development and protection of certain racial groups or individ-
uals belonging to them, for the purpose of guaranteeing them the full and
equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms. These mea-
sures shall in no case entail as a consequence the maintenance of unequal or
separate rights for different racial groups after the objectives for which they
were taken have been achieved.
Id. art. 2(2), 660 U.N.T.S. at 218.
856. With the question of special assistance to deprived groups we propose to
deal in some length in a later article.
857. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,supra
note 433, arts. 2(1)(a)-(c), 660 U.N.T.S. at 218.
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engage in no act or practice of racial discrimination against persons,
groups of persons or institutions and to ensure that all public authori-
ties and public institutions, national and local, shall act in conform-
ity with this obligation. . .; not to sponsor, defend or support racial
discrimination by any persons or organizations . . .; [and finally to]
take effective measures to review governmental, national and local
policies, and to amend, rescind or nullify any laws and regulations
which have the effect of creating or perpetuating racial discrimina-
tion wherever it exists."'
This prohibition on official actors is extended also to promotion or
incitement of racial discrimination. Article 4(c) obliges contracting
states not to "permit public authorities or public institutions, na-
tional or local, to promote or incite racial discrmination. 8 59 In rec-
ognition that "racial discrimination is often private discrimina-
tion,""86 the Convention in one brief but important provision asserts
a broad reach extending to private parties and associations. Article
2(1)(d) stipulates:
Each State Party shall prohibit and bring to an end, by all appropri-
ate means, including legislation as required by circumstances, racial
discrimination by any persons, group or organization."'
In rounding out its substantive prescriptions, the Convention pro-
vides for remedies against all actors, official and non-official alike.
Article 6 reads:
States Parties shall assure to everyone within their jurisdiction
effective protection and remedies, through the competent national
tribunals and other State institutions, against any acts of racial dis-
crimination which violate his human rights and fundamental free-
doms contrary to this Convention, as well as the right to seek from
such tribunals just and adequate reparation or satisfaction for any
damage suffered as a result of such discrimination.82
The comprehensive prohibition of discrimination on grounds of
race contained within this Convention is fortified by many parallel
expressions emanating from various United Nations bodies. It may
be recalled that in the long train of resolutions regarding apartheid,
adopted both by the General Assembly and the Security Council,
858. Id.
859. Id. art. 4(c), 660 U.N.T.S. at 220.
860. Henkin, National and International Perspectives in Racial Discrimination,
4 HuMAN RIGHTS J. 263, 265 (1971).
861. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, supra
note 433, art. 2(1)(d), 660 U.N.T.S. at 218.
862. Id. art. 6, 660 U.N.T.S. at 222.
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there has been a recurrent, emphatic, and equally general condem-
nation of racial discrimination as unlawful under international
law."63 The continued exacerbation caused by racial discriminations
led the General Assembly to proclaim the year 1971 as International
Year for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination.8"
The intensely aroused "conscience and sense of justice of mankind"
for "the total and unconditional elimination of racial discrimination
and racism"865 reached a climax with the General Assembly's deci-
sion to launch "the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial
Discrimination, '"8 " inaugurating a wide range of concerted activities
on December 10, 1973, the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.6 7 In the Programme for the Decade
for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination approved
by the General Assembly on November 2, 1973, it is emphatically
declared that
discrimination between human beings on the ground of race, colour
or ethnic origin is an affront to humanity and shall be condemned as
a violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and
of the human rights and fundamental freedoms proclaimed in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as an obstacle to friendly
and peaceful relations among nations and as a factor capable of dis-
turbing peace and security among peoples. 68
The crystallization of contemporary prescriptions against racial
discrimination is further confirmed by the International Court of
Justice in the Namibia case." One end result of the long and tor-
tuous litigation on Namibia (South West Africa) was the unequivo-
cal condemnation of racial discrimination by the International
Court of Justice. In holding South Africa's continued occupation of
Namibia to be in violation of the Mandate and the Charter of the
United Nations,870 the Court pronounced, in 1971, in language worth
reiterating:
Under the Charter of the United Nations, the former Mandatory had
pledged itself to observe and respect, in a territory having an interna-
863. See notes 505-25 & accompanying text supra.
864. G.A. Res. 2785, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. 29, at 81, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971).
865. G.A. Res. 2544, preamble, 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 53, U.N. Doc. A/7630
(1969).
866. G.A. Res. 3057, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 70, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973).
867. Id. preamble.
868. Id., Annex at 1.
869. I.C.J. Advisory Opinion on Namibia, note 531, supra.
870. Id. at 58.
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tional status, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race. To establish instead, and to enforce, distinc-
tions, exclusions, restrictions and limitations exclusively based on
grounds of race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin which
constitute a denial of fundamental human rights is a flagrant viola-
tion of the purposes and principles of the Charter."'
This conclusion had been anticipated by the profound and eloquent
dissenting opinion of Judge Tanaka in the South West Africa Cases
(Second Phase)72 in 1966, a previous incarnation of the 1971 case.
Drawing upon every source of international law authorized in the
Statute of the International Court of Justice, Judge Tanaka con-
cluded:
From what has been said above, we consider that the norm of non-
discrimination or non-separation on the basis of race has become a
rule of customary international law as is contended by the Appli-
cants, and as a result, the Respondent's obligations as Mandatory are
governed by this legal norm in its capacity as a member of the United
Nations .... 113
On the regional level, comparable prescription can be found in the
European Convention of Human Rights and the American Conven-
tion of Human Rights. The European Convention, in Article 14,
provides:
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention
shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex,
race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or
other status.74
Similarly, the American Convention, in Article 1(1), obliges the
contracting states to
undertake to respect the rights and freedoms recognized herein and
to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full
exercise of those rights and freedoms, without any discrimination for
reasons of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opin-
ion, national or social origin, economic status, birth, or any other
social condition.8 7 5
871. Id. at 57.
872. South West Africa Cases (Second Phase), [1966] I.C.J. 4, 284 (Tanaka, J.,
dissenting).
873. Id. at 293.
874. European Convention, supra note 11, art. 14, 213 U.N.T.S. at 232 (emphasis
added).
875. American Convention, supra note 59, art. 1(1), 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS at
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This growing consensus in transnational expectation against ra-
cial discrimination has been further fortified by the development of
new "general principles of law" as expressed in national constitu-
tions, statutes, and judicial decisions. As Judge Tanaka observed in
his condemnation of racial discrimination in the South West Africa
Cases (Second Phase) in 1966:
The principle of equality before the law, however, is stipulated in the
list of human rights recognized by the municipal system of virtually
every State no matter whether the form of government be republican
or monarchical and in spite of any differences in the degree of preci-
sion of the relevant provisions. This principle has become an integral
part of the constitutions of most of the civilized countries in the
world. Common-law countries must be included."'
"There is a clear trend," in the words of Santa Cruz, "to include
constitutional provisions not only guaranteeing equality before the
law but specifically providing against racial discrimination." 77 He
further states:
Almost all the constitutions or basic laws of States contain provisions
relating to human rights and fundamental freedoms, and a great
majority of States have enacted legislation or taken other measures
aimed at preventing or combating racial discrimination and achiev-
ing equal rights for all without distinction. A majority of constitutions
promulgated in recent years contain provisions giving effect to the
human rights and fundamental freedoms set out in the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights. 8
It may be noted that the national constitutions employ, in addi-
tion to the standard terms of race, color, descent, national origin,
and ethnic origin, as illustrated in the Convention on the Elimina-
tion of Racial Discrimination,87" a wide range of other words to refer
to prohibited grounds of differentiation, such as nationality,"' racial
origin, " ' origin,8" ' tribe, 83 tribal affiliation," 4 family," 5 place of
101 (emphasis added).
876. South West Africa Cases (Second Phase), [1966] I.C.J. 4, 299 (Tanaka, J.,
dissenting).
877. H. SANTA CRUZ, supra note 439, at 28.
878. Id.
879. See notes 791-807 & accompanying text supra.
880. See, e.g., CONsTrrUTIoN art. 20(2) (Czechoslovakia, 1960), reprinted in 2 A.
PEASLEE, supra note 389, at 231; CONsTrruToN arts. 123 & 135 (1936, amended 1965)
(Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), reprinted in 2 A. PEASLEE, supra note 389,
at 1005-06.
881. See, e.g., Civil Code of Cambodia art. 21, cited in H. SANTA CRUZ, supra
note 439, at 28 n.43.
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birth,86 social origin and position,88 7 place of origin,"" national and
racial appurtenance,8 9 social extraction,89 kinship, 8 ' and filia-
tion.8
9 2
Special national legislation, in implementation of constitutional
protections, has also been enacted to prevent and eradicate racial
discrimination. For example, the United States has in recent years
effectively resorted to a series of civil rights enactments, notably:
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, outlawing racial discrimination in pub-
lic accommodations and employment and strengthening federal
power to enforce school integration; 893 the Voting Rights Act of 1965
banning the use of literacy tests and related devices to deny the
right to vote on account of race or color;9 4 and the Fair Housing Act
882. See, e.g., CONSTITUTION art. 1 (Congo (Brazzaville), 1963), reprinted in 1 A.
PEASLEE, supra note 389, at 85-86; CONSTITUTION arts. 2 & 3 (1958, amended 1963)
(France), reprinted in 3 A. PEASLEE, supra note 389, at 312-13.
883. See, e.g., CONSTITUTION arts. 10(2)-(3) (Nepal, 1962), reprinted in 2 A.
PEASLEE, supra note 389, at 774.
884. See, e.g., CONSTITUTION art. 15 (Congo (Leopoldville), 1964), reprinted in 1
A. PEASLEE, supra note 389, at 105.
885. See, e.g., id.
886. See, e.g., id.
887. See, e.g., CONSTITUTION art. 76 (Mongolian Peoples Republic, 1960),
reprinted in 2 A. PEASLEE, supra note 389, at 762.
888. See, e.g., CONSTITUTION art. 14 (Kenya, 1963), reprinted in 1 A. PEASLEE,
supra note 389, at 264; CONSTITUTION art. 11 (Malawi, 1964), reprinted in 1 A.
PEASLEE, supra note 389, at 482; CONSTITUTION art. 17 (1962, amended 1963)
(Uganda), reprinted in 1 A. PEASLEE, supra note 389, at 928-29; CONSTITUTION art.
14 (Zambia, 1964), reprinted in 1 A. PEASLEE, supra note 389, at 1031.
889. See, e.g., Electoral Law of 24 Oct. 1956 (Poland), cited in H. SANTA CRUZ,
supra note 439, at 30 n.69.
890. See, e.g., id.
891. See, e.g., CONSTITUTION art. 11 (1951, amended 1963) (Libya), reprinted in
1 A. PEASLEE, supra note 389, at 437.
892. See, e.g., CONSTrrUTION art. 25 (Ecuador, 1967), reprinted in 4 A. PEASLEE,
supra note 389, at 463. Article 150, paragraph 1 of the Constitution of Brazil
provides:
All are equal before the law, without distinction as to sex, race, occupation,
religious creed, or political convictions. Racial prejudice shall be punished
by law.
CONSTITUTION art. 150, 1 (Brazil, 1967), reprinted in 4 A. PEASL!E,, supra note 389,
at 192 (emphasis added).
893. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to h-6 (1970), as amended, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000c, c-6(a)(2), c-9, d-5, e to e-17, h-2 (Supp. II, 1972). For its predeces-
sors see the Civil Rights Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-449, 74 Stat. 90; Civil Rights
Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634.
894. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-73p (1970).
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of 1968 abolishing discrimination in residential housing.895 The en-
actment by the United Kingdom of the Race Relations Act of
1968,96 in the wake of the growing racial tension exacerbated by the
inflow of "colored" immigrants, is another notable example.
The judicial processes of states have also played a role in creating
transnational expectations. The tremendous changes propelled by
the Supreme Court in the law of the United States have carried a
message to many parts of the world. The clear trend of the Court's
decisions has been toward the elimination of racial discrimination
in all its forms and manifestations.97 In its epochal decision in
Brown v. Board of Education,"' the Court held that "in the field of
education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place. Separate
educational facilities are inherently unequal." '99 The impact of this
decision has been felt not only in the educational sector,"0 but also
in many other sectors of community life. In the power sector, earlier
895. Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31 (1970).
896. Race Relations Act of 1968, c. 71. The text of this Act and that of its
predecessor, the Race Relations Act of 1965, c. 71, is reprinted in A. LESTER & G.
BINDMAN, RACE AND LAW IN GREAT BRrrn 419-58 (1972). For a useful legislative
background consult H. STREET, G. HOWE & G. BINDMAN, THE STREET REPORT ON
ANTI-DISCRMINATION LEGISLATION (1967). See dlso I. MACDONALD, RACE RELATIONS
AND IMMIGRATION LAW (1969); Hepple, Race Relations Act 1968, 32 MODERN L. REV.
181 (1969).
897. See generally D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW (1973) [hereinafter
cited as D. BELL]; 2 T. EMERSON, D. HABER & N. DORSEN, POLITICAL AND CwVL
RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES (stu. ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as T. EMERSON, D.
HABER & N. DORSEN]; 2 N. DoRSEN, N. CHACHKIN & S. LAW, EMERSON, HABER &
DORSEN'S POLITICAL AND CiviL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES (1973 Supp.)
[hereinafter cited as N. DORSEN, N. CHACHKIN & S. LAW]; J. GREENBERG, note 698
supra; M. KoNvrrz, BELL OF RIGHTS READER 523-611 (5th ed. rev. 1973); 2 THE
CONSTITUTION AND THE SUPREME COURT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 201-341 (L. Pol-
lak ed. 1968); Larson, The New Law of Race Relations, 1969 WIS. L. REV. 470;
Pollak, Law and Liberty: The American Constitution and the Doctrine that All
Men are Created Equal, 2 HuMAN RIGHTS 1 (1972).
898. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
899. Id. at 495.
900. After the first Brown decision of May 1954, the Supreme Court further ruled
in 1955 that desegregation in public schools be effected with "all deliberate speed."
Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955). Consequently, there have
been repeated attempts, through various devices, to avoid, evade, and delay com-
pliance with the Court ruling. For a detailed description see A. BLAUSTEIN & C.
FERGUSON, DESEGREGATION AND THE LAW (2d ed. 1962). Confronted with a flow of
litigation, the Court has generally remained vigilant in barring various devices
designed to sidestep the holding and spirit of the Brown decisions. See, e.g., Swann
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Green v. County School
Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
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decisions invalidating "the White Primary" ' have in recent years
been fortified by a series of civil rights acts, °2 especially the Voting
Rights Act of 1965101 and the Voting Rights Act Amendments of
1970.111 The net effect of these statutes has been to secure effectively
the equal right to vote and to stand for election by outlawing the
employment of obstructive devices such as literacy tests or other
registration obstacles.9 °5 Their validity, though challenged, has been
upheld by the Court.0 Building upon a far-reaching doctrine of
"state action,""9 7 the Court has, further, proceeded to outlaw the
separation of public facilities and accommodations (e.g., buses,
parks, beaches and bathhouses, golf courses, auditoriums,
courtroom seating, hotels, restaurants, other places of entertain-
ment),'0 8 public housing,09 employment," '° and other areas of public
901. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649
(1944).
902. See D. BELL, supra note 897, at 129-58; 2 T. EMERSON, D. HABER & N.
DORSEN, supra note 897, at 1141-1219; 2 N. DORSEN, N. CHACHKIN & S. LAW, supra
note 897, at 39-75.
903. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973- 7 3p (1970).
904. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b(a), b(b), aa to
bb-4 (1970).
905. See notes 902-04 supra.
906. Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526 (1973); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S.
112 (1971); Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969); Hadnott v. Amos,
394 U.S. 358 (1969); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); South Carolina
v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 601 (1966). See also UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, POLmCAL PARTICIPATION (1968); Avins, Literacy Tests and the Fifteenth
Amendment: The Original Understanding, 12 So. TEx. L.J. 24 (1970); Christopher,
The Constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 18 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1965);
Cox, Constitutionality of the Proposed Voting Rights Act of 1965, 3 HOUSTON L.
REV. 1 (1965); Rice, Voting Rights Act of 1965: Some Dissenting Observations, 15
KAN. L. REV. 159 (1966); Note, 1965 Voting Rights Act: An Evaluation, 3 HARV.
Civ. RIGHTS-Crv. LIB. L. REV. 357 (1968).
907. See 2 T. EMERSON, D. HABER & N. DORSEN, supra note 897, at 1645-73; 2
N. Dorsen, N. Chachkin & S. Law, supra note 897, at 269-87. See also EDWARD
S. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 416-18 (13th rev. ed.
H. Chase & C. Ducat eds. 1973); Avins, Toward Freedom of Choice in Places of
Public and Private Accommodation, 48 NEn. L. REv. 21 (1968); Avins, What is a
Place of "Public" Accommodation?, 52 MARQ. L. REV. 1 (1968).
908. See, e.g., Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1968) (snack bars); Heart of Atlanta
Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (motels and other places of public
accommodation); Watson v. Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963) (parks and other recrea-
tional facilities); Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284 (1963) (parks); Gayle v. Browder,
352 U.S. 903 (1956) (buses); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (golf
courses); Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955)
(beaches).
909. Cf. D. BELL, supra note 897, at 607-710; 2 T. EMERSON, D. HABER & N.
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concern."' In 1967, the Court, in holding unconstitutional a Virginia
statute barring interracial marriages in Loving v. Virginia,9 12 pron-
ounced: "The clear and central purpose of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was to eliminate all official state sources of invidious racial
discrimination in the States."9 '3 In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,914
the Court held that all racial discrimination, private as well as
public, in the sale or rental of property is outlawed by the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, a statute enacted in legitimate exercise of the
congressional power to enforce the thirteenth amendment.915 "It
may well be," in the words of Larson, "that this decision, by infus-
ing new vitality both into the early Reconstruction statutes and into
the thirteenth amendment, will prove to be the most far-reaching
race relations case since the Civil War."9 ' Larson adds:
Jones, at one strike, supplied a broad fair housing law, and quite
possibly an equally broad law banning discrimination in employ-
ment, professional services, private education, retail establishments,
and service businesses of all sorts, by revitalizing the Reconstruction
statutes on equal property and contract rights, as well as the thir-
teenth amendment abolishing slavery."
DORSEN, supra note 897, at 1579-1643; 2 N. DORSEN, N. CHACHKIN & S. LAW, supra
note 897, at 222-68.
910. Cf. D. BELL, supra note 897, at 711-856; 2 T. EMERSON, D. HABER & N.
DORSEN, supra note 897, at 1467-1567; 2 N. DORSEN, N. CHACHKIN & S. LAW, supra
note 897, at 175-221.
911. An example is discrimination in health and welfare services. See 2 T. EMER-
SON, D. HABER & N. DORSEN, supra note 897, at 1716-46; 2 N. DORSEN, N. CHACH-
KIN & S. LAW, supra note 897, at 300-46.
912. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
913. Id. at 10.
914. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
915. Id. at 443-44. In the words of Justice Stewart, who delivered the opinion
of the Court:
Negro citizens, North and South, who saw in the Thirteenth Amendment a
promise of freedom-freedom to "go and come at pleasure" and to "buy and
sell when they please"-would be left with "a mere paper guarantee" if
Congress were powerless to assure that a dollar in the hands of a Negro will
purchase the same thing as a dollar in the hands of a white man. At the very
least, the freedom that Congress is empowered to secure under the Thirteenth
Amendment includes the freedom to buy whatever a white man can buy, the
right to live wherever a white man can live. If Congress cannot say that being
a free man means at least this much, then the Thirteenth Amendment made
a promise the Nation cannot keep.
Id. at 443 (footnotes omitted).
916. Larson, The New Law of Race Relations, 1969 Wis. L. REv. 470, 486.
917. Id. at 471. The development in the national law of the United States,
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In establishing structures and procedures for the application of
the newly emerged basic prescription against racial discrimination,
the general community has moved significantly toward more highly
specialized and increasingly centralized structures and procedures.
The most general goal sought in application is of course that of
minimizing to the utmost degree possible the occurrence of racial
discrimination. Yet, it is widely recognized that, because of the
complexity residing in both the practices of racial discrimination
and their causes, the broad goal of minimization must be made
more specific in terms of a whole series of inter-related sub-goals."8
These sub-goals may be summarized as follows: 1) prevention, from
a long-range perspective, of the occurrence of racial discrimination
by fostering appropriate predispositions in people; 2) deterrence, at
the incipient stage, of attempts to engage in racial discrimination;
3) restoration, with promptness, of exacerbated situations when dis-
ruption has been caused by discriminatory acts; 4) rehabilitation of
victims of discriminatory situations by affording appropriate reme-
dies and compensations; 5) reconstruction, in a concerted long-term
effort, of the whole social environment, including the special mea-
sures necessary to ameliorate accumulated grievances and to pro-
mote the self-development of all community members; and 6)
correction of offenders by invoking the community process of crimi-
nal sanction.9
Toward these ends, the Convention on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, in recognition of the highly decentralized structure
of world effective power, thrusts upon individual states the primary
entirely paralleling and supporting the Convention on Racial Discrimination, is
comprehensively traced and analyzed by Professor Nathaniel Nathanson. See
Nathanson, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination: The Convention Obligations Compared with the Constitutional
and Statutory Law of the United States (Paper presented to the Panel on Human
Rights Law and International Implementation, American Society of International
Law, February 1974). A comprehensive study would undoubtedly demonstrate the
comparable trend of development in differing national communities. Cf. H. SANTA
CRUZ, supra note 439, at 26-42; Batshaw, A Landmark Decision Against Discrimi-
nation in Canada, 4 HUMAN RIGHTS J. 207 (1971); Keith, Race Relations and the
Law in New Zealand, 6 HUMAN RIGHTS J. 329 (1973); Kinsells, The Canadian Model
for the Protection from Discrimination, 4 HUMAN RIGHTS J. 270 (1971); Smith,
Prevention of Discrimination Under Kenya Law, 20 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 136 (1971).
918. Cf. Reisman, supra note 565, at 51-54; Schacter, How Effective are
Measures Against Racial Discrimination, 4 HUMAN RIGHTS J. 293 (1971).
919. For detailed formulation and application of these goals, see R. ARENS & H.
LASSWELL, IN DEFENSE OF PUBLIC ORDER: THE EMERGING FIELD OF SANCTION LAW
199-203 (1961); M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER 261-383 (1961).
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responsibility for achieving the major goal of minimization of racial
discrimination by relating concrete undertakings to these sub-goals.
To secure the long-term goal of prevention, the Convention, in Arti-
cle 7, stipulates:
States Parties undertake to adopt immediate and effective mea-
sures, particularly in the fields of teaching, education, culture and
information, with a view to combating prejudices which lead to racial
discrimination and to promoting understanding, tolerance and
friendship among nations and racial or ethnical groups, as well as to
propagating the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United
Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United
Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination, and this Convention 2 '
To deter the consummation of immediately threatened discrimina-
tory acts, the Convention, in Article 4, bans not only racist propa-
ganda and organizations but also incitement to racial discrimina-
tion." ' To restore the exacerbated situations caused by past dis-
criminations, the Convention, in Article 6, requires contracting
states to "assure to everyone within their jurisdiction effective pro-
tection and remedies, through the competent national tribunals and
other State institutions. 921 2 For the purpose of rehabilitation, the
Convention, again in Article 6, requires contracting states to afford
victims "just and adequate reparation or satisfaction for any dam-
age suffered . . . ."2 For measures directed toward long-range re-
construction, the Convention stresses the importance of undertak-
ing special programs to assist traditionally deprived groups,9 24 a
move vital to the attainment of genuinely effective equality of op-
portunity, and urges a continuing effort of enlightenment to change
people's predispositions, 25 a task essential to the sub-goal of recon-
struction as well as of broader prevention . 2 The Convention, in
Article 2(l)(e), further states:
Each State Party undertakes to encourage, where appropriate, inte-
grationist multi-racial organizations and movements and other
920. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, supra
note 433, art. 7, 660 U.N.T.S. at 222.
921. Id. art. 4, 660 U.N.T.S. at 218-20.
922. Id. art. 6, 660 U.N.T.S. at 222..
923. Id.
924. Id. arts. 1(4) & 2(2), 660 U.N.T.S. at 216, 218.
925. Id. art. 7, 660 U.N.T.S. at 222.
926. Oriented to the long-term, the sub-goals of reconstruction and prevention
may in many ways be overlapping; they are integrative rather than mutually exclu-
sive.
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means of eliminating barriers between races, and to discourage any-
thing which tends to strengthen racial division."
And finally, the Convention, in seeking the sub-goal of correction,
obliges contracting states to make certain acts criminal offenses,
including dissemination of racist ideas, incitement to racial discrim-
ination, acts of racial violence, rendering assistance to racist activi-
ties, and participation in racist organizations and activities. 28
To supervise the degree of compliance by contracting states, the
Convention on Racial Discrimination established the Committee on
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, consisting of "eighteen
experts of high moral standing and acknowledged impartiality"
serving "in their personal capacity." '929 The competence conferred
upon the Committee is fourfold:
1) to appraise, under Article 9, reports on "the legislative, judi-
cial, administrative or other measures" of compliance submitted by
contracting states and thus to "make suggestions and general rec-
ommendations;" 930
2) to act, pursuant to Articles 11 and 13, on complaints brought
by one State Party against another for failing to give effect to the
provisions of the Convention;931
3) to deal with petitions by individuals under the conditions spec-
ified in Article 14;932
4) to cooperate, pursuant to Article 15, with competent United
Nations bodies regarding petitions from the inhabitants of Trust,
Non-Self-Governing and other dependent territories.9 3
The reporting system is a feature characteristic of most of the
transnational human rights instruments.9 34 Under Article 9 of the
927. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, supra
note 433, art. 2(1)(e), 660 U.N.T.S. at 218.
928. Id. arts. 4(a)-(b), 660 U.N.T.S at 220.
929. Id. art. 8(1), 660 U.N.T.S at 224.
930. Id. art. 9, 660 U.N.T.S. at 224-26.
931. Id. arts. 11-13, 660 U.N.T.S. at 226-30.
932. Id. art. 14, 660 U.N.T.S. at 230-32.
933. Id. art. 15, 660 U.N.T.S. at 232-34.
934. See Das, Measures of Implementation of the International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination with Special Reference to
the Provisions Concerning Reports from States Parties to the Convention, 4 HUMAN
RIGHTS J. 213 (1971); Schwelb, supra note 434, at 1034-37. Cf. C. JENCKS, THE
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF TRADE UNION FREEDOM (1957); E. LANDY, THE EFFEC-
TIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION: THREE DECADES OF I.L.O. EXPERIENCE
(1966); Schwelb, Civil and Political Rights: The International Measures of
Implementation, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 827, (1968); Schwelb, Some Aspects of the
Measures of Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, 1 HUMAN RIGHTS J. 375 (1968).
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Convention, each State Party is required, except initially, to submit
a biannual report, and the Committee may request further informa-
tion if necessary. 35 The Committee's annual report to the General
Assembly not only relays information about its activities, but may
also contain both general and specific recommendations. 36 The
importance of the reporting system has been underscored by Reis-
man in these words:
This Committee function of appraisal and recommendation should
not be underestimated. If it is carried forward impartially, a total
public picture of trends in regard to the elimination of racial discrimi-
nation will be available. Trouble spots will be highlighted and publi-
cized and priorities and tactics for action can be determined by offi-
cial and private international organizations operating beyond the for-
mal confines of the Committee. The threat of international exposure
may stimulate some states to take more active measures to combat
racial discrimination. 7
Under the inter-state complaint procedure provided in Articles 11
through 13, any State Party may bring an alleged violation of the
Convention by another Party to the attention of the Committee. 38
The complaint ("communication") will be transmitted to the State
Party concerned, which then has three months to "submit to the
Committee written explanations or statements clarifying the mat-
ter." 3 "If the matter is not adjusted to the satisfaction of both
parties," either party has the right to "refer the matter again to the
Committee;" 4 ° the Committee is authorized to deal with the matter
upon ascertaining that the requirements of exhaustion of "domestic
remedies" are met. 4 ' "After the Committee has obtained and col-
lated all the information it deems necessary," according to Article
12(1) (a), it is incumbent upon the Committee Chairman to appoint
an ad hoc Conciliation Commission, "comprising five persons who
may or may not be members of the Committee, 94 2 but who are in
935. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, supra
note 433, art. 9(1), 660 U.N.T.S. at 224-26.
936. Id. art. 9(2), 660 U.N.T.S. at 226.
937. Reisman, supra note 565, at 59.
938. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, supra
note 433, arts. 11-13, 660 U.N.T.S. at 226-30.
939. Id. art. 11(1), 660 U.N.T.S. at 226.
940. Id. art. 11(2).
941. Id. art. 11(3). These requirements, as in general international law, would
be dispensed with "where the application of the remedies is unreasonably pro-
longed." Id.
942. Id. art. 12(1)(a), 660 U.N.T.S. at 228.
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principle "appointed with the unanimous consent of the parties to
the dispute." '943 The Commission is to make available its "good off-
ices" to the disputing parties in search of "an amicable solution"
on the basis of "respect" for the Convention. " ' Failing an agreed
settlement, the Commission is required to "prepare and submit to
the Chairman of the Committee a report embodying its findings on
all questions of fact relevant to the issue between the parties and
containing such recommendations as it may think proper for the
amicable solution of the dispute." '945 This report, together with the
"declarations of the States Parties concerned""94 signifying their
acceptance or rejection of the report's recommendations, is to be
made available to all the other contracting states after a specified
period.1 7
The right of individual petition is made subject to the option of
states under the Convention. "A State Party may," under Article
14(1), "at any time declare that it recognizes the competence of the
Committee to receive and consider communications from individu-
als or groups of individuals within its jurisdiction claiming to be
victims of a violation by that State Party of any of the rights set
forth in this Convention." '948 The same provision, however, immedi-
ately adds: "No communication shall be received by the Committee
if it concerns a State Party which has not made such a declara-
tion. 9 49 Furthermore, the competence of the Committee regarding
individual petitions is operative "only when at least ten States Par-
ties" have made the requisite declarations of acceptance. 5 The
Committee, guided by a set of somewhat complicated procedures for
handling such petitions, 5' especially the exhaustion of domestic
943. Id. According to Article 12(1)(b):
If the States Parties to the dispute fail to reach agreement within three
months on all or part of the composition of the Commission, the members of
the Commission not agreed upon by the States parties to the dispute shall
be elected by secret ballot by a two-thirds majority vote of the Committee
from among its own members.
Id. art. 12(1)(b).
944. Id. art. 12(1)(a). Note the emphasis on "respect" for the Convention.
945. Id. art. 13(1), 660 U.N.T.S. at 230. For a technical interpretation of this
provision see Schwelb, supra note 434, at 1040-41.
946. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, supra
note 433, art. 13(3), 660 U.N.T.S at 230.
947. Id.
948. Id. art. 14(1).
949. Id.
950. Id. art. 14(9), 660 U.N.T.S at 232.
951. Id. arts. 14(2)-(6), 660 U.N.T.S. at 230-32.
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remedies,952 may engage in fact-finding and formulate "its sugges-
tions and recommendations. 95 3 The Committee is required, under
Article 14(8), to "include in its annual report a summary of such
communications and, where appropriate, a summary of the explan-
ations and statements of the States Parties concerned and of its own
suggestions and recommendations." '954 To accord individual victims
competence to invoke the prescriptions of the Convention before the
Committee is indeed an immensely significant step, though
achievement of the requisite number of acceptances (at least 10)
seems to be delayed. 55
Unlike the restriction imposed on individual petitions in Article
14(1),111 Article 15(2)(a) authorizes the Committee to
receive copies of the petitions from, and submit expressions of opin-
ion and recommendations on these petitions to, the bodies of the
United Nations which deal with matters directly related to the princi-
ples and objectives of this Convention in their consideration of peti-
tions from the inhabitants of Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territo-
ries and all other territories to which General Assembly resolution
1514(XV) applies, relating to matters covered by this Convention
which are before these bodies. 57
This sharp contrast has provoked a commentator to call it another
manifestation of "the UN's double standard on human rights
complaints.""95
During the first four years (1970-1973) of its operation, the Com-
mittee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has concerned
952. Id. art. 14(7)(a), 660 U.N.T.S. at 232.
953. Id. art. 14(7)(b).
954. Id. art. 14(8).
955. As of this writing, only four states-Austria, the Netherlands, Sweden, and
Uruguay-have made the required declaration.
956. See text accompanying note 948 supra.
957. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, supra
note 433, art. 15(2)(a), 660 U.N.T.S. at 232-34.
958. J. CAREY, UN PROTECTION OF CIVm AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 151 (1970). Simi-
larly, Mr. MacDonald of Canada, shortly after the Convention was approved by
the Third Committee of the Assembly, characterized the incorporation of Article
15 as "bad politics and worse law." 20 U.N. GAOR, 3d Comm. 504 (1965). In the
words of one commentator:
It makes the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination a kind
of auxiliary organ to the organs dealing with the implementation of the right
to self-determination, at the present the Trusteeship Council and the Com-
mittee of Twenty-four.
Schwelb, The Implementation of the International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination in INTERNATIONAL LAW ASS'N, REPORT OF THE
FIFTY-FiFTH CONFERENCE 605 (1974).
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itself mainly with appraising reports submitted by the contracting
states and making general recommendations, "9 and considering,
pursuant to Article 15, petitions submitted by the inhabitants of
various dependent territories,96 in addition to making necessary
organizational arrangements, notably its own rules of procedure."
The Committee has not been seized with any formal inter-state
complaint under Article 11.992 The procedure for individual petitions
contemplated in Article 14 is yet to be set in operation, because only
four of the 76 state parties have made the requisite declaration." 3
959. The general recommendations are presented in the Committee's annual
reports. See 1973 Report, 28 GAOR Supp. 18, at 21-78, 103-07, :12-19, U.N.
Doc. A/9018 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 1973 Report]; 1972 Report, 27 U.N. GAOR
Supp. 18, at 12-26, 37-39, 57-67, U.N. Doc. A/8718 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as 1972 Report]; 1971 Report, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. 18, at 5-25, 31-34, U.N.
Doc. A/8418 (1971) [hereinafter cited as 1971 Report]; 1970 Report, 25 U.N. GAOR
Supp. 27, at 9-11, 32-36, U.N. Doc. A/8027 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970
Report].
960. See 1973 Report, supra note 959, at 79-98, 106-07, 120-22; 1972 Report,
supra note 959, at 27-29, 40-53, 68-71; 1971 Report, supra note 959, at 26-28,
31-47, 58-61; 1970 Report, supra note 959, at 11-14, 37-39.
961. Pursuant to Article 10(1) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination, supra note 433, 660 U.N.T.S. at 226, the Committee
adopted its Provisional Rules of Procedure (78 rules in total) in 1970 at its first and
second sessions. For its text see 1970 Report, supra note 959, at 17-31. Prior to
the adoption of the Committee's Provisional Rules of Procedures, a comprehensive,
detailed draft had been proposed in a law journal. See Newman, The New Interna-
tional Tribunal, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 1559 (1968).
For the subsequent adoption of the amendments to the Committee's Provisional
Rules of Procedure see 1971 Report, supra note 959, at 4, 33 (Rule 35); 1972 Report,
supra note 959, at 8-11, 37 (Rules 64A & 66A); 1973 Report, supra note 959, at
6-8, 103 (Rules 13 & 56).
962. Nevertheless, allegations arising from the reports submitted to the Commit-
tee by Panama about discrimination in the Panama Canal Zone and by Syria about
discrimination in the Golan Heights took on the character, in a manner of speaking,
of inter-state complaints. See 1971 Report, supra note 959, at 13-25, 31, 34; 1973
Report, supra note 959, at 30-31, 51-52, 104-05. See also L. SOHN & T.
BUERGENTHAL, supra note 530, at 866-98; Schwelb, supra note 958, at 593-605.
963. For continuation of this discussion see McDougal, Lasswell, and Chen,
Human Rights for Women and World Public Order, 69 Am. J. INT'L L. 497 (1975);
McDougal, Lasswell, and Chen, Non-conforming Political Opinion and Human
Rights: Transnational Protection Against Discrimination, 2 YALE STUDIES OF
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (forthcoming, 1975), and other subsequent publications.
These articles will eventually be published under the same authorship, in book
form, as HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER.
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